On September 10, 2021, the Democratic majority of the United States House Committee on Ways and Means (“House Ways and Means Committee”) released draft legislation of its contributions to the Build Back Better Act (the “Legislative Recommendations”), designed to be enacted through the budget reconciliation process. On September 15, 2021, following close to 40 hours of debate over the course of four days, the House Ways and Means Committee advanced the Legislative Recommendations. Ten days later, on September 25, 2021, the House Budget Committee advanced the Legislative Recommendations. If enacted into law, the Legislative Recommendations would substantially extend and expand available clean energy tax incentives, helping to bring President Biden’s campaign promise to “reform and extend” these incentives to “unleash a clean energy revolution in America” closer to fruition.[1]
The Legislative Recommendations materially extend existing incentives, including the investment tax credit (“ITC”), the production tax credit (“PTC”), and the carbon capture and sequestration credit, including incentives that had begun (or were about to begin) to expire or phase down. These extensions will make the incentives available well into the next decade, while at the same time imposing new requirements designed to enhance the benefit to U.S. workers from spending on clean energy infrastructure (including prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements). The Legislative Recommendations also expand the scope and availability of incentives, including making the ITC available for standalone energy storage and energy transmission assets and introducing new incentives for the production of clean hydrogen.
Perhaps most importantly, investors would have the option to elect to treat the applicable credit as a payment made against the tax imposed by subtitle A (the so-called “direct pay” option), and this option would be available for classes of investors (i.e., tax-exempt entities, taxpayers with substantial losses, and certain governmental entities) that have historically not been able to benefit directly from tax credits. If enacted, the “direct pay” option may make it easier for taxpayers without substantial taxable income (and an attendant need for tax credits) to make equity investments in clean energy projects.
In addition, the Legislative Recommendations propose to make income generated by various types of renewable energy assets (as well as facilities that install sufficient carbon capture equipment) “qualifying income” for “publicly traded partnerships,” opening up another source of capital for the development of clean energy projects.
Under budget reconciliation, Democrats only need 50 votes in the Senate to pass legislation through an equally divided Senate (the Vice President breaks the tie). But Democratic progressives and moderates disagree on the price tag and the scope of the Build Back Better Act. For the Legislative Recommendations to become law, they will need to pass muster with key Democratic moderates in both the House and Senate. If the Legislative Recommendations are enacted into law, we would expect that they will spur significant new investment in clean energy projects, providing increased certainty in an area of the law that has historically been subject to year-end stopgap extensions and a complicated patchwork of ever-changing and unpredictable qualification rules.
Direct Pay
The PTC, ITC, and section 45Q[2] carbon capture and sequestration credits (each of which is discussed in greater detail in a later subsection) have historically been non-refundable credits, meaning that substantial taxable income was generally a necessary prerequisite to benefit from the incentives.[3] The Legislative Recommendations would take steps to change that through a “direct pay” option, effective for projects whose placed in service date is after December 31, 2021. Under the “direct pay” option, an owner of a clean energy facility that would otherwise qualify for certain credits (including the ITC (including for transmission property), the PTC, the carbon capture and sequestration credit, and the advanced energy project credit) is authorized to make an irrevocable “direct pay” election. If the owner makes such an election, the owner will be treated as having paid tax in an amount equal to the credit amount (such that the investor is entitled to an overpayment or refund to the extent the deemed payment exceeds its tax liability).[4] In addition, partnerships and S corporations (i.e., entities not subject to entity-level income tax) are eligible to receive “direct pay” payments. The Legislative Recommendations provide that such payments will be made directly to the partnership or S corporation (rather than to their partners or shareholders).
The irrevocable (it appears, solely for a particular taxpayer with respect to a particular year) “direct pay” election would be required to be made no later than the due date (including extensions) for the return of tax for the taxable year for which the applicable credit is determined. Under the Legislative Recommendations, it appears (but is not entirely clear) that direct pay elections will not be able to be made on a facility-by-facility basis. The Legislative Recommendations provide even less clarity as to whether taxpayers will be able to make elections on a credit-by-credit basis. Further legislative clarity on these points would be useful, although the Secretary of the Treasury is legislatively authorized to address the time and manner for making the direct pay election and so may have some flexibility to provide clarification through regulatory guidance.
In addition to making renewable energy incentives available to entities lacking sufficient taxable income, the “direct pay” option would make such incentives available to various classes of investors that have historically not benefited directly from them, including state and local governments, Native American tribal governments, and tax-exempt organizations.
The “direct pay” option would, however, be subject to various restrictions and limitations. Perhaps most notable is the “domestic content” requirement, which focuses on whether the facility is composed of iron, steel or manufactured products that were produced in the United States, where a “manufactured product” is deemed manufactured in the United States if not less than 55 percent of the total cost of the components are attributable to components mined, produced or manufactured in the United States (the “Domestic Content Requirement”). This requirement would phase in over time, first applying to facilities whose construction begins in 2024 (which would be subject to a ten percent haircut if the Domestic Content Requirement was not met), gradually ramping up in 2025 (projects starting construction in 2025 would be subject to a 15 percent haircut), and then becoming subject to a cliff in 2026 (when projects must meet the Domestic Content Requirement or face the complete loss of any “direct pay” benefit). While there is a long onramp to applicability of the Domestic Content Requirement and the Secretary of the Treasury is permitted to waive the “domestic manufacture” requirement for projects the construction of which starts later in the decade, these new requirements could become a material impediment to the utility of the “direct pay” option.
In addition, the combination of the irrevocability of the “direct pay” election and the Domestic Content Requirement may deter taxpayers from the “direct pay” option. If a taxpayer elects into the “direct pay” option but fails to satisfy the Domestic Content Requirements, such taxpayer would not only be ineligible to receive the full amount of the “direct payment,” but would also apparently lose its ability to claim any alternative tax credit (e.g., the PTC, ITC, and section 45Q credits), at least for the taxable year for which the election was made.[5] Had the taxpayer not made the “direct pay” election, such credits would, at the very least, have been available to the taxpayer.
Moreover, the Legislative Recommendations clarify that direct payments elected with respect to ITCs will be subject to recapture and basis adjustment rules similar to the existing ITC rules.
In general, the “direct pay” option would be expected to reduce the need for tax-equity investors (i.e., investors with significant taxable income that have the ability to utilize tax credits) to partner with developers to monetize clean energy tax credits. But tax-equity financing would still yield benefits because a tax-equity investor may be willing to monetize not just the federal clean energy tax incentives produced by a renewable energy project, but also the future cash flows, depreciation deductions, and other state-level incentives resulting from that project. Tax-equity financing could also provide timing benefits, as tax-equity investors generally fund before (in the case of the ITC) or shortly after (in the case of the PTC) a project is placed in service, whereas the “direct pay” payment would be a refund of a tax deemed paid, with the tax not being deemed paid until the later of the due date of the tax return for the taxable year to which the “direct pay” payment relates or the date on which the return is actually filed, resulting in a delay of cash payment to sponsors until such time. Moreover, tax-equity investors can also effectively offset tax credits received under the ITC and PTC regimes against estimated tax payments, so the “direct pay” option may result in the loss of an additional timing benefit available to some taxpayers.
In addition, the Legislative Recommendations provide that the Secretary of the Treasury may require such information or registration as the Secretary determines is necessary or appropriate for purposes of preventing duplication, fraud, improper payments, or excessive payments under these provisions. Drawing on regulatory authority to prevent any “direct payment” from exceeding the credit to which a taxpayer would otherwise be entitled, we would anticipate that the Secretary would clarify that other limitations imposed under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, as amended (the “Code”), and any applicable Treasury Regulations (including, for example, the limitation in section 38(c) on the portion of a taxpayer’s tax liability that can be reduced through the general business credit (which includes the energy credit)) to apply to direct payments. And, if the Secretary determines that there has been an excessive payment, a penalty is imposed (in an amount equal to the sum of the excessive payment plus 20 percent).
Furthermore, given the expected size of some of the refund claims contemplated by the “direct pay” arrangement, it is uncertain whether or not such claims may in the future be subjected to mandatory review by the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation (the “JCT”). Treasury Regulations exclude refunds of overpayments (such as estimated tax payments and withholdings reported on original returns) from JCT review. The Internal Revenue Service has interpreted the applicable Treasury Regulations to exclude all refundable credits reported on original returns as well, but historically there have been few, if any, refundable business credits. The U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration has prepared a report that criticizes the existing Treasury Regulations on this matter, which notes that the JCT should review more original returns. Making PTCs and ITCs refundable and adding the “direct pay” option could significantly increase the pressure to move that issue forward and require JCT review of original returns claiming PTC and ITC refund claims and claims under the “direct pay” option.
Expansion and Extension of Renewable Electricity Production Credit (PTC) under Section 45
The PTC available to taxpayers under section 45 of the Code applies to “qualified facilities” (as currently defined in section 45 of the Code) at a specified percentage of certain credit amounts (as adjusted by the “inflation adjustment factor” in section 45(e)(2), the “PTC Credit Amounts”).
Under the current PTC regime, the full PTC is only available for projects the construction of which began by the end of 2016 (with the PTC phasing down for projects on which construction began in 2017 or later).
The Legislative Recommendations would extend the duration of the PTC for more than a decade, and expand the scope and amount of the credit in various respects, but would also impose new requirements that need to be satisfied in order to qualify for the credit.
In terms of the duration of the credit, for projects beginning construction between January 1, 2022 and December 31, 2031 (and for projects the construction of which began in 2020 or 2021, but only if those facilities are placed in service in 2022 or later), the credit would be available at 100 percent of the PTC Credit Amounts. This 100 percent credit would be a boon for taxpayers relative to the current regime, given that the PTC was going to be completely unavailable to projects beginning construction in 2022 or later, and (as noted) projects the construction of which began in 2017 or later were subject to phaseouts (e.g., a 40 percent reduction for a 2021 start of construction project). Importantly, however, the Legislative Recommendations do not extend the full PTC to projects the construction of which began prior to 2020. While this may be a drafting glitch, if the Legislative Recommendations are enacted in their current form, we would expect that taxpayers who already began construction on a project (under the flexible regulatory “begun construction” guidance) would have incentives to try to take available steps to abandon or otherwise recommence the work that was done previously on such project, and in light of the placed in service rule for 2020 or 2021 start of construction projects, we would expect taxpayers to delay placing in service such projects until 2022 where feasible to benefit from being able to claim the credit at a 100 percent rate.
Under the Legislative Recommendations, the PTC would be subject to a gradual phaseout beginning more than a decade in the future, with a 20 percent phaseout for projects beginning construction during the year 2032, 40 percent for projects beginning construction during 2033, and a complete phaseout for projects beginning construction after December 31, 2033.
Beyond its temporal expansion, the Legislative Recommendations would also expand the scope of projects to which the PTC is available. The Legislative Recommendations permit credits for electricity generated by solar power for the first time in nearly two decades, at a PTC Credit Amount of 2.5 cents per kilowatt hour for facilities placed in service after December 31, 2021 and the construction of which begins before January 1, 2034. In addition, the Legislative Recommendations contain proposed section 45W, which creates a PTC for zero-emission nuclear power equal to the amount by which (1) the product of (a) 1.5 cents multiplied by (b) the kilowatt hours produced by the taxpayer at a qualified nuclear power facility and sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated person during the taxable year, exceeds (2) the “reduction amount” for such taxable year. The “reduction amount” is equal to the lesser of subparagraph (1) above, or 80 percent of the excess of (A) the gross receipts from any electricity produced by such qualified nuclear power facility and sold to an unrelated person during the taxable year, over (B) the product of (i) 2.5 cents and (ii) the figure calculated in subparagraph (b) above.
As part of an effort to incentivize domestic manufacturing, the Legislative Recommendations would create a bonus for certain projects, increasing the applicable PTC Credit Amount by ten percent for any qualified facility that satisfies the Domestic Content Requirement. This incentive approach deviates from the “direct pay” rules (which, as described previously, penalize taxpayers who place in service a facility that would otherwise be eligible for PTCs, make a “direct pay” election, but fail to satisfy the Domestic Content Requirement).
As noted, however, in addition to expanding the PTC in various respects, the Legislative Recommendations would impose new requirements to qualify for the full PTC, subjecting projects that do not satisfy certain prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements to a substantial 80 percent reduction to the otherwise available PTC Credit Amounts. Such requirements would apply broadly, to any project with a maximum net output of at least one megawatt, the construction of which begins on or after the date the Legislative Recommendations are signed into law.
The proposed wage requirements (the “Prevailing Wage Requirements”) in the Legislative Recommendations would require the taxpayer to provide written certification to the government that all laborers and mechanics employed in the construction (and, for the ten-year period beginning on the date of service, alteration or repair) of a qualified facility are paid wages at rates not less than the prevailing rates on projects of similar character in the locality, as determined by the Secretary of Labor. If a taxpayer underpays its employees and its available PTC is slashed (to 20 percent of the otherwise available credit amount) as a result, it could cure such violation by both (1) compensating each of its employees that worked on the project in an amount equal to the sum of (a) the difference between the actual wages paid during the applicable period and the amount of wages required to be paid under the Legislative Recommendations, and (b) applicable interest, and (2) paying a penalty to the U.S. government of $5,000 for each underpaid employee. The Legislative Recommendations leave unanswered practical questions about how or when the determination as to whether the Prevailing Wage Requirements has been satisfied would be made. Assuming such determination is to be made on audit, that audit would likely occur several years after the relevant credit had been claimed, requiring taxpayers (and contractors who work for them) to provide service providers with additional compensation at that time, even though certain service providers might no longer be affiliated in any way with the project (or the owner of the project that is claiming the credit).
The proposed apprenticeship requirement in the Legislative Recommendations (the “Apprenticeship Requirement,” and, together with the Prevailing Wage Requirements, the “Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements”) would require the taxpayer to ensure that an “applicable percentage” of the total labor hours (which excludes hours worked by foremen, superintendents, owners, or executives) connected with the construction (and, for the ten-year period beginning on the date of service, alteration or repairs) on a project be performed by “qualified apprentices.” The term “qualified apprentice” means an individual who is (1) an employee of the project’s contractor or subcontractor, and (2) participating in an apprenticeship program registered under the National Apprenticeship Act. For projects beginning construction before January 1, 2023, five percent of the total labor hours must be performed by qualified apprentices. For projects beginning construction during calendar year 2023, ten percent of the total labor hours must be performed by qualified apprentices, and for projects beginning construction after December 31, 2023, 15 percent of the total labor hours must be performed by qualified apprentices. Each contractor or subcontractor who employs four or more individuals to perform construction, alteration, or repair work on a project must employ at least one qualified apprentice to assist in the work. The taxpayer may be excused for failing to satisfy these requirements if (1) the taxpayer can demonstrate that there is a dearth of qualified apprentices available for employment in the geographic area of the project, and (2) the taxpayer makes a good faith effort to comply with the Apprenticeship Requirement, including by requesting qualified apprentices from a registered apprenticeship program (even if such request is denied, the taxpayer will be excused as long as the denial is not the result of the refusal by contractors or subcontractors involved in the project to comply with the standards of a registered apprenticeship program).
Because projects whose construction begins prior to the enactment of the Legislative Recommendations would be exempted from the proposed Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements, we can expect to see taxpayers seek to “grandfather” in projects by beginning construction before these requirements are enacted. For projects seeking to qualify for the full PTC, taxpayers will need timely and clear guidance from the government about how to meet the requirements (e.g., clear guidance from the Secretary of Labor about how to determine the prevailing wages in a particular location). While the Prevailing Wage Requirement can generally be satisfied through the mere payment of additional wages (and so should be relatively easy to satisfy), the Apprenticeship Requirement will force taxpayers to closely monitor (and force their contractors and subcontractors to closely monitor) who performs construction, alterations, and repairs on projects, likely necessitating new certification processes, particularly because the Legislative Recommendations do not have a mechanism to “cure” failures to comply with the requirement through the payment of a penalty. In terms of tax-equity financings, we would expect that tax-equity investors will seek to push noncompliance risk onto project sponsors, particularly the risk that activities that occur following funding (such as repairs) might jeopardize PTC qualification.
Expansion and Extension of Energy Credit (ITC) under Section 48
The ITC available under section 48 of the Code would be significantly extended under the Legislative Recommendations. In particular, a solar facility on which construction began prior to 2032 (and which is placed in service after 2022 but before 2036) would be eligible for the ITC without phase-down if such solar facility meets the continuity of construction requirements issued by the IRS. Without the extension under the Legislative Recommendations, the ITC would continue to phase down through the end of 2023, and for projects beginning construction in 2024 would only be available at a modest ten percent rate.
It is worth noting that the Legislative Recommendations would not increase the ITC for solar projects for which construction began after 2019 if such projects are placed in service before the end of 2021. Beginning with projects placed in service in 2022, however, certain solar projects on which construction begins prior to 2032 would be eligible for the ITC at the rate of 30 percent—which is the highest amount of the ITC for which solar projects have been eligible in recent years. Thereafter, the credit would begin to step down, with the ITC being equal to 26 percent for projects beginning construction in 2032, and 22 percent for solar projects beginning construction in 2033. In addition, the Legislative Recommendations push out the statutory deadline (December 31, 2036) by which solar projects must be placed in service to qualify for an ITC greater than ten percent. The structure of the Legislative Recommendations, as it pertains to solar projects, would seem to incentivize sponsors that are developing solar projects that are nearly complete and operational to delay placing these projects into service until after the end of this year. All else being equal (and assuming enactment), an owner of a project eligible for the ITC could receive (at least) an additional four percentage points in ITCs if the owner (or sponsor) waited to place the solar project in service until after the end of this year.
The Legislative Recommendations also expand the list of renewable energy projects eligible for the ITC in various respects (including to “qualified biogas property” and “microgrid controllers”). Most notable, perhaps, is the expansion of the ITC to “energy storage technology” which is equipment, other than equipment primarily used in the transportation of goods or individuals and not for the production of electricity, that uses batteries or certain other technologies to store energy for conversion to electricity and that has capacity of at least five kilowatt hours. Equipment that would meet these requirements, but has a capacity of less than five kilowatt hours, can qualify for this credit if such equipment is modified or refitted such that it has at least five kilowatt hours of capacity. However, no portion of the tax basis that was part of such equipment before its modification can be taken into account in calculating the ITC after modification. The expansion of the ITC to standalone batteries could be of key importance to the renewable energy industry. Under current law, only certain storage technologies that are directly tied to facilities that generate electricity and that are otherwise eligible to claim the ITC (separate from such storage technologies) are ITC eligible. Not only would the expansion of the ITC to these standalone facilities spur development of such technologies and infrastructure, but it would also support the build-out of what many industry observers have described as a missing piece of the puzzle for the renewable energy space—sufficient battery storage to build reserves of renewably generated electricity for use during the periods of time when renewable facilities are not generating sufficient energy for public consumption (e.g., storage of solar energy generated during the day for use during nights and evenings).
As with other portions of the Legislative Recommendations, for projects with a maximum net output of at least one megawatt, any credit claimed under section 48 would only be eligible for the full rate if the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements are satisfied. If such requirements are not satisfied, or otherwise cured, then any credit claimed under section 48 could be claimed at a rate equal to only 20 percent of the otherwise available credit amount. These requirements are similar to the requirements that apply to facilities seeking to claim PTCs, although the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements only apply for five years after a facility is placed in service (rather than for ten years). See the discussion of these requirements above under “Expansion and Extension of Renewable Electricity Production Credit (PTC) under Section 45.” The exception from the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements for projects with a maximum net output of less than one megawatt would be particularly helpful to the residential rooftop solar industry.
With respect to an energy property that satisfies the Domestic Content Requirement, such energy property is eligible for a step-up—or bonus—in the amount of ITC that can be claimed in respect of that project. For a project that meets the Domestic Content Requirement but that (1) has a maximum net output of one megawatt or more, and (2) does not meet the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements, that project is eligible for a two percentage point increase in the amount of ITC that can be claimed. For projects that meet the Domestic Content Requirement and that either (1) have a maximum net output of less than one megawatt or (2) satisfy the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements, then such a project is eligible for a ten percentage point increase in the amount of ITC that can be claimed.
Certain solar facilities with a nameplate capacity of less than five megawatts are eligible for a ten percentage point step-up in the ITC if the facility is located in a “low-income community” (defined by cross-reference to the new markets tax credit rules in section 45D of the Code). If a solar facility with a nameplate capacity of less than five megawatts is part of a “qualified low-income residential building project or a qualified low-income economic benefit project,” then it is eligible for a step-up in the ITC equal to 20 percentage points.[6] The property with respect to which this step-up in ITC can be claimed includes certain energy storage property installed in connection with such solar facility and the amount of expenditures incurred for “qualified interconnection property” (as defined in the Legislative Recommendations). In sum, under the Legislative Recommendations, certain small scale solar facilities that are installed as part of a “qualified low-income residential building project” and that meet the Domestic Content Requirements could be eligible for the ITC at an amount equal to 60 percent of the basis of the energy property placed in service in connection with that project.
Qualifying Electric Transmission Property (Section 48D)
In addition to expanding the ITC (as described above), the Legislative Recommendations provide for a new tax credit (similar to the ITC) claimable in respect of “qualifying electric transmission property” for an amount equal to 30 percent of the basis of the applicable property. “Qualifying electric transmission property” is generally defined to include an electric transmission line that is capable of transmitting electricity at a voltage of not less than 275 kilovolts that has a transmission capacity of not less than 500 megawatts and any property that, with respect to a credit-eligible electric transmission line, is necessary for the operation of such electric transmission line (or is otherwise listed as “transmission plant” in the Uniform System of Accounts for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
A qualifying electric transmission line can be a replacement to, or upgrade to, an existing electric transmission line, but only if the transmission capacity of such electric transmission line, as upgraded, increases to an amount equal to the existing capacity of such transmission line plus 500 megawatts. The basis allocable to such existing transmission line also would not be eligible for any credit under section 48D. This new section 48D credit is not claimable with respect to property on which construction begins prior to January 1, 2022 or if a state or political subdivision thereof, any agency or instrumentality of the United States, a public service or public utility commission, or an electric cooperative has previously (before the date when the Legislative Recommendations are enacted) “selected for cost allocation such property for cost recovery.”
As with other portions of the Legislative Recommendations, any credit claimed under section 48D would only be eligible for the full rate if the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements are satisfied, although these requirements will not apply to projects the construction of which begins before the Legislative Recommendations are enacted. Depending on when the Legislative Recommendations might be enacted, however, there may be little opportunity to plan around the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements, given that the credit does not apply to property the construction of which begins before January 1, 2022. If such requirements are not satisfied, or otherwise cured, then any credit claimed under section 48D could be claimed at a rate equal to only 20 percent of the full credit amount.
With respect to an energy project that is composed of “steel, iron, or manufactured products which were produced in the United States” (i.e., that satisfies the Domestic Content Requirement), such energy property is eligible for a step-up—or bonus—in the amount of ITC that can be claimed in respect of that project. If a transmission project satisfies the Domestic Content Requirement but does not satisfy the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements, then that project is eligible for a two percentage point increase in the amount of ITC that can be claimed. Those projects that satisfy the Domestic Content Requirement and meet the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements are eligible for a ten percentage point increase in the amount of ITC that can be claimed.[7]
In general, any credit claimed under section 48D would have to be claimed in respect of property that is placed in service prior to January 1, 2032.
Expansion and Extension of Credit for Carbon Oxide Sequestration under Section 45Q
The Legislative Recommendations extend the date by which construction must have begun on a “qualified facility” for purposes of section 45Q from January 1, 2026 to January 1, 2032. The Legislative Recommendations leave many aspects of the tax credit rules for facilities that capture carbon oxide intact, but also makes some significant expansions and revisions to the rules.
The Legislative Recommendations would accelerate certain scheduled section 45Q rate increases (to be effective in 2022, rather than 2026 under current law): to $35 per metric ton, for qualified carbon oxide captured and used in an enhanced oil or natural gas recovery (or other allowable uses), and to $50 per metric ton for qualified carbon oxide captured and disposed of in secured geological storage.[8] For direct air capture facilities, each metric ton of qualified carbon oxide that is captured and disposed of in a geological storage would be eligible for a $180 credit, and each metric ton of carbon oxide that is captured and used in an enhanced oil or natural gas recovery (or another allowable use) would be eligible for a $130 credit.[9]
Under the Legislative Recommendations, the “qualified facilities” eligible for these expanded credits include:
- “direct air capture facilities” that capture 1,000 metric tons or more of qualified carbon oxide during a taxable year (under current law, the applicable threshold is not less than 100,000 metric tons),[10]
- electricity generating facilities that capture 18,750 metric tons or more of qualified carbon oxide during the taxable year and at least 75 percent of the carbon dioxide from such facilities would otherwise be released into the atmosphere by such facility during such taxable year (under current law, the applicable threshold is not less than 500,000 metric tons, but there is no minimum percentage capture requirement under current law), and
- any other facilities that capture 12,500 metric tons or more of qualified carbon oxide during the taxable year and at least 50 percent of the carbon oxide from such facilities would otherwise be released into the atmosphere during such taxable year (the facilities described in this paragraph, “Industrial Facilities”) (under current law, the applicable threshold is not less than 25,000 metric tons, but there is no minimum percentage capture requirement under applicable law).
As with other portions of the Legislative Recommendations, any credit claimed under section 45Q would only be creditable in full if the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements are satisfied.[11] If such requirements are not satisfied, or otherwise cured, then any credit claimed under section 45Q could be claimed at a rate equal to 20 percent of the full credit amount.
Modification of Special Rules for Offshore Wind Projects
The Legislative Recommendations modify special rules that excepted certain offshore wind projects from ITC phase-outs under current law in light of such projects’ significantly longer development timelines. Under the Legislative Recommendations, offshore wind projects are generally subjected to the same extended construction deadlines as onshore wind projects. The Legislative Recommendations make clear, however, that the 100 percent ITC remains available in respect of certain offshore wind projects placed in service before 2022.[12]
Going forward, the Legislative Recommendations would revert to prior law regarding the geographic boundaries for offshore wind projects eligible for the ITC. Under current law (which applies to projects that begin construction before 2022), for a project to be PTC eligible, it must be located within the United States or in a possession, which is defined for PTC purposes to include an exclusive economic zone (which generally extends as much as 200 nautical miles from a territorial sea baseline). For the ITC, on the other hand (which, under current law, is available for offshore wind projects that begin construction through 2025) the facility must be “located in the inland navigable waters of the United States or in the coastal waters of the United States.” The narrower geographic ITC boundary for offshore wind projects would only apply to projects that were placed in service before 2022.
Publicly Traded Partnerships
In general, under existing law, a “publicity traded partnership” (which is any partnership if the interests in such partnership are traded on an established securities market or readily tradable on a secondary market (or the substantial equivalent thereof)) is taxed as a corporation (and therefore subject to entity-level U.S. federal income tax) unless an exception applies. The primary exception to these rules is for partnerships that earn 90 percent or more “qualifying income” (which includes a variety of types of passive income as well as income and gains from exploration, development, mining, production, processing, refining, transportation, and marketing of any mineral or natural resource). Historically, the income generated by a renewable energy facility would not have been “qualifying income.” Under the Legislative Recommendations, however, the definition of “qualifying income” would be revised to include various types of income derived from clean energy projects (including PTC and ITC eligible property and income or gain from a “qualified facility” under section 45Q(d)).
This aspect of the Legislative Recommendations, if enacted, would open up a potential source of new capital for clean energy projects, making it possible for investors in the public markets to more easily participate (through a flow-through vehicle) in such projects. The impact of this proposal on traditional tax-equity investors is not entirely clear. On the one hand, “publicly traded partnerships” could compete against tax-equity investors, reducing returns as additional capital competes for the right to invest in projects. On the other hand, publicly traded partnerships would not be well situated to directly capture the key benefits generated by renewable energy projects—tax credits and depreciation deductions—because deductions and credits attributable to an investment in a renewable energy project would generally pass through to the holders of interests in the partnership, who may or may not be able to effectively monetize those items, although (with respect to the tax credits, but not depreciation deductions) publicly traded partnerships could seek to avail themselves of the “direct pay” election, subject to the limitations and restrictions on “direct pay” described previously in this alert, and subject to the limitations described in the next sentence. In addition, certain rules that can reduce or eliminate the availability of the ITC or accelerated depreciation (including the tax-exempt use property rules) based on tax characteristics of the owners of a partnership could make it challenging for publicly traded partnerships to partner with tax-equity investors in a way that would allow those investors to effectively monetize tax benefits from a clean energy project.
Clean Hydrogen Incentives
The Legislative Recommendations also propose to add section 45X, which would provide a tax credit for the production of clean hydrogen. This new credit would be available (subject to the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements[13]) for clean hydrogen projects the construction of which begins before January 1, 2029 that are placed in service after December 31, 2021, and, with respect to those projects, the credit would be claimable for the ten-year period beginning on the placed in service date of the clean hydrogen project. This credit is not available for clean hydrogen produced at a facility that includes property for which a section 45Q carbon oxide sequestration credit is allowed (i.e., “blue” hydrogen facilities taking advantage of the section 45Q credit would not also be entitled to the section 45X credit).
The amount of the credit is equal to the product of (1) the number of kilograms of “qualified clean hydrogen” (hydrogen that is produced through a process that achieves a percentage reduction in lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of at least 40 percent as compared to hydrogen produced by steam-methane reforming of non-renewable natural gas) produced during the applicable taxable year, and (2) the “applicable amount” of $3.00 (adjusted for inflation) multiplied by the “applicable percentage.” The “applicable percentage” is a percentage available to taxpayers based on the percentage reduction in “lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions” (as defined in the Clean Air Act) as compared to hydrogen produced by steam-methane reforming. The “applicable percentage” can be: (a) 20 percent (for a less than 75 percent reduction), (b) 25 percent (for a reduction greater than or equal to 75 percent and less than 85 percent), (c) 34 percent (for a reduction greater than or equal to 85 percent and less than 95 percent), and (d) 100 percent (for a 95 percent or greater reduction). In other words, the higher the reduction, the higher the applicable percentage, and therefore, the larger the available tax credit eligible to be claimed under section 45X would be.
Tax Credits and BEAT
Tax credits are only useful to the extent they are able to actually reduce cash taxes payable. Under the Legislative Recommendations, the general business credit (which includes the PTC, the ITC, and section 45Q credits and would include the proposed section 48D and section 45X credits) would be fully creditable against BEAT liability. Under current law, only up to 80 percent of the otherwise-available section 48 ITC and the section 45 PTC (and none of the section 45Q credit) are able to reduce BEAT liability (and then only through 2025, after which the ITC and PTC would also effectively cease to reduce BEAT liability).
This modification to the rules would be expected to make the credit more desirable to tax-equity investors with meaningful potential BEAT liability, particularly if BEAT liability is expanded as has been proposed.
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[1] Democratic National Committee, The Biden Plan To Build A Modern, Sustainable Infrastructure And An Equitable Clean Energy Future, JoeBiden.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2021), https://joebiden.com/clean-energy/.
[2] Unless otherwise noted, section references refer to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
[3] Substantial taxable income was not, however, needed for developers/owners of certain renewable energy projects to benefit from the “cash grant” program under section 1603 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009. Under this program, eligible developers/owners of certain renewable energy projects were able to forgo tax credits in lieu of a direct cash payment from the Treasury Department that would defray part of the cost of the project.
[4] Curiously, the payment is to be treated as a payment against “the tax imposed by subtitle A,” which includes sections 1 through 1563. Thus, if enacted in its current form, the deemed payment would offset not only income tax liability (imposed under chapter 1 of subtitle A), but also liability for self-employment taxes, the net investment income tax, and various withholding taxes (including liability to remit taxes withheld on various payments to non-U.S. taxpayers). It is possible that the offset was intended be limited to income taxes.
[5] As noted, it appears that election is only irrevocable with respect to a particular taxable year. Thus, for credits that accrue over a period of time (e.g., the PTC, which is available over ten years), it appears that taxpayers may be able to toggle between “direct pay” and PTCs from year to year. For facilities that would otherwise seek to claim the ITC, however, a “direct pay” election could completely foreclose the ability to claim that credit (which is a one-time credit, available in the year when a facility is placed in service).
[6] A solar facility is part of “qualified low-income residential building project” if (1) the facility is installed on a residential rental building that is part of one of various enumerated legislative programs (e.g., a “covered housing program” defined in section 41411(a) of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994), and (2) the financial benefits of the electricity produced by the facility are equitably allocated among the building occupants. A facility is treated as part of a “qualified low-income economic benefit project” if at least 50 percent of the financial benefits of the electricity produced by the facility are provided to households that meet certain income requirements. For purposes of determining whether there has been a “financial benefit,” the Legislative Recommendations specify that electricity acquired at below-market rates “shall not fail to be taken into account as a financial benefit.”
[7] The Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements also include an exception (similar to the ITC and PTC) for projects with a maximum net output of less than one megawatt, which in this instance appears to be a drafting glitch. First, it does not comport with the 500 megawatt requirement for “qualifying electric transmission property” described in the Legislative Recommendations. Second, this requirement is not noted in the JCT’s report discussing the Legislative Recommendations, entitled “Description Of The Chairman’s Modification To The Provisions Of The ‘Clean Energy For America Act’.” Similar issues arise with respect to the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements that would be made applicable to sections 45Q and 45X (discussed below). We would expect that these exceptions may be subsequently revised as the Legislative Recommendations make their way through the legislative process.
[8] Credit amounts are subject to inflation adjustments.
[9] The Legislative Recommendations expanding section 45Q appear to contain several drafting oversights. The caption for new subparagraph (B) of section 45Q(b)(1), as provided for by section 136107(c) of the Legislative Recommendations, describes a “Special Rule for Direct Air Capture Facilities” but then, by its terms, would only apply to those facilities described in section 45Q(d)(2)(C), which (as amended by the Legislative Recommendations) only pertains to Industrial Facilities and not the “direct air capture facilities” that would be described in section 45Q(d)(2)(A). We note that section 136107(e)(1)(C) of the Legislative Recommendations would also revise section 45Q(b)(1)(B) without coordination with the changes proposed by section 136107(c). Also, the “direct pay” rules for a partnership or S corporation seeking direct payments for section 45Q credits would require the qualified facility be “held” by the partnership or S corporation.
[10] Note that a “direct air capture facility” is any facility that captures carbon dioxide, and the eligibility for such a “direct air capture facility” for the enhanced credit under section 45Q is calculated on the basis of the number of metric tons of “qualified carbon oxide” captured. However, with respect to a “direct air capture facility,” “qualified carbon oxide” only includes, for purposes of section 45Q, carbon dioxide (1) that is captured directly from the ambient air, and (2) that is measured at the source of capture and verified at the point of disposal, injection, or utilization. As a result, and assuming that legislators clarify that a “direct air capture facility” is eligible for the expanded credit under section 45Q, any “direct air capture facility” can earn the expanded tax credits under the Legislative Recommendations only if such facility captures 1,000 metric tons or more of carbon dioxide during the taxable year, and meets certain other requirements.
[11] In the Legislative Recommendations, the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements for section 45Q contain an exception for a qualified facility with a maximum net output of less than one megawatt, which (similar to the issue in proposed sections 48D and 45X) may be a drafting glitch.
[12] To date, there are only two operating offshore wind projects in the United States, although a third project is reportedly slated for construction.
[13] In the Legislative Recommendations, the Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Requirements for section 45X contain an exception for a project with a maximum net output of less than one megawatt, which (similar to the issue in proposed sections 45Q and 48D) may be a drafting glitch.
This alert was prepared by Matt Donnelly, Michael Desmond, Roscoe Jones, Jr., Eric Sloan, Mike Cannon, Josiah Bethards, and Laura Pond.
Gibson Dunn lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of the firm’s Tax, Public Policy, or Power and Renewables practice groups, or any of the following:
Tax Group:
Matt Donnelly – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3567, [email protected])
David Sinak – Dallas (+1 214-698-3107, [email protected])
Michael Q. Cannon – Dallas (+1 214-698-3232, [email protected])
Josiah Bethards – Dallas (+1 214-698-3354, [email protected])
Public Policy Group:
Michael D. Bopp – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8256, [email protected])
Roscoe Jones, Jr. – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3530, [email protected])
Power and Renewables Group:
Nicholas H. Politan, Jr. – New York (+1 212-351-2616, [email protected])
Gerald P. Farano – Denver (+1 303-298-5732, [email protected])
© 2021 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
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Over the past few years we have observed a trend in companies seeking to outsource (and monetize) certain core, best-in-class processes. These transactions, dubbed “lift-outs”, include examples such as insurance companies lifting-out their insurance claims processing capabilities, medical device companies lifting-out their medical device manufacturing capabilities, and pharmaceutical companies lifting-out their research and development capabilities.
While the benefits of these transactions are potentially significant, lift-outs are complex and require a broad array of legal disciplines, such as technology, corporate, tax, privacy, real estate, intellectual property, and employment law specialists, often in multiple jurisdictions. They also demand a significant amount of effort and advance planning in order to address issues such as pricing, governance, change management, limits on liability, indemnification obligations, intellectual property rights, termination rights, and exit rights, among others. As a result, successful lift-out transactions require robust legal expertise in order to document and support the long term goals, opportunities and arrangements of the parties.
From a legal perspective, many of the challenges that arise from lift-out transactions stem from the fact that lift-outs are a hybrid of several better known transactions, namely IT outsourcing transactions, business process outsourcing transactions and carve-out divestiture transactions. While lift-outs have elements that on their face look familiar to either an outsourcing attorney or M&A attorney, these elements and issues are often not addressed in a traditional manner. As such, understanding how to address these elements is critical to a successful lift-out transaction. This alert will discuss several of these key elements.
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September 2021 was certainly the month of sustainability initiatives for the UK’s competition watchdog.
On 20 September, the Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) published a Green Claims Code aimed at protecting consumers from misleading environmental claims amidst concerns over ‘greenwashing’. Greenwashing refers to overstated, unsubstantiated green credentials of a product or service. The Code is also intended to protect businesses from unfair competition and ensure a level playing field.
And then on 29 September, the CMA launched a public consultation, to help inform its advice to government on how competition and consumer regimes can better support the UK’s Net Zero and sustainability goals. The consultation runs until 10 November 2021.
Impact: who needs to take the Green Claims Code into account
The new Code potentially impacts any company which puts forward claims of positive environmental impact in relation to its products or services. It is particularly important for businesses involved in textiles and fashion, travel and transport, and fast-moving consumer goods because the CMA has flagged these industries as priorities. These are the sectors where consumers appear to be most concerned about misleading claims. Any other sector where the CMA finds significant concerns could also become a priority in due course. Financial services, for example, is not currently one of the CMA’s priority areas, but the Code would nonetheless apply in this sector. For example, to companies selling “ethical” or “green” investment services, which would also be a focus area of the UK’s financial services regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
The purpose of the Code is to help businesses understand and comply with their existing obligations under consumer protection law when making environmental claims. The Green Claims Code is broad and applies to all commercial practices, including advertisements, product labelling, packaging, and even product names.
The Code will operate in parallel with and not to the exclusion of other applicable rules and regimes. Accordingly businesses should consider whether they are subject to any sector- or product-specific requirements and ensure they comply with them, as well as their obligations under general consumer protection law.
Consequences: what happens if the Code is breached?
The Code is not new legislation, it draws on enforcement powers derived from existing consumer protection rules under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations (CPUT) 2008 and Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008.
The CMA and other bodies (for example, Trading Standards Services) can bring court proceedings in relation to the Code.
Any business found to be in breach of consumer law can face civil action or criminal prosecution. Breach of CPUT can attract criminal liability, including for directors and other officers of corporate bodies.
There is also a direct civil right of redress by consumers against traders who conduct misleading or aggressive practices. If found to be in breach, companies may be required to pay redress to any consumers harmed as a result of the breach.
More generally, a company’s reputation, and sales, could also suffer damage.
Timing: when will enforcement ramp up?
The CMA has announced that it will begin a review of misleading green claims in January 2022. It is not required to wait until January 2022 to take action, and has noted that where there is evidence of breaches of consumer law, it may take action before the start of the formal review.
The CMA shares consumer protection law enforcement powers with other bodies, such as Trading Standards Services and sectoral regulators. And, where appropriate, the CMA has flagged that it may work with other enforcement or regulatory bodies in relation to environmental claims.
Significance: why is greenwashing of importance to the CMA?
Consumers are increasingly environmentally-minded. A recent YouGov survey showed that 57% of UK consumers are willing to pay more for environmentally friendly products, increasing up to 69% of consumers for the younger generations. Mintel found in 2019 that nearly half of new UK beauty and personal care launches had an ethical or environmental claim, an increase of almost 100% compared to four years earlier. The CMA notes the increase in claims by businesses to meet this consumer demand, and considers that many of these claims may be misleading. A beauty product promoted as ‘microbead free’, for example, may be misleading in its suggestion of a benefit over other products because microbeads in rinse-off cosmetics and personal care products are, in any event, banned in the UK.
Earlier this year, the International Consumer Protection Enforcement Network (ICPEN) hosted its annual sweep of websites, led by the CMA and the Dutch Competition Authority. The global review found that 40% of green claims made online could be misleading consumers, through tactics such as:
- Making vague claims and unclear language including terms such as ‘eco’ or ‘sustainable’ or reference to ‘natural products’ without adequate explanation or evidence of the claims.
- Using own brand eco logos and labels that are not associated with an accredited organisation.
- Hiding or omitting certain information, such as a product’s pollution levels, to appear more eco-friendly.
More detail on the Code
In November 2020, the CMA announced an investigation into misleading environmental claims. The CMA’s final guidance has now been published, with the Green Claims Code announced on Monday 20 September. This work ties in to the CMA’s Annual Plan commitment to support the move towards a low carbon economy.
The aim of the new Code is to protect consumers from misleading environmental claims, and to protect businesses from unfair competition. The CMA intends to create a level playing field for businesses whose products or services genuinely represent a better choice for the environment, thus incentivising them to invest in the environmental performance of their products.
There are six principles set out in the Code:
- claims must be truthful and accurate
- claims must be clear and unambiguous
- claims must not omit or hide important relevant information
- comparisons must be fair and meaningful
- claims must consider the full life cycle of the product or service
- claims must be substantiated
The focus of the Code is on environmental claims made by businesses, but the guidance is also relevant to the wider category of sustainability claims.
The CMA is not alone: a trending initiative across Europe
The CMA’s new Green Claims Code forms part of a broader trend where competition regulators are taking an interest in the link between competition regulation and the green economy. This includes clamping down on suspected greenwashing practices.
There is also ongoing work in the advertising space in the UK by the Advertising Standards Authority, with new guidelines covering environmental claims in advertising. There are separate and specific regulations in place and being developed in relation to financial services products, for example the EU’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation and EU Taxonomy. Earlier this year, HM Treasury announced that a new advisory group had been set up to advise the UK Government on standards for green investment, and will oversee the creation of a Green Taxonomy.
The Dutch Competition Authority published new guidelines for sustainability claims in January 2021, which set out five rules for companies to follow, for example to substantiate sustainability claims with evidence.
The European Commission launched an initiative last year which aims to harmonise green claims across Europe, including the prevention of overstated environmental information (‘greenwashing’) and the sale of products with a covertly shortened lifespan. The EC held a public consultation on the initiative which closed in October 2020, and intends to propose a new directive as a result.
These recent developments are part of a trend in which failings traditionally thought to have fallen into soft-edged Environmental, Social and Governance territory are being hardened into actionable standards. Companies are increasingly being held to account for the claims they make about their own ethical and sustainability performance, particularly where these claims can negatively impact outcomes or choices for customers.
Dos and Don’ts: some practical tips for Green Claims
Companies potentially affected are well advised to review current business practices, in order to ensure compliance with the CMA’s new Code and avoid potentially incurring civil and criminal penalties and reputational damage for misleading consumers.
In particular, they should:
- Avoid using broad, general terms, such as ‘green’, ‘eco’ and ‘sustainable’. These claims will be considered to apply to the whole life cycle of the product and must be substantiated with evidence.
- Avoid conflating the environmental goals of the business with specific product claims.
- Clearly state any caveats that apply to product claims.
- Consider implicit claims being made by a product, for example through the use of images and colours on packaging.
- Avoid claiming as environmental benefits any features or benefits that are necessary standard features or legal requirements of that product or service type.
Following the CMA’s guidance is a good starting point. But multinational companies will also need to consider guidance available in other jurisdictions besides the UK.
The future: environmental sustainability and competition rules
There has been a lot of global interest in the interaction between climate change and competition law in recent years, with thought-provoking debate around how to tackle a global crisis through collaboration, without encouraging harmful collusion between competitors.
On 29 September 2021, the CMA opened a consultation on advice to the UK government. The consultation, which runs until 10 November 2021, calls for views to help inform its advice to government on how competition and consumer regimes can better support the UK’s Net Zero and sustainability goals, including preparing for climate change. The key areas in which the CMA is seeking information are:
- competition law enforcement;
- merger control;
- consumer protection law; and
- market investigations.
The CMA’s consultation is similar to the EU consultation on competition policy and the Green Deal, which ran in late 2020. Both consultations consider how antitrust policy and environmental and climate policies work together, and how the merger control regimes could better contribute to protecting the environment and supporting sustainability goals. The EC’s consultation is somewhat wider, as it also considered State aid rules, which is not within the scope of the CMA consultation.
On 10 September the EC published a Brief titled Competition Policy in Support of Europe’s Green Ambition which gives an overview of its consultation. Executive Vice-President Vestager recently stated in a speech at the IBA Competition Conference that “one of the main messages from our consultation and the conference was the need to support the green transition by enforcing our rules more vigorously than ever.” DG COMP’s ongoing reviews of its vertical and horizontal block exemption regulations (and accompanying guidelines) provide a perfect opportunity for the EC to take a more proactive approach to promote sustainability through the application of EU competition law. The new vertical guidelines are expected to be in place by May 2022, with the new horizontal guidelines following by the end of December 2022 and so we will need to wait until then to see how Vestager’s message will translate in practice.
We expect the results of the UK consultation process to yield similar results to the EU consultation. But how the CMA will respond in its application of UK competition laws going forward is a development to be watched carefully.
Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions that you may have regarding the issues discussed in this update. For further information, please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of the firm’s Antitrust and Competition practice group, or the following authors:
Deirdre Taylor – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4274, [email protected])
Mairi McMartin – Brussels (+32 2 554 72 29, [email protected])
Kirsty Everley – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4043, [email protected])
Please also feel free to contact the following practice leaders and members:
Ali Nikpay – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4273, [email protected])
Deirdre Taylor – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4274, [email protected])
Selina S. Sagayam – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4263, [email protected])
Susy Bullock – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4283, [email protected])
Patrick Doris – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4276, [email protected])
Attila Borsos – Brussels (+32 2 554 72 10, [email protected])
Mairi McMartin – Brussels (+32 2 554 72 29, [email protected])
© 2021 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.
First of four industry-specific programs
The False Claims Act (FCA) is one of the most powerful tools in the government’s arsenal to combat fraud, waste, and abuse involving government funds. After several years of statements and guidance indicating that the Department of Justice (DOJ) might alter its approach to FCA enforcement, the Biden Administration appears to be taking a different, more aggressive approach. Meanwhile, newly filed FCA cases remain at historical peak levels, and the government has recovered nearly $3 billion or more annually under the FCA for a decade. The government also continues to pursue new, large spending projects in COVID-related stimulus and infrastructure—which may bring yet more vigorous efforts by DOJ to pursue fraud, waste, and abuse in government spending. As much as ever, any company that receives government funds—especially in the financial services sector—needs to understand how the government and private whistleblowers alike are wielding the FCA, and how they can defend themselves.
Please join us to discuss developments in the FCA, including:
- The latest trends in FCA enforcement actions and associated litigation affecting financial services;
- Updates on the Biden Administration’s approach to FCA enforcement, including developments impacting DOJ’s use of its statutory dismissal authority;
- New proposed amendments to the FCA introduced by Senator Grassley; and
- The latest trends in FCA jurisprudence, including developments in particular FCA legal theories affecting your industry and the continued evolution of how lower courts are interpreting the Supreme Court’s Escobar decision.
View Slides (PDF)
PANELISTS:
F. Joseph Warin is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office, chair of the office’s Litigation Department, and co-chair of the firm’s White Collar Defense and Investigations practice group. His practice focuses on complex civil litigation, white collar crime, and regulatory and securities enforcement – including Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigations, False Claims Act cases, special committee representations, compliance counseling and class action civil litigation.
James Zelenay is a partner in the Los Angeles office where he practices in the firm’s Litigation Department. He is experienced in defending clients involved in white collar investigations, assisting clients in responding to government subpoenas, and in government civil fraud litigation. He also has substantial experience with the federal and state False Claims Acts and whistleblower litigation, in which he has represented a breadth of industries and clients, and has written extensively on the False Claims Act.
Casey Kyung-Se Lee is a senior associate in the New York office and a member of the firm’s White Collar Defense and Investigations, and Litigation Practice Groups. Mr. Lee’s practice focuses on representing clients in litigation and investigations involving the federal government. Mr. Lee rejoined Gibson Dunn in 2020 after serving as an Assistant United States Attorney in the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, where he investigated allegations of fraud against the United States under the False Claims Act, Anti-Kickback Statute, and other statutes.
MCLE CREDIT INFORMATION:
This program has been approved for credit in accordance with the requirements of the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board for a maximum of 1.5 credit hours, of which 1.5 credit hours may be applied toward the areas of professional practice requirement.
This course is approved for transitional/non-transitional credit. Attorneys seeking New York credit must obtain an Affirmation Form prior to watching the archived version of this webcast. Please contact [email protected] to request the MCLE form.
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RELATED WEBCASTS IN THIS SERIES:
- The False Claims Act – 2021 Update for Government Contractors (October 14, 2021)
- The False Claims Act – 2021 Update for Drug & Device Manufacturers (October 20, 2021)
- The False Claims Act – 2021 Update for Health Care Providers (October 26, 2021)
On September 22, 2021, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the “PCAOB”) adopted a final rule (the “Final Rule”) implementing the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (the “HFCAA”), which became law in December 2020 and prohibits foreign companies from listing their securities on U.S. exchanges if the company has been unavailable for PCAOB inspection or investigation for three consecutive years. The Final Rule (available here) requires U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) approval before it goes into effect.
In May 2021, the SEC adopted interim final amendments (the “Amendments”, available here) to certain forms, including Forms 20-F and 10-K, to implement the disclosure and submission requirements of the HFCAA. In June 2021, the Senate passed the Accelerating Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (the “AHFCAA”), which, if signed into law, would reduce the time period for the delisting of foreign companies under the HFCAA to two consecutive years, instead of three years.
Three aspects of the HFCAA and the PCAOB’s Final Rule should be kept in mind.
The following Gibson Dunn attorneys assisted in preparing this update: Michael Scanlon, David Lee, David Ware, and Maggie Zhang.
On September 23, 2021, President Joseph Biden announced his intention to nominate Professor Saule Omarova of Cornell Law School to be the next Comptroller of the Currency. The Comptroller heads the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Treasury bureau that supervises national banks and federal thrifts; the Comptroller is also an ex officio member of the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
If confirmed by the Senate, Professor Omarova will have significant influence over regulatory policy, not only for banking institutions, but also for fintech companies that seek to enter the banking system via either a national bank or FDIC-insured industrial bank charter or that have bank partners.
Professor Omarova worked in the Bush Treasury Department and has published numerous articles on financial regulation. This Alert touches on the key themes of her academic writings and addresses how these themes could translate into regulatory priorities at the OCC and FDIC, and in view of the fact that President Biden will likely soon nominate a new Vice Chair for Supervision at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve).
A. Key Themes
Professor Omarova has written on numerous topics in her academic career. Early on, she analyzed 1990s OCC interpretations that expanded national bank derivatives activities to include derivatives on commodities and equities; the Federal Reserve’s granting of Section 23A exemptions immediately before and during the 2008 Financial Crisis; and the historical exemptions from the definition of a “bank” under the Bank Holding Company Act.[1] More recently, she has written on bank governance, innovation in the financial industry, “culture” at financial institutions, restructuring the Federal Reserve to take customer demand deposits, and the “Too Big to Fail” problem, among other topics.[2]
Several key themes emerge from these writings:
- Concerns that post-Financial Crisis reforms have only magnified the size and interconnectedness of the largest banking organizations
- Concerns that banking and related financial activities frequently serve only private interests
- Concerns that activities outside of narrow banking – derivatives, commodities, trading, and even certain capital markets activities – are inherently risky
- Concerns that a focus on “innovation” may result in a weakening of supervisory standards
Perhaps most interesting, however, is Professor Omarova’s recurring theme that traditional bank supervision is too narrowly focused on what she calls “micro” issues and solutions, and that a new regulatory paradigm centered on overall “macro” economic and public interest goals, and including substantially increased government intervention in the financial sector, may be needed.
1. Concern with Size and Interconnectedness
Professor Omarova, like other observers, has noted one of the ironies of post-Financial Crisis regulation – that although the size and interconnectedness of the global banking sector contributed significantly to the Crisis, the financial system was saved only by increasing the size of the nation’s largest banks:
The post-crisis increase in the level of concentration of the U.S. financial industry is difficult to deny. For example, as of the year-end 2017, top five U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) held forty-eight percent of the country’s BHC assets. By early 2018, there were four U.S. BHCs with more than $1.9 trillion in assets on their individual balance sheets. Despite the post-crisis passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the most wide-ranging regulatory reform in the U.S. financial sector since the 1930s, [too big to fail] remains a “live” issue on the public policy agenda.[3]
This in turn, she believes, imposes considerable challenges for supervisors: “today’s financial system is growing increasingly complex and difficult to manage. This overarching trend manifests itself not only in the dazzling organizational complexity of large financial conglomerates, but also in the exponential growth of complex financial instruments – derivatives, asset-backed securities, and other structured products – and correspondingly complex markets in which they trade.”[4] The result is that it is “extremely difficult to measure and analyze not only the overall pattern of risk distribution in the financial system but also the true level of individual financial firms’ risk exposure.”[5]
2. Private Versus Public Interest
It is fair to say that Professor Omarova is not a strong believer in the “Invisible Hand.” Her articles frequently posit a dichotomy between the driving forces of finance and the “public interest.” Her article on bank culture, for example, makes this assertion:
[New York Federal Reserve Bank President] Gerald Corrigan argued that, in exchange for the publicly-conferred benefits uniquely available to them, banks have an obligation to align their implicit codes – and their actual conduct – with the public good. In practice, however, there has been little evidence of such an alignment . . . . One of the most troubling revelations [about bank conduct before the Financial Crisis] was that, in the vast majority of these cases, banks’ and their employees’ socially harmful and ethically questionable business conduct was perfectly permissible under the existing legal rules. In each of those instances, bankers voluntarily, and often knowingly, chose to pursue a particular privately lucrative but socially suboptimal business strategy. And, as long as mortgage markets kept going up and speculative trading in mortgage assets remained profitable, bankers showed no interest in fulfilling their public duties or prioritizing moral values over pecuniary self-interest.[6]
In an article on bank governance, she returns to this theme, stating that “[a]ll too often, however, the incentives of bank managers and shareholders to pursue short-term private gains are perfectly aligned but work directly against the public interest in preserving long-term financial stability. The recent financial crisis . . . made abundantly clear that the modern system of corporate governance . . . is not a sufficiently reliable or consistent mechanism for managing this insidious and apparently pervasive conflict in a publicly beneficial way.”[7]
Although it is clear how Professor Omarova views what then-Chief Judge Cardozo called “the forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length,”[8] it is less clear how she defines the “public interest.” Her writings do, however, suggest that it includes a focus on maintaining financial stability and appropriately allocating capital and credit to productive use, which she argues is not likely to occur absent government intervention:
[T]o date, there has been no meaningful debate on improving the system-wide allocation of financial resources to productive enterprise. In most, if not all, post-crisis discussions on financial regulation, the underlying presumption remains that private market actors are inherently better at assessing financial risks and spotting potentially beneficial investment opportunities ‘on the ground.’ Accordingly, the existing dysfunctions in the process of system-wide credit allocation are framed predominantly in terms of specific private incentive misalignments or more general political-economy frictions.[9]
3. Preference for Narrow Banking
From her earliest writings, Professor Omarova has expressed a distrust of activities that are not at the core of traditional commercial banking. In an early article, she took issue with the OCC’s increasingly flexible approach to interpreting the phrase “business of banking” in the National Bank Act to include derivative activities related to commodities and equities, including hedging such activities through physically settled transactions, and related activities such as national bank participation in power marketing and clearing organizations.[10] She similarly criticized Federal Reserve interpretations of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act under which commodity activities were deemed “complementary” to financial activities, and investments in commodity-related assets could be permissible merchant banking investments.[11] (It is worthwhile remembering that under Governor Daniel Tarullo, the Federal Reserve commenced an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking to consider established commodity activities by financial holding companies.[12]) And Professor Omarova strongly supported the statutory Volcker Rule but feared that the law’s mandated administrative rulemakings had great potential to weaken it.[13]
These concerns about risks from non-traditional activities extend to capital markets activities generally, including those that were broadly permissible for bank holding companies even before the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted. (By 1997, the Federal Reserve had interpreted the Glass-Steagall Act in a manner that posed few limits on corporate debt and equity underwriting and dealing, in addition to underwriting and dealing in bank-permissible assets.[14]) Professor Omarova states that “[i]n today’s world, secondary markets in financial assets are far bigger, more complex, and more systemically important than primary markets. . . . It is not surprising, therefore, that today’s secondary markets in financial instruments are the principal sites of both relentless transactional ‘innovation’ and chronic over-generation of systemic risk.”[15] In criticizing the Federal Reserve’s Section 23A exemptions granted during the Financial Crisis, she argued that “it is hard to deny that these extraordinary liquidity backup programs also functioned to prop up the banks’ broker-dealer affiliates, which . . . were in the business of creating, trading, and dealing in securities that needed . . . financing and, as a result, had direct exposure to . . . highly unstable markets.”[16]
4. Innovation as a Source of Risk
In contrast to former Acting Comptroller Brian Brooks, who encouraged financial innovation, most notably with respect to national charters for virtual currency companies, Professor Omarova has had a skeptical eye on the question. One of her early articles, as noted above, criticized the OCC for its interpretive approach with respect to equity and commodity derivatives:
[T]he OCC’s highly expansive interpretation of the “business of banking” . . . served to undermine the integrity and efficacy of the U.S. system of bank regulation. Through the seemingly routine and often nontransparent administrative actions, the OCC effectively enabled large U.S. commercial banks to transform themselves from the traditionally conservative deposit-taking and lending institutions, whose safety and soundness were guarded through statutory and regulatory restrictions on potentially risky activities, into a new breed of financial “super-intermediaries,” or wholesale dealers in pure financial risk.[17]
This view carries over in later discussions of pre-Financial Crisis loan securitizations and credit default swaps, as well as fintech generally. Of the latter, Professor Omarova has written:
By making transacting in financial markets infinitely faster, cheaper, and easier to accomplish, fintech critically augments the ability of private actors to synthesize tradable financial claims – or private liabilities – and thus generate new financial risks on an unprecedented scale. Moreover, as the discussion of Bitcoin and ICOs shows, new crypto-technology enables private firms to synthesize tradable financial assets effectively out of thin air. . . . The sheer scale and complexity of the financial market effectively “liberated” from exogenously imposed constraints on its growth will make it inherently more volatile and unstable . . . . The same factors, however, will also make it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for the public to control, or even track, new technology-driven proliferation of risk in the financial system.[18]
5. The Futility of Bank Supervision
Perhaps most interestingly for someone who would be the lead supervisor of most of the nation’s largest banks, Professor Omarova’s writings show a decidedly pessimistic view of the effectiveness of financial regulation. She frequently points out the failures of what she terms “micro” entity-specific solutions to such risks, in order to argue in favor of a revised “macro,” i.e., far more fundamental and structural, approach. One example comes from her article on Too Big To Fail: “At the heart of the TBTF problem, there is a fundamental paradox: TBTF is an entity-centric, micro-level metaphor for a cluster of interrelated systemic, macro-level problems. This inherent conceptual tension between the micro and the macro, the entity and the system, frames much of the public policy debate on TBTF.”[19]
Professor Omarova’s “macro” approach includes suggestions of potential governmental interventions in the financial system on a scale unprecedented even in times of crisis – government “golden shares” in large financial companies that would allow the government to override management decisions to forestall a crisis,[20] Federal Reserve counter-cyclical intervention in a broader range of financial markets,[21] “public interest” guardians who would supplement regulatory bodies to correct the self-interest of the financial sector,[22] and a significant National Investment Authority to counteract the biases of the private investment community.[23] As Professor Omarova acknowledges, such measures would require new legislation, for which there does not currently appear to substantial appetite.
B. Consequences For Regulatory Priorities
What then do these themes likely foretell should Professor Omarova receive Senate confirmation? It is of course always a challenge to predict the future, and academic writing is frequently at its best when it seeks to challenge traditional paradigms and manners of thought. This said, it does seem that the following outcomes are certainly within the realm of possibility.
1. Size and Interconnectedness
The OCC currently supervises eight of the country’s ten largest banks: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citibank, US Bank, PNC Bank, TD Bank, and Capital One, ranging from just under $400 billion in assets to over $3 trillion in assets. Some, but not all, of them also engage broadly in investment banking activities. The OCC also regulates many banks in the next asset tier below.
The OCC does not have any general authority to break up well-managed banks or to order them to cease activities, but it is not unusual for the OCC to adjust its supervisory approach based on the risk profile of an institution. What Professor Omarova might add to this traditional approach given her views of increasing systemic risk and the importance of the “macro” is a more holistic approach, in which not only will a particular institution’s own risk profile determine its supervision, but also the perceived risks created by those institutions to which it is most connected. In addition, large banks that fail to meet supervisory expectations can face activities limitations; an early article by Professor Omarova analyzed the idea of requiring regulatory approval of complex financial products.[24]
Moreover, although mergers of bank holding companies must be approved only by the Federal Reserve, in many cases once the holding company merger has been approved, the parties seek to merge the subsidiary banks for efficiency reasons. If the resulting bank will be a national bank, the OCC must approve the transaction under the Bank Merger Act. The statutory factors that the OCC must consider are similar to those the Federal Reserve considers, but the OCC makes an independent decision. Many of the required factors relate to size – competitive effect, ability of management (including on integrating institutions), and financial stability.[25]
2. Private Interest Versus Public Interest
In terms of constraining what Professor Omarova views as the self-interest of the financial sector, it is noteworthy that the responsible agencies, including the OCC, have never completely finalized the executive compensation rulemaking required by Dodd-Frank, something to which SEC Chair Gary Gensler has recently called attention.[26] One of the more controversial aspects of the original rulemaking was the extent of permissible clawbacks of compensation, if actions by individual bankers ended up imposing losses on the financial institution involved. On this question, Professor Omarova’s characterization of the “morals of the marketplace” could be significant.
Another means by which the bank regulators have sought to address privatizing gains and socializing losses since the Crisis is bank governance. The OCC’s principal contribution in this regard is its Guidelines Establishing Heightened Standards for large national banks and federal thrifts, which impose a prescriptive approach to certain aspects of bank corporate governance.[27] These Guidelines were adopted as safety and soundness standards pursuant to Section 39 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which gives the OCC the authority to issue orders for noncompliance, orders that may be enforced by the issuance of civil money penalties or in federal district court actions. The OCC could further strengthen these standards or take a more aggressive approach to enforcing them.
3. Narrow Banking
Historically, as Professor Omarova herself has noted, the OCC has been one of the most flexible agencies in its interpretations of its governing statute, the National Bank Act. Although certain of the activities that she has criticized for increasing systemic risk are conducted by bank affiliates, not all of them are: national banks conduct significant derivative activities, certain capital markets activities are bank permissible, and numerous bank activities implicate the broad definition of proprietary trading contained in the Volcker Rule. Even in the absence of revisiting, for example, the National Bank Act interpretations relating to permissible derivatives activities, the OCC has the authority to examine all national bank activities. Those banking institutions with substantial businesses in areas that Professor Omarova has characterized as non-core and risk-creating should therefore expect a much stricter supervisory approach. The Volcker Rule regulations, which as revised still invite significant supervisory discretion in practice due to the difficulty of distinguishing between prohibited trading and permissible activities like risk-mitigating hedging, could well see ramped up examination interest, and expectations of compliance programs could increase.
4. Innovation and Fintechs
There are currently several pressing fintech-related issues at the OCC. First is the question of whether the OCC will grant a national bank charter to a company that proposes to make loans but not take FDIC-insured deposits, and that is not a statutorily authorized national trust bank. The OCC has claimed the authority under the National Bank Act to issue such a charter, but it has not acted on one such application, and it has been sued in federal court by state banking supervisors who believe that granting such a charter goes beyond the business of banking in the National Bank Act. Professor Omarova’s statements on the potential perils of innovation for supervisors and her general “public interest” concerns may well be relevant on this question.
Second, shortly before and just after President Biden was inaugurated, the OCC granted three trust company charters to digital currency companies, and issued a broad interpretation of permissible digital currency activities under the National Bank Act. The OCC is currently re-examining the bases for such charters, with Acting Comptroller Hsu expressing safety and soundness concerns over certain virtual currency activities. For Professor Omarova, virtual currencies and other digital assets are one of the areas where innovation is most likely to cause systemic risk.[28]
Third, Professor Omarova will be a voting member of the FDIC Board, which determines whether a state industrial bank may receive deposit insurance, and which also must approve any change of control transaction involving an FDIC-insured industrial bank. Under Chair Jelena McWilliams – but with a Republican-appointed Comptroller and Republican-appointed Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau – the FDIC Board approved two such applications, one for Square and one for Nelnet. In one of her earliest articles, Professor Omarova analyzed the historical exemption for industrial banks in the Bank Holding Company Act,[29] and since that writing, Congress has refused to repeal the exemption, and the FDIC has finalized a framework for supervising the parents of industrial banks. It is certainly possible that given her preference was “narrow” banking, Professor Omarova would wish to see a linkage to traditional banking activities, with ancillary activities being preferable when conducted in an agency capacity, when considering such applications.
Finally, many fintechs operate via bank partnerships. Under the Trump Administration, the OCC issued fintech-friendly interpretations regarding the “true lender” and “valid when made” doctrines, which engendered opposition from consumer groups and certain state regulators and attorneys general. Congress used the Congressional Review Act this summer to void the “true lender” rule, but the “valid when made” interpretation remains. Professor Omarova’s criticism of the elasticity of the OCC’s interpretations of the National Bank Act on derivatives matters during the 1990s could extend beyond the derivatives area to bank-fintech partnership issues. Demonstrating a lack of increased risk to banks and the system from such partnerships, therefore, could become significant.
5. The Quarles/Brainard Divide – Likely Positioning
It is also important to note that Professor Omarova’s appointment is not taking place in a vacuum. In several weeks, Vice Chair Randal Quarles’s term as the Federal Reserve Governor in charge of bank supervision will come to an end, although a mere Governor Quarles could remain at the Federal Reserve for another decade. During the last four years, Vice Chair Quarles has shepherded through a number of “reforms to the reform” wrought by the Dodd-Frank Act. Many of the more important actions drew dissents from Governor Lael Brainard, who is one of the contenders to be Governor Quarles’ successor. Of these actions, quite a few implicated rules promulgated by the OCC as well as the Federal Reserve:
- Loosening the regulatory restrictions of the Volcker Rule
- Tailoring capital and liquidity requirements for an institution’s asset size and other factors, with institutions between $100 billion and $250 billion in assets particularly benefiting
- Reducing margin requirements for inter-affiliate uncleared swap transactions
- Proposing to reduce the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio for the largest banks and their holding companies
From her articles, Professor Omarova would appear to be decidedly in Governor Brainard’s camp on these four issues.
Conclusion: The Limits of Bank Supervision and Regulation
In her writings, Professor Omarova is a strong proponent for government intervention in the financial system, and a skeptic of a light-touch supervisory approach. In this way, she is reminiscent of the first de facto Federal Reserve Governor for bank supervision, another banking law professor turned regulator, Daniel Tarullo. Governor Tarullo, of course, oversaw the implementation of a highly prescriptive top-down approach to bank supervision at the Federal Reserve, which even he noted in his “farewell address” may have gone too far in some areas, particularly for non-systemic banks.[30] Professor Omarova also has quite a bit in common with former FDIC Chair Sheila Bair, who herself was a professor of regulatory policy, was critical of bank derivative activities, and pushed the Collins Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act because of her suspicions regarding internal bank financial models.
But it is also fair to say that neither Governor Tarullo nor Chair Bair appeared to have quite as skeptical views on the limitations of bank supervision and regulation as Professor Omarova. What will a proponent of a new paradigm approach to the American banking industry do in the absence of any legislative appetite for departing from the reigning paradigm since the New Deal?
This is perhaps the most difficult question of all to answer. A logical response, however, is that in those areas that are perceived to pose the greatest risk, such a proponent would double down on the supervisory tools that are currently available in order to counter perceived risks at inception. Large federal banking institutions that depart from core deposit and lending activities should therefore expect searching supervisory reviews of their non-traditional activities.
_________________________
[1] Saule T. Omarova, “The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the ‘Business of Banking,’” 63 U. Miami L. Rev. 1041 (2009); Saule Omarova, “From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act,” 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1683 (2011); Saule T. Omarova and Margaret E. Tahyar, “That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United States,” 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 113 (2012).
[2] Saule T. Omarova, “Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The ‘Golden Share’ Approach,” 68 Ala. L. Rev. 1029 (2017); Saule T. Omarova, “New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon,” 36 Yale J. on Reg. 735 (2019); Saule T. Omarova, “Ethical Finance as a Systemic Challenge: Risk, Culture, and Structure,” 27 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 797 (2018); Saule T. Omarova, “The ‘Too Big to Fail’ Problem,” 103 Minn. L. Rev. 2495 (2019).
[3] “The ‘Too Big to Fail’ Problem,” supra note 2.
[6] “Ethical Finance as a Systemic Challenge: Risk, Culture, and Structure,” supra note 2.
[7] “Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The ‘Golden Share’ Approach,” supra note 2.
[8] Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 528 (N.Y. 1928).
[9] Saule T. Omarova, “What Kind of Finance Should There Be?”, 83 Law & Contemp. Probs. 195 (2020).
[10] “The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the ‘Business of Banking,’” supra note 1.
[11] Saule T. Omarova, “The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities,” 98 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (2013).
[12] See https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20140114a.htm.
[13] Saule T. Omarova, “The Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for A New Age?”, 15 N.C. Banking Inst. 83 (2011)
[14] See https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/boardacts/1996/19961220/ (increasing limit on bank ineligible revenues for Section 20 companies to 25 percent of total revenues).
[15] “What Kind of Finance Should There Be?”, supra note 9.
[16] “From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act,” supra note 1.
[17] “The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the ‘Business of Banking,’” supra note 1.
[18] “New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon,” supra note 2.
[19] “The ‘Too Big to Fail’ Problem,” supra note 2.
[20] “Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The ‘Golden Share’ Approach,” supra note 2.
[21] “The ‘Too Big to Fail’ Problem,” supra note 2.
[22] Saule T. Omarova, “Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation,” 37 J. Corp. L. 621 (2012).
[23] Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority,” 43 J. Corp. L. 437 (2018).
[24] Saule T. Omarova, “License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products,” 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 63 (2012).
[26] Akayla Gardner & Ben Bain, “Wall Street Pay Clawback Rule to Get New Push at SEC,” Bloomberg News (September 22, 2021).
[27] 12 C.F.R. Part 30 (Appendix D).
[28] “New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon,” supra note 2.
[29] “That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United States,” supra note 1.
[30] See https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20170404a.htm.
The following Gibson Dunn lawyers assisted in preparing this client update: Arthur Long.
Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, the author, or any of the following members of the firm’s Financial Institutions practice group:
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Michael D. Bopp – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8256, [email protected])
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M. Kendall Day – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8220, [email protected])
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On Friday, September 24, the White House’s “Safer Federal Workforce Task Force” (“Task Force”) issued new guidance (the “Guidance”) regarding vaccination requirements and other COVID-safety measures for federal contractor employees. This Guidance implements President Biden’s Executive Order regarding COVID precautions for government contractors, issued September 9, 2021.
Key terms of the Guidance include a vaccination mandate for all covered employees of federal contractors, except in “limited circumstances” for workers “legally entitled” to accommodation. The vaccination mandate applies to covered employees working from home and who have recovered from COVID-19. There is no alternative for workers to present a weekly negative COVID test, as expected in the forthcoming Occupational Safety and Health Administration Emergency Temporary Standard (“OSHA ETS”) for large employers. Employers covered by both the Guidance and the OSHA ETS (i.e., federal contractors with 100 or more employees) would be held to this higher standard. The Guidance also directs masking and distancing practices in accordance with CDC guidelines.
This alert provides a brief overview of these and other provisions of the Guidance for contractors.
I. President Biden’s September 9 Executive Order Regarding Vaccinations for Employees of Federal Contractors
The Executive Order for federal contractors called for the Task Force, which the President established in January, to establish vaccination requirements for federal contactors by September 24.[1] The Order is effectuated by directing federal agencies to include a clause in contracts requiring “the contractor and any subcontractors (at any tier)” to “comply with all guidance for contractor or subcontractor workplace locations published by the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force,” “for the duration of the contract.”[2] Under the Order, this clause is to be included in new contracts and extensions and renewals of existing contracts, and “shall apply to any workplace locations . . . in which an individual is working on or in connection with a Federal Government contract.”[3]
The Order cited the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (the Procurement Act) as authority for the new federal contractor mandate.[4] As noted in prior alerts, there is some question whether the Procurement Act authorizes the imposition of workplace safety standards in this manner, and legal challenges are possible.
II. Key Definitions
The Guidance defines the following key terms:
- A covered contractor is “a prime contractor or subcontractor at any tier who is party to a covered contract.”
- A covered contractor employee is “any full-time or part-time employee of a covered contractor (1) working on or in connection with a covered contract or (2) working at a covered contractor workplace.”
- An employee works “in connection with a covered contract” when he performs “duties necessary to the performance of the covered contract, but who are not directly engaged in performing the specific work called for by the covered contract,” such as human resources, billing, and legal review.
- A covered contractor workplace is a “location controlled by a covered contractor at which any employee of a covered contractor working on or in connection with a covered contract is likely to be present during the period of performance for a covered contract. A covered contractor workplace does not include a covered contractor employee’s residence.”
III. Three Areas of COVID-19-Safety Protocols
The Guidance addresses three key safety requirements for covered contractors and subcontractors at all tiers, except for contracts which are “under the Simplified Acquisition Threshold as defined in section 2.101 of the FAR” and contracts or subcontracts “for the manufacturing of products.”[5] The FAQs go on to state that these safety protocols do not apply to “subcontracts solely for the provision of products” and “covered contractor employees who only perform work outside the United States or its outlying areas.” Thus, the Guidance’s exceptions to the safety protocols largely do not expand or contract the scope of applicable contracts from the Executive Order.
(1) Vaccination:
The Guidance states that all covered contractor employees, including those who previously had COVID-19 as well as covered contractor employees working from home, must be fully vaccinated by December 8. The only exceptions are for employees who are “legally entitled to an accommodation” for medical or religious reasons.
A covered contractor is responsible for reviewing requests for accommodation and determining what, if any, accommodations to offer. Covered contractors are not responsible for providing vaccines to their employees (but may choose to do so), nor are they instructed to pay employees for the time and expenses associated with getting vaccinated (however, this may be a requirement of state and local law and is expected to be a requirement for large employers in the forthcoming OSHA ETS).
Contractors are instructed to review and verify, but not necessarily collect or store, documents to ensure that their employees are fully vaccinated. Acceptable documents include physical or electronic CDC cards, state health records, or private medical records. Unacceptable documents include positive antibody tests and attestations that an employee is vaccinated.
Agencies have discretion to grant temporary exemptions from the vaccine requirement when there is “an urgent, mission-critical need” to have contractors begin work before becoming fully vaccinated. Even then, employees must be fully vaccinated within 60 days of beginning work on the contract. They also must adhere to physical distancing and masking requirements for unvaccinated workers in the meantime.
(2) Physical Distancing and Masks:
Contractors must ensure that all employees and visitors present in covered contractor workplaces follow CDC guidance pertaining to physical distancing and masks. Fully vaccinated employees do not have to physically distance, but unvaccinated employees should maintain six feet of distance from others whenever practicable.
In areas of high community transmission (as determined by the CDC), everyone, including visitors, whether vaccinated or not, must wear masks indoors. In areas of low community transmission, only the unvaccinated must wear masks indoors (they also must wear masks outdoors in certain circumstances). Contractors are responsible for checking the CDC’s website weekly to determine the transmission rate of the local community. When the transmission rate increases, additional safety measures are effective immediately. When the transmission rate decreases to a low or moderate level, safety measures can be removed after two consecutive weeks at that lower level.
These mask mandates apply in all shared spaces and common areas. They do not apply in enclosed office spaces or when individuals are eating or drinking and maintaining appropriate distancing. Contractors can create exceptions to the mask mandate for situations where masks can burden breathing or otherwise pose a safety concern as determined by a workplace risk assessment. And the mask requirements do not apply when employees are working remotely from their residences.
As with the vaccination requirement, employers must review and consider what, if any, religious and medical accommodations to the mask requirement they must offer.
(3) Implementation:
All covered contractors must designate a COVID-safety coordinator. The coordinator is an employee responsible for coordinating, implementing, and enforcing compliance with the Guidance. The coordinator must provide relevant information about the Guidance to employees and visitors likely to enter a covered contractor workplace. The Guidance is silent as to whether a coordinator is required for each worksite or whether a single coordinator can fulfill these responsibilities for more than one worksite.
IV. Relationship to Other Federal and State Mandates
The Guidance purports to apply in all states and municipalities, even those that prohibit employers from imposing vaccination, mask, and distancing requirements. It claims to supersede any contrary state laws and local ordinances. It does not, however, excuse covered contractors from complying with stricter measures imposed by state and local governments. The Guidance also says that agencies may impose additional safety requirements on covered contractor employees while present on federal property.
The Guidance states that all contractors must comply with its COVID-19 protocols, even those employers that will also be subject to the forthcoming OSHA ETS. As we previously explained, the ETS—which is anticipated within weeks of September 9—is expected to require all employers with 100 or more employees to ensure that their workforce is fully vaccinated or to require any workers who remain unvaccinated to produce a negative test result at least weekly before coming to work. However, the Guidance for contractors states that “[c]overed contractors must comply with the requirements set forth in this Guidance regardless of whether they are subject to other workplace safety standards,” such as the forthcoming ETS. Given that the Guidance does not indicate that employees can undergo regular COVID testing in lieu of being vaccinated (and in fact does not mention testing at all), large employers who are also federal contractors will not be able to avoid a vaccination requirement by relying on the ETS testing option.
Finally, new contracts must state that if the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force updates its Guidance to add new requirements, those requirements will apply to existing contracts.
________________________
[1] Executive Order on Ensuring Adequate COVID Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/09/09/executive-order-on-ensuring-adequate-covid-safety-protocols-for-federal-contractors/.
[4] Id. (citing 40 U.S.C. 101 et seq).
[5] The Executive Order exempted “(i) grants; (ii) contracts, contract-like instruments, or agreements with Indian Tribes…; (iii) contracts or subcontracts whose value is equal to or less than the simplified acquisition threshold, as that term is defined in section 2.101 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation; (iv) employees who perform work outside the United States or its outlying areas, as those terms are defined in section 2.101 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation; or (v) subcontracts solely for the provision of products.” Executive Order on Ensuring Adequate COVID Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors.
The following Gibson Dunn attorneys assisted in preparing this client update: Eugene Scalia, Jason C. Schwartz, Katherine V.A. Smith, Jessica Brown, Lucas C. Townsend, Lindsay M. Paulin, Andrew G. I. Kilberg, Chad C. Squitieri, Marie Zoglo, and Josh Zuckerman.
Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. To learn more about these issues, please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, or any of the following in the firm’s Administrative Law and Regulatory, Labor and Employment or Government Contracts practice groups.
Administrative Law and Regulatory Group:
Eugene Scalia – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8543,[email protected])
Helgi C. Walker – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3599, [email protected])
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U.S. businesses invest significant capital, resources, and time to develop highly valuable technology and processes. Business competitors – and, increasingly, state actors or affiliates of state actors – are stealing that technology at an alarming rate for economic or national strategic advantage to devastating consequences to U.S. industry and national security. This webcast will examine developments regarding the nature of the theft risk, including risk from insiders, cyber intrusions, or other means, and enforcement trends from the Department of Justice and other government agencies.
A team of national security, cyber-crime, and litigation practitioners with experience both inside and outside of government will share their experiences in investigating and defending companies that fall victim to theft of their trade secrets and highlight a number of notable recent criminal prosecutions under the Economic Espionage Act and related statutes. We will discuss best practices for minimizing risk in this important area.
View Slides (PDF)
PANELISTS:
David Burns, a partner in Washington, D.C. and co-chair of the firm’s National Security Practice Group, served in senior positions in both the National Security Division and the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. As Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the National Security Division he supervised the Division’s investigations and prosecutions, including counterterrorism, counterintelligence, economic espionage, cyber hacking, FARA, disclosure of classified information, and sanctions and export controls matters. Mr. Burns’ practice focuses on national security, white-collar criminal defense, internal investigations, and regulatory enforcement matters.
Zainab Ahmad, a partner in New York and co-chair of the firm’s National Security Practice Group, previously served as Deputy Chief of the National Security and Cybercrime section at the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of New York. Ms. Ahmad is a decorated former prosecutor who has received both of DOJ’s highest honors, the Attorney General’s Award and the FBI Director’s Award, and whose work prosecuting terrorists was profiled by The New Yorker magazine. Her practice is international and focuses on cross-border white collar defense and investigations, including corruption, anti-money laundering, sanctions and FCPA issues, as well as data privacy and cybersecurity matters.
Alexander Southwell, a partner in the New York office and co-chair of the firm’s Privacy, Cybersecurity and Data Innovation Practice Group, previously served as an Assistant United States Attorney in the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York where he focused on cyber-crimes and intellectual property offenses, in addition to securities and commodities and other white collar frauds. Mr. Southwell advises companies and boards across industries victimized by cyber-crimes and which experienced data breaches and he has particular expertise counseling on issues under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Economic Espionage Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and related federal and state computer fraud and consumer protection statutes.
Robert Hur, a partner in Washington, D.C. and co-chair of the firm’s Crisis Management Practice Group, served as the 48th United States Attorney for the District of Maryland. During his tenure as United States Attorney, the Office handled numerous high-profile matters including those involving national security, cybercrime, public corruption, and financial fraud. Before serving as United States Attorney, Mr. Hur served as the Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General (“PADAG”) at the Department of Justice, a member of the Department’s senior leadership team and the principal counselor to Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein. Mr. Hur assisted with oversight of all components of the Department, including the National Security, Criminal, and Civil Divisions, all 93 U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He also liaised regularly on behalf of the Justice Department with the White House, Congressional committees, and federal intelligence, enforcement and regulatory agencies.
Mark Lyon, a partner in Palo Alto and co-chair of the firm’s Artificial Intelligence and Automated Systems Practice Group, has extensive experience representing and advising clients on the legal, ethical, regulatory, and policy issues arising from emerging technologies. As practice group chair, Mr. Lyon has extensive experience representing and advising clients on the legal, ethical, regulatory, and policy issues arising from emerging technologies like artificial intelligence. As a member of the firm’s Privacy, Cyber Security and Consumer Protection practice group, Mr. Lyon brings a global focus to help his clients develop, implement, and audit appropriate policies and procedures to comply with applicable data privacy and cyber security regulations.
MCLE CREDIT INFORMATION:
This program has been approved for credit in accordance with the requirements of the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board for a maximum of 1.0 credit hour, of which 1.0 credit hour may be applied toward the areas of professional practice requirement.
This course is approved for transitional/non-transitional credit. Attorneys seeking New York credit must obtain an affirmation form prior to watching the archived version of this webcast. Please contact [email protected] to request the MCLE form.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP certifies that this activity has been approved for MCLE credit by the State Bar of California in the amount of 1.0 hour.
California attorneys may claim “self-study” credit for viewing the archived version of this webcast. No certificate of attendance is required for California “self-study” credit.
Corporate carveouts, whether conducted in the context of a sale, spin-off or other divestiture, are among the most complex transactions a company may undertake, but nevertheless, these deals have been an increasingly common means of unlocking value for both the divesting company and business to be separated. Ensuring that the transaction perimeter is appropriately defined is a key area of executing these transactions and can be one of the most time and resource-consuming aspects of the deal. Furthermore, navigating the complexity of the operational separation of the two entities, and ensuring each company is set up to operate independently at close requires detailed planning and executional support, which must also not distract from the ongoing performance of the base business.
This webcast brings together leading divestiture practitioners from both Gibson Dunn and Boston Consulting Group to discuss some of the key areas of consideration in preparing for and executing a carveout, including: (1) appropriately defining the “business,” (2) identifying entities, assets and liabilities within the scope of the business and developing a plan for allocating or splitting up shared assets and liabilities, (3) strategies for utilizing internal and external resources to manage the process efficiently in the preparation, execution, consummation and post-closing stages of the transaction and (4) key learnings and best practices from our experience on the front lines supporting the operational separation during a carveout.
View Slides (PDF)
PANELISTS:
Daniel Angel is a Partner in Gibson Dunn’s New York office, Co-Chair of the firm’s Technology Transactions Practice Group and a member of its Strategic Sourcing and Commercial Transactions Practice Group. He is a transactional attorney who has represented clients on technology-related transactions since 2003. Mr. Angel has worked with a broad variety of clients ranging from market leaders to start-ups in a wide range of industries including financial services, private equity funds, life sciences, specialty chemicals, insurance, energy and telecommunications.
Stephen Glover is a Partner in Gibson Dunn’s Washington, D.C. office and previous Co-Chair of the firm’s Mergers and Acquisitions Practice Group. Mr. Glover has an extensive practice representing public and private companies as well as private equity firms in complex mergers and acquisitions, including spin-offs, carveouts and related transactions, as well as other corporate matters. Mr. Glover’s clients include businesses that operate in many different industries.
Saee Muzumdar is a Partner in Gibson Dunn’s New York office and Co-Chair of the firm’s Mergers and Acquisitions Practice Group. Ms. Muzumdar is a corporate transactional lawyer whose practice includes representing both strategic companies and private equity clients (including their portfolio companies) in connection with all aspects of their domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions activities and general corporate counseling.
Ben Aylor is a Managing Director and Senior Partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Boston Consulting Group. He focuses on helping clients meet the challenges of major change efforts including post-merger integrations and broad transformations/ transformational M&A, and also leads BCG’s efforts on manufacturing network design and Global Trade. Ben has led both overall corporate post-merger integration programs and the manufacturing aspects of post-merger integrations, as well as advised several large carveouts and spin-offs in the pharmaceutical industry.
Hob Brooks is a Partner in the Philadelphia office of Boston Consulting Group. Mr. Brooks advises biopharmaceutical and medtech companies on complex large-scale transformation programs and pre-/post-merger transaction planning, execution, and integration. He has worked across several multi-billion dollar carveouts, spin-offs, divestitures and integrations during his tenure with BCG.
MCLE INFORMATION:
This program has been approved for credit in accordance with the requirements of the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board for a maximum of 1.0 credit hour, of which 1.0 credit hour may be applied toward the areas of professional practice requirement.
This course is approved for transitional/non-transitional credit. Attorneys seeking New York credit must obtain an affirmation form prior to watching the archived version of this webcast. Please contact [email protected] to request the MCLE form.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP certifies that this activity has been approved for MCLE credit by the State Bar of California in the amount of 1.0 hour.
California attorneys may claim “self-study” credit for viewing the archived version of this webcast. No certificate of attendance is required for California “self-study” credit.
The use of alternative data in investment decision-making—incorporating large volumes of data found outside a company’s public filings—has expanded rapidly in the last several years, as data has increased in availability. Investment funds commonly have data analysts use a variety of alternative data sources, from data on commercial transactions to information about human behavior, to inform investment decisions in trading securities. And the alternative data industry is continuing to grow. In 2020, the industry was valued at $1.72 billion and, by 2028, is expected to reach close to $70 billion.[1] With increasing popularity, it’s unsurprising this growth has led to increased interest from market regulators. While the SEC has shown interest in alternative data in the past, it recently took the significant step in bringing the first enforcement action against an alternative data provider for securities fraud.
The App Annie Settlement
On September 14, 2021, the SEC announced a settled enforcement action against App Annie, Inc., an alternative data provider, and the Company’s co-founder and former CEO and Chairman Bertrand Schmitt, for misrepresentations both to data sources in connection with the collection of data, and to investment firm subscribers regarding the data underlying its product.[2] Without admitting or denying the findings, App Annie and Schmitt consented to a cease-and-desist order finding a violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, and imposing a penalty of $10 million for App Annie, and $300,000 for Schmitt, and a three-year officer and director bar against him.
App Annie provides market data analytics on mobile application performance. Companies with mobile applications provide App Annie access to their data in return for free analytics. App Annie sells a data analytics product to investment firms and other subscribers for a fee. App Annie’s Terms of Service represented that its data analytics estimates were generated using statistical models from data that was aggregated and anonymized. In reality, according the SEC, between late 2014 and mid-2018, App Annie used actual non-aggregated and non-anonymized performance data from companies to reduce disparities between model-driven estimates and the actual data and thereby make App Annie’s paid subscription product more accurate and more valuable to its trading firm clients.
According to the SEC’s order, App Annie’s use of non-anonymized and non-aggregated data to enhance the accuracy of its analytics product rendered representations made to the sources of data, as well as the subscribers to the analytics, materially misleading. In collecting data from companies’ applications, App Annie represented to the companies providing access to app usage data that all data would be aggregated and anonymized before utilized in its paid subscription product. In addition, App Annie represented to its investment firm subscribers that the Company’s estimates were generated in a manner consistent with the consents it obtained from the underlying data sources, and that App Annie had effective controls to prevent misuse of confidential data and ensure compliance with federal securities laws. However, the SEC found that because App Annie’s estimates used non-aggregated and non-anonymized data, in contradiction to its representations to its data sources, the Company’s estimates were based on data used in a manner inconsistent with its representations to its data providers. According to the order, App Annie understood that investment firm subscribers were using the Company’s product to make investment decisions and that subscribers did in fact trade based on App Annie’s data product.
The order asserts, without explanation, that the data on app usage “often is material to a public company’s financial performance and stock price.” The order also does not explain how App Annie’s incorporation of actual data into its estimates rendered the various representations to subscribers materially misleading as required by Section 10(b) or how the alleged misrepresentations were “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities. Rather the order asserts that Schmitt “understood it was material to trading firms’ decisions to use App Annie’s estimates for investment purposes.”
The order does not provide for any disgorgement or even provide a Fair Fund to distribute any of the penalty to customers who may have been harmed. Finally, it is notable that Schmitt agreed to a three year officer and director bar even though App Annie is a private company.
Individual Liability for App Annie CEO Bertrand Schmitt
In bringing claims against Schmitt individually, the order emphasizes Schmitt’s direct involvement in the decision to use non-aggregated and non-anonymized data. The SEC further found Schmitt oversaw a “manual estimate alteration process,” during which engineers made manual adjustments to purportedly statistical models to make them more “accurate” in tracking actual company metrics. When the Company learned of Schmitt’s misconduct in June 2018, it ceased manually adjusting its data and stopped using non-aggregated and non-anonymized data in its subscription product. Around the same time, Schmitt resigned as CEO. He served as Chief Strategy Officer of App Annie until he was terminated in January 2020.
After the SEC published the order, Schmitt addressed the settlement on LinkedIn.[3] He noted that “compliance was a critical element of the business” and that he and App Annie “obtained legal advice on compliance procedures and even hired an in-house compliance team.” Nonetheless, the SEC explicitly found that, contrary to the App Annie’s representations, “during the relevant period, the Company did not have effective internal controls and did not conduct regular compliance reviews,” suggesting the SEC did not credit any advice of counsel defense.
Regulatory Risks and Mitigation Strategies
While this settlement represents the first enforcement action in this space, the SEC has been increasing its focus on the growing alternative data sphere for several years. In its 2020 Examination Priorities, the Commission’s Office of Compliance Inspection and Examinations included for the first time a focus on investment advisers’ use of alternative data.[4] The Commission noted that examinations will “focus on firms’ use of these data sets and technologies to interact with and provide services to investors, firms, and other service providers and assess the effectiveness of related compliance and control functions.”[5] The SEC’s press release announcing the App Annie settlement also acknowledged the role of the examination staff in the investigation that led to the enforcement action.[6]
For years, we have counseled clients on risk mitigation strategies for the use of alternative data. While this settlement highlights the regulatory risks accompanying the use of alternative data, it also validates the importance of the compliance oversight that subscribers have employed to manage those risks. Notably, the representations that subscribers received protected them from the government’s allegation against App Annie’s alleged misuse of company data. Accordingly, it bears repeating compliance and oversight mitigate the risks arising from the use of alternative data.
- Compliance Oversight. An important first step in managing risk is to engage compliance before adopting new data sources. This means that firms should have in place a mechanism to require compliance pre-approval before a new data source is accepted.
- Policies and Procedures. While there is no requirement to have policies and procedures specifically addressing the use of alternative data, where an adviser is making significant use of such data, policies and procedures specifically addressing the risks unique to alternative data sources can be a way to demonstrate a firm’s attention to the risks of its business. Policies and procedures for the use of alternative data could encompass requirements for compliance pre-approval, as well as guidance on compliance diligence of potential data vendors, contractual protections, training of investment professionals and periodic review of the use of alternative data sources.
- Due Diligence on Data Vendors. The diligence process should be part of the compliance oversight process. The diligence process can have multiple components which may vary depending on the nature of the data, the vendor, and the variety of legal issues that might be implicated. Questions examined during the diligence process could include, for example, the original source of the data and the alternative data provider’s right to use and sell the data. If appropriate, direct questioning of vendor representatives may be appropriate in evaluating the care and robustness of a vendor’s compliance approach.
- Documentation and Record Keeping. Before finalizing an approval of the vendor, compliance may also involve documentation of certain representations and warranties to mitigate further the potential regulatory risks associated with alternative data. For example, contracts could incorporate representations concerning: (i) the vendor’s right to use and sell the data; (ii) the vendor’s compliance with relevant laws concerning the collection and use of the data; (iii) the absence of material nonpublic information or a duty of confidentiality concerning the data; (iv) the absence of personal identifying information in the data; and (v) in the case of web-scraping services, compliance with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and other relevant laws.
- Monitoring and Periodic Review. Given the rapidly evolving market, vendors engage in a continuous search for new sources of data and the development of better analytical insights. Accordingly, effective compliance monitoring can benefit from periodically reviewing the status of existing vendors as part of the annual compliance review, particularly if the vendor’s offerings change over time.
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[1] Grand View Research, Alternative Data Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report by Data Type (Credit & Debit Card Transactions, Social & Sentiment Data, Mobile Application Usage), By Industry, By End User, By Region, And Segment Forecasts 2021 – 2028, Report Overview (Aug. 2021), available at https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/alternative-data-market.
[2] Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 92975 (Sept. 14, 2021).
[3] Bertrand Schmitt, Lessons Learned, Closing a Chapter, Sept. 14, 2021, available at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/lessons-learned-closing-chapter-bertrand-schmitt/.
[4] See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, 2020 Examination Priorities at 14 (OCIE 2020 Priorities), available at https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2020.pdf.
[6] SEC Press Release, SEC Charges App Annie and its Founder with Securities Fraud (Sept. 14, 2021), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-176.
Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work in the firm’s Securities Enforcement Practice Group, or the following authors:
Mark K. Schonfeld – Co-Chair, New York (+1 212-351-2433, [email protected])
Richard W. Grime – Co-Chair, Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8219, [email protected])
Reed Brodsky – New York (+1 212-351-5334, [email protected])
Alexander H. Southwell – New York (+1 212-351-3981, [email protected])
Zoey G. Goldnick – New York (+1 212-351-2631, [email protected])
Please also feel free to contact any of the following practice group leaders and members:
New York
Zainab N. Ahmad (+1 212-351-2609, [email protected])
Matthew L. Biben (+1 212-351-6300, [email protected])
Reed Brodsky (+1 212-351-5334, [email protected])
Joel M. Cohen (+1 212-351-2664, [email protected])
Lee G. Dunst (+1 212-351-3824, [email protected])
Barry R. Goldsmith (+1 212-351-2440, [email protected])
Mary Beth Maloney (+1 212-351-2315, [email protected])
Mark K. Schonfeld (+1 212-351-2433, [email protected])
Alexander H. Southwell (+1 212-351-3981, [email protected])
Avi Weitzman (+1 212-351-2465, [email protected])
Lawrence J. Zweifach (+1 212-351-2625, [email protected])
Tina Samanta (+1 212-351-2469, [email protected])
Washington, D.C.
Stephanie L. Brooker (+1 202-887-3502, [email protected])
Daniel P. Chung (+1 202-887-3729, [email protected])
M. Kendall Day (+1 202-955-8220, [email protected])
Richard W. Grime (+1 202-955-8219, [email protected])
Jeffrey L. Steiner (+1 202-887-3632, [email protected])
Patrick F. Stokes (+1 202-955-8504, [email protected])
F. Joseph Warin (+1 202-887-3609, [email protected])
San Francisco
Winston Y. Chan (+1 415-393-8362, [email protected])
Thad A. Davis (+1 415-393-8251, [email protected])
Charles J. Stevens (+1 415-393-8391, [email protected])
Michael Li-Ming Wong (+1 415-393-8234, [email protected])
Palo Alto
Michael D. Celio (+1 650-849-5326, [email protected])
Paul J. Collins (+1 650-849-5309, [email protected])
Benjamin B. Wagner (+1 650-849-5395, [email protected])
Denver
Robert C. Blume (+1 303-298-5758, [email protected])
Monica K. Loseman (+1 303-298-5784, [email protected])
Los Angeles
Michael M. Farhang (+1 213-229-7005, [email protected])
Douglas M. Fuchs (+1 213-229-7605, [email protected])
Nicola T. Hanna (+1 213-229-7269, [email protected])
Debra Wong Yang (+1 213-229-7472, [email protected])
© 2021 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP is pleased to announce that the Asia Pacific Loan Market Association (APLMA) has released an English law term facilities agreement template for Indonesia offshore loans, which is available in the APLMA documentation library.
Gibson Dunn’s lawyers, together with members of the APLMA Indonesian Documentation Steering Committee, worked on the drafting of the English law APLMA template for Single Borrower, Single Guarantor, Single Currency Term Facility Agreement for Indonesia Offshore Loans (the “APLMA Indonesia Template”), to help achieve a degree of consistency amongst financial institutions that lend into Indonesia and facilitate growth of the secondary market there.
The APLMA Indonesia Template not only sets out Indonesia specific provisions that typically are seen in loan documents for Indonesian cross-border transactions, such as those relating to reporting obligations owed to Bank Indonesia and Law No. 24 of 2009 relating to the use of Bahasa Indonesia, but also includes detailed notes to help template users focus on these key Indonesia related issues. A Bahasa Indonesia version of the APLMA Indonesia Template will be published shortly.
The APLMA Indonesian Documentation Steering Committee was founded and spearheaded by Gibson Dunn partner Jamie Thomas, who chairs the committee.
Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding the above. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, or the lawyers below who worked on the drafting of the APLMA Indonesia Template:
Jamie Thomas – Singapore (+65 6507.3609, [email protected])
U-Shaun Lim – Singapore (+65 6507.3633, [email protected])
© 2021 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.
On September 17, 2021, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) imposed sanctions in response to the ongoing humanitarian and human rights crisis in Ethiopia, particularly in the Tigray region of the country.[1] The new sanctions program provides authority to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose a wide range of sanctions for a variety of activities outlined in a new Executive Order (“E.O.”). No individuals or entities have yet been designated under the E.O. However, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has warned that “[a]bsent clear and concrete progress toward a negotiated ceasefire and an end to abuses – as well as unhindered humanitarian access to those Ethiopians who are suffering – the United States will designate imminently specific leaders, organizations, and entities under this new sanctions regime.”
This action comes on the heels of repeated calls by the United States for all parties to the conflict to commit to an immediate ceasefire as evidenced in the Department of State’s press statement on May 15, 2021, and Secretary of State Blinken’s phone call to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on July 6, 2021. Similarly, on August 3-4, 2021, U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”) Administrator Samantha Power traveled to Ethiopia to “draw attention to the urgent need for full and unhindered humanitarian access in Ethiopia’s Tigray region and to emphasize the United States’ commitment to support the Ethiopian people amidst a spreading internal conflict” according to a USAID press release at the time. And prior to the actions on September 17, on August 23, 2021, OFAC sanctioned General Filipos Woldeyohannes,Chief of Staff of the Eritrean Defense Forces, for engaging in serious human rights abuses under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program and condemned the violence and ongoing human rights abuses in the Tigray region of Ethiopia.
The nature and scope of this new sanctions regime suggests that the Biden administration is taking a measured, flexible, and cautious approach to the situation in Ethiopia. OFAC is able to impose sanctions measures of varying degrees of severity, without those sanctions necessarily flowing down to entities owned by sanctioned parties – which should limit ripple effects on the Ethiopian economy. Alongside the Chinese Military Companies sanctions program, this new sanctions program is one of the very few instances where OFAC’s “50 Percent Rule” does not apply, perhaps signaling a more patchwork approach to sanctions designations going forward. The decision to hold off on any initial designations is also telling, and makes clear the focus on deterrence – as opposed to punishment for past deeds. Moreover, at the outset, OFAC has issued general licenses and related guidance allowing for humanitarian activity in Ethiopia to continue. The approach here, although slightly different, is broadly consistent with the Biden administration’s handling of the situation in Myanmar, in which it has gradually rolled out sanctions designations over a period of many months and prioritized humanitarian aid in its general licenses and guidance.[2]
Menu-Based Sanctions Permit Targeted Application of Restrictions
With respect to persons or entities engaged in certain targeted activities, the E.O. permits the Department of the Treasury to choose from a menu of blocking and non-blocking sanctions measures. In keeping with recent executive orders of its kind, the criteria for designation under the E.O. are exceedingly broad. The E.O. provides that the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may designate any foreign person determined:
- to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in, any of the following:
- actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Ethiopia, or that have the purpose or effect of expanding or extending the crisis in northern Ethiopia or obstructing a ceasefire or a peace process;
- corruption or serious human rights abuse in or with respect to northern Ethiopia;
- the obstruction of the delivery or distribution of, or access to, humanitarian assistance in or with respect to northern Ethiopia, including attacks on humanitarian aid personnel or humanitarian projects;
- the targeting of civilians through the commission of acts of violence in or with respect to northern Ethiopia, including involving abduction, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge, or any conduct that would constitute a violation of international humanitarian law;
- planning, directing, or committing attacks in or with respect to northern Ethiopia against United Nations or associated personnel or African Union or associated personnel;
- actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Ethiopia; or
- actions or policies that undermine the territorial integrity of Ethiopia;
- to be a military or security force that operates or has operated in northern Ethiopia on or after November 1, 2020;
- to be an entity, including any government entity or a political party, that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, activities that have contributed to the crisis in northern Ethiopia or have obstructed a ceasefire or peace process to resolve such crisis;
- to be a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of Ethiopia, the Government of Eritrea or its ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the Amhara regional government, or the Amhara regional or irregular forces;
- to be a spouse or adult child of any sanctioned person;
- to be or have been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of any of the following, where the leader, official, senior executive officer, or director is responsible for or complicit in, or who has directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in, any activity contributing to the crisis in northern Ethiopia:
- an entity, including a government entity or a military or security force, operating in northern Ethiopia during the tenure of the leader, official, senior executive officer, or director;
- an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in any activity contributing to the crisis in northern Ethiopia or obstructing a ceasefire or a peace process to resolve such crisis during the tenure of the leader, official, senior executive officer, or director; or
- the Government of Ethiopia, the Government of Eritrea or its ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the Amhara regional government, or the Amhara regional or irregular forces, on or after November 1, 2020;
- to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any sanctioned person; or
- to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any sanctioned person.
Upon designation of any such foreign person, the Secretary of the Treasury may select from a menu of sanctions options to implement as follows:
- the blocking of all property and interests in property of the sanctioned person that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person, and provide that such property and interests in property may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in;
- the prohibiting of any United States person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of the sanctioned person;
- the prohibiting of any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credit to the sanctioned person;
- the prohibiting of any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person has any interest; or
- the imposing on the leader, official, senior executive officer, or director of the sanctioned person, or on persons performing similar functions and with similar authorities as such leader, official, senior executive officer, or director, any of the sanctions described in (1)-(4) above.
The restrictions above not only prohibit the contribution or provision of any “funds, goods, or services to, or for the benefit of” any sanctioned person, but also the receipt of any such contribution of provision of funds, goods, or services from any sanctioned person. Those persons subject to blocking sanctions would be added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”), while those subject to non-blocking sanctions would be added to the Non-SDN Menu-Based Sanctions List (“NS-MBS List”).[3]
In addition to the restrictions described above, the E.O. directs other heads of relevant executive departments and agencies to, as necessary and appropriate, to (1) “deny any specific license, grant, or any other specific permission or authority under any statute or regulation that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or technology to the sanctioned person” and (2) deny any visa to a leader, official, senior executive officer, director, or controlling shareholder of a sanctioned person.
OFAC’s “50 Percent Rule” Does Not Automatically Apply
Importantly, and unlike nearly all other sanctions programs administered by OFAC, this E.O. stipulates that OFAC’s “50 Percent Rule” does not automatically apply to any entity “owned in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, by one or more sanctioned persons, unless the entity is itself a sanctioned person” and the sanctions outlined within the E.O. are specifically applied. OFAC makes clear in Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) 923 and 924 that such restrictions do not automatically “flow down” to entities owned in whole or in part by sanctioned persons regardless of whether such persons are listed on OFAC’s SDN List or NS-MBS List.
Parallel Issuance of New General Licenses and FAQs to Support Wide Range of Humanitarian Efforts
Recognizing the importance of humanitarian efforts to addressing the ongoing crisis in northern Ethiopia, OFAC concurrently issued three General Licenses and six related FAQs:
- General License 1, “Official Activities of Certain International Organizations and Other International Entities,” authorizes all transactions and activities for the conduct of the official business of certain enumerated international and non-governmental organizations by their employees, grantees, or contractors. FAQ 925 provides additional information on which United Nations organizations are included within this authorization.
- General License 2, “Certain Transactions in Support of Nongovernmental Organizations’ Activities,” authorizes transactions and activities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to certain enumerated activities by non-governmental organizations, including humanitarian projects, democracy-building initiatives, education programs, non-commercial development projects, and environmental or natural resource protection programs. FAQ 926 provides additional examples of the types of transactions and activities involving non-governmental organizations included within this authorization.
- General License 3, “Transactions Related to the Exportation or Reexportation of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, Medical Devices, Replacement Parts and Components, or Software Updates,” authorizes transactions and activities ordinarily incident and necessary to the exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices, and software updates for medical devices to Ethiopia or Eritrea, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to Ethiopia or Eritrea. The authorization is limited to those items within the definition of “covered items” as stipulated in the general license, and the general license includes a note that the compliance requirements of other federal agencies, including the licensing requirements of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), still apply. As of this writing, licenses from BIS for exports to Ethiopia are still required for any items controlled for reasons of chemical and biological weapons (CB1 and CB2), nuclear nonproliferation (NP1), national security (NS1, NS2), missile technology (MT1), regional security (RS1 and RS2), and crime control (CC1 and CC2) unless a license exception under the Export Administration Regulations (15 C.F.R. § 730 et seq.) applies.
Concluding Thoughts and Predictions
The implementation of this new sanctions program targeting “widespread violence, atrocities, and serious human rights abuse” in Ethiopia highlights the Biden administration’s efforts to apply pressure to Ethiopian and Eritrean forces to implement a ceasefire and permit the free flow of humanitarian aid into the Tigray region. We will continue to monitor further developments to see how the Biden administration chooses to deploy the flexible tools of economic pressure that it has created. As noted, we anticipate that, based on the administration’s recent past practice, its approach to designations under the new Ethiopia-related sanctions program will be gradual and measured as opposed to sweeping. Notably, the administration’s decision to create a new sanctions program as opposed to simply designating additional individuals and entities under an existing OFAC program (such as the Global Magnitsky sanctions program) may indicate the administration’s desire to put the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments on alert before additional actions are taken. The new Ethiopian sanctions program’s broad general licenses as well as the non-application of OFAC’s “50 Percent Rule” give further support to this assessment.
Moreover, the new sanctions program appears calibrated to minimize any collateral effects on international and non-governmental organizations operating within the humanitarian aid space, and may signal that the Biden administration will include broad humanitarian allowances in new sanctions actions moving forward.
Although the Department of the Treasury had not yet designated any foreign persons pursuant to this new sanctions regime, companies considering engaging with parties in the Horn of Africa should remain abreast of any new developments and designations, as unauthorized interactions with designated persons can result in significant monetary penalties and reputational harm to individuals and entities in breach of OFAC’s regulations.
__________________________
[1] According to the accompanying press release from the Department of the Treasury, the imposition of new sanctions represents an escalation of the Biden administration’s efforts to hold accountable those persons “responsible for or complicit in actions or policies that expand or extend the ongoing crisis or obstruct a ceasefire or peace process in northern Ethiopia or commit serious human rights abuse.” In the same statement, the Treasury Department made clear the purpose of the E.O. was to target “actors contributing to the crisis in northern Ethiopia” and was not “directed at the people of Ethiopia, Eritrea, or the greater Horn of Africa region.”
[2] For more on Myanmar sanctions developments, please see our prior client alerts on February 16, 2021, and April 2, 2021.
[3] For more background on the NS-MBS List, please see our December 2020 client alert which discussed the designation of Republic of Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries (“SSB’) to the then newly created NS-MBS List. To date, SSB remains the only designee on the NS-MBS List.
The following Gibson Dunn lawyers assisted in preparing this client update: Chris Mullen, Audi Syarief, Judith Alison Lee, Adam Smith, Stephanie Connor, Christopher Timura, Allison Lewis, and Scott Toussaint.
Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding the above developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, the authors, or any of the following leaders and members of the firm’s International Trade practice group:
United States:
Judith Alison Lee – Co-Chair, International Trade Practice, Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3591, [email protected])
Ronald Kirk – Co-Chair, International Trade Practice, Dallas (+1 214-698-3295, [email protected])
Jose W. Fernandez – New York (+1 212-351-2376, [email protected])
Nicola T. Hanna – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7269, [email protected])
Marcellus A. McRae – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7675, [email protected])
Adam M. Smith – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3547, [email protected])
Stephanie L. Connor – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8586, [email protected])
Christopher T. Timura – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3690, [email protected])
Courtney M. Brown – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8685, [email protected])
Laura R. Cole – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3787, [email protected])
Chris R. Mullen – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8250, [email protected])
Samantha Sewall – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3509, [email protected])
Audi K. Syarief – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8266, [email protected])
Scott R. Toussaint – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3588, [email protected])
Shuo (Josh) Zhang – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8270, [email protected])
Asia:
Kelly Austin – Hong Kong (+852 2214 3788, [email protected])
Fang Xue – Beijing (+86 10 6502 8687, [email protected])
Qi Yue – Beijing – (+86 10 6502 8534, [email protected])
Europe:
Attila Borsos – Brussels (+32 2 554 72 10, [email protected])
Nicolas Autet – Paris (+33 1 56 43 13 00, [email protected])
Susy Bullock – London (+44 (0)20 7071 4283, [email protected])
Patrick Doris – London (+44 (0)207 071 4276, [email protected])
Sacha Harber-Kelly – London (+44 20 7071 4205, [email protected])
Penny Madden – London (+44 (0)20 7071 4226, [email protected])
Steve Melrose – London (+44 (0)20 7071 4219, [email protected])
Matt Aleksic – London (+44 (0)20 7071 4042, [email protected])
Benno Schwarz – Munich (+49 89 189 33 110, [email protected])
Michael Walther – Munich (+49 89 189 33-180, [email protected])
Richard W. Roeder – Munich (+49 89 189 33-160, [email protected])
© 2021 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.
National Security is the highest priority of the Justice Department and remains a key focus for other enforcement agencies, including the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department, and State Department. This webcast will discuss developments and trends in enforcement across a wide range of national security topics. A team of national security practitioners with experience both inside and outside of government will address, among other things:
- Terrorism Financing
- Sanctions & Export Controls
- Theft of Intellectual Property & Economic Espionage
- Cyber Attacks and Ransomware
- The Foreign Agents Registration Act
- Foreign Investment in the United States
View Slides (PDF)
PANELISTS:
Zainab Ahmad, a partner in New York and co-chair of the firm’s National Security Practice Group, previously served as Deputy Chief of the National Security and Cybercrime section at the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of New York. Ms. Ahmad is a decorated former prosecutor who has received both of DOJ’s highest honors, the Attorney General’s Award and the FBI Director’s Award, and whose work prosecuting terrorists was profiled by The New Yorker magazine. Her practice is international and focuses on cross-border white collar defense and investigations, including corruption, anti-money laundering, sanctions and FCPA issues, as well as data privacy and cybersecurity matters.
David Burns, a partner in Washington, D.C. and co-chair of the firm’s National Security Practice Group, served in senior positions in both the National Security Division and the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. As Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the National Security Division he supervised the Division’s investigations and prosecutions, including counterterrorism, counterintelligence, economic espionage, cyber hacking, FARA, disclosure of classified information, and sanctions and export controls matters. Mr. Burns’ practice focuses on national security, white-collar criminal defense, internal investigations, and regulatory enforcement matters.
Robert Hur, a partner in Washington, D.C. and co-chair of the firm’s Crisis Management Practice Group, served as the 48th United States Attorney for the District of Maryland. During his tenure as United States Attorney, the Office handled numerous high-profile matters including those involving national security, cybercrime, public corruption, and financial fraud. Before serving as United States Attorney, Mr. Hur served as the Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General (“PADAG”) at the Department of Justice, a member of the Department’s senior leadership team and the principal counselor to Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein. Mr. Hur assisted with oversight of all components of the Department, including the National Security Division. Civil, Criminal, and Antitrust Divisions, all 93 U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He also liaised regularly on behalf of the Justice Department with the White House, Congressional committees, and federal intelligence, enforcement and regulatory agencies.
Adam M. Smith, a partner in Washington, D.C., was Senior Advisor to the Director of the U.S. Treasury Department’s OFAC and the Director for Multilateral Affairs on the National Security Council. His practice focuses on international trade compliance and white collar investigations, including with respect to federal and state economic sanctions enforcement, the FCPA, embargoes, and export controls. He routinely advises multi-national corporations regarding regulatory aspects of international business.
Courtney Brown, a senior associate in Washington, D.C., practices in the areas of white collar criminal defense and corporate compliance. Ms. Brown has experience representing and advising multinational corporate clients and boards of directors in internal and government investigations on a wide range of topics, including anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, healthcare fraud, sanctions, securities, and tax. She has participated in two government-mandated FCPA compliance monitorships and conducted compliance trainings for in-house counsel and employees.
MCLE CREDIT INFORMATION:
This program has been approved for credit in accordance with the requirements of the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board for a maximum of 1.5 credit hours, of which 1.5 credit hours may be applied toward the areas of professional practice requirement. This course is approved for transitional/non-transitional credit.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP certifies that this activity has been approved for MCLE credit by the State Bar of California in the amount of 1.25 hours.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP is authorized by the Solicitors Regulation Authority to provide in-house CPD training. This program is approved for CPD credit in the amount of 1 hour. Regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (Number 324652).
Neither the Connecticut Judicial Branch nor the Commission on Minimum Continuing Legal Education approve or accredit CLE providers or activities. It is the opinion of this provider that this activity qualifies for up to 1.25 hours toward your annual CLE requirement in Connecticut, including 0 hour(s) of ethics/professionalism.
Application for approval is pending with the Colorado, Illinois, Texas, Virginia and Washington State Bars.
Participants should anticipate receiving their certificates of attendance via e-mail in approximately 8 weeks following the webcast.
On September 9, the Supreme Court of California issued its ruling in Sandoval v. Qualcomm Inc., No. S252796, ___ Cal.5th ___. The decision is the latest in a line of cases reinforcing the strong presumption under California law that a person who hires an independent contractor delegates to the contractor all responsibility for the safety of contract workers.
In Sandoval, a contract worker hired by Qualcomm to examine electrical equipment on its campus was severely injured. He sued Qualcomm for negligence and premises liability under the theory that Qualcomm should have implemented more precautions that would have protected him from injuring himself on a live circuit. A jury found Qualcomm liable for negligently exercising control over the worksite, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Cuéllar, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Qualcomm. The Court explained that because contractors are generally hired based on their expertise and independence, there is a strong presumption that all responsibility for ensuring the safety of contract workers rests with contractors, not the hirer. And although there are exceptions to that general rule when the hirer fails to disclose a concealed hazard to the contractor or retains control over the contractor’s work and affirmatively contributes to the worker’s injury, neither of those narrow exceptions applied to this case.
I. The Court Narrowly Construes the Hooker Retained-Control Exception to the Presumption That Hirers Are Not Liable for Injuries to Contract Workers
California law recognizes a presumption that a hirer of an independent contractor delegates to the contractor all responsibility for injuries to contract workers. That rule is grounded in the principles that hirers typically do not control the work of contractors and that contractors have a greater ability to perform contracted work safely and, if necessary, can build the cost of safety measures into the contract.
There are two exceptions to this general rule. The first, not at issue in Sandoval, applies when the hirer owns or operates the property on which work occurs and fails to disclose a concealed hazard to the contractor and its workers. The second, which was at issue in Sandoval, is the “Hooker” or “retained control” exception. It permits hirer liability “if the hirer retains control over any part of the work and actually exercises that control so as to affirmatively contribute to the worker’s injury.” See id. at [p. 12]. The Court has been reluctant to add to these two exceptions; in Gonzalez v. Mathis (Aug. 19, 2021) No. S247677, ___ Cal.5th ___, decided last month, the Court declined to recognize a third exception that would have held hirers liable for injuries to contract workers from known hazards on the premises that could not be avoided through reasonable precautions.
Sandoval addresses “the meaning of Hooker’s three key concepts: retained control, actual exercise, and affirmative contribution.” Sandoval, supra, at [p. 17].
Retained control. For Hooker to apply, the hirer must “retain[] a sufficient degree of authority over the manner of performance of the work entrusted to the contractor.” Id. The hirer must “sufficiently limit the contractor’s freedom to perform the contracted work in the contractor’s own manner.” Id. at [p. 18]. And that interference with the contractor’s work must be meaningful: A hirer can exercise a “broad general power of supervision and control”—including by maintaining a right to inspect, stop work, make recommendations, or prescribe alterations—without “retaining control” over the contracted work. Id. at [pp. 18–19]. Under that framework, the Court concluded that “Qualcomm did not retain control over the inspection merely by declining to shut down [all] circuits” or failing to let the contractor do so. Id. at [p. 27].
Actual exercise. A hirer “actually exercises” retained control if it involves itself to such an extent that the contractor “is not entirely free to do the work in [its] own manner.” Id. at [p. 20] (citation omitted). This analysis requires a finding that the hirer “exert[ed] some influence over the manner in which the contracted work is performed,” either through “direction, participation, or induced reliance.” Id. Notably, however, the Court made clear that “actual exercise” does not require active participation by the hirer—Sandoval approvingly cited a decision applying the Hooker exception to a hirer that had merely “contractually prohibited” a contractor from undertaking certain safety measures. See id. at [p. 21 n.6]. With respect to Sandoval’s case, the Court concluded that Qualcomm did not “actually exercise” any retained control because the contractor “remained entirely free to implement (or not) any . . . precautions in its own manner,” a decision “over which Qualcomm exerted no influence.” Id. at [p. 28].
Affirmative contribution. Finally, “affirmative contribution” requires that the hirer’s exercise of retained control “contribute[] to the injury in a way that isn’t merely derivative of the contractor’s contribution.” Id. at [p. 21]. The hirer must, in other words, “induce[]” the injury rather than merely “fail[] to prevent” it. Id. The Court also corrected two misconceptions in decisions applying Hooker. First, it clarified that both “affirmative” acts and failures to act can support liability—the relevant question is “the relationship between the hirer’s conduct and the contractor’s conduct” and whether “the hirer’s exercise of retained control contributes to the injury independently of the contractor’s contribution (if any).” Id. at [pp. 22–23]. Second, the affirmative-contribution requirement is distinct from substantial-factor causation; negligent hiring, for instance, may be a substantial factor in a contract worker’s injury, but it does not affirmatively contribute to that injury because it derives from the contractor’s negligence. Id. at [p. 23]. Applying this analysis to Sandoval’s case, the Court held that even if Qualcomm had exercised some form of retained authority by leaving protective covers over live circuits, those actions did not “affirmatively contribute” to the contractor’s injuries—that conduct, the Court explained, had no role in the contractor’s decision to open the protective cover. Id. at [p. 29].
II. Implications of the Court’s Decision
Gonzalez and Sandoval both demonstrate that the California Supreme Court is committed to preserving the presumption that hirers aren’t liable for injuries to contract workers and will not lightly expand or broadly construe exceptions to that general rule. Gonzalez rejected a plaintiff’s effort to add a new exception, and Sandoval reinforces the narrowness of the existing exceptions. By clarifying that hirers must actually exercise any retained authority and affirmatively contribute to a contract worker’s injury before facing liability under Hooker, Sandoval sends a strong signal to businesses that they can hire independent contractors, set general guidelines, and maintain some supervisory authority over the contractors’ work without exposing themselves to potential liability.
Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the California Supreme Court, or in state or federal appellate courts in California. Please feel free to contact the following lawyers in California, or any member of the Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Group.
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7000, [email protected])
Julian W. Poon – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7758, [email protected])
Theane Evangelis – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7726, [email protected])
Bradley J. Hamburger – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7658, [email protected])
Michael Holecek – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7018, [email protected])
Daniel R. Adler – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7634, [email protected])
Ryan Azad – San Francisco (+1 415-393-8276, [email protected])
Matt Aidan Getz – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7754, [email protected])
© 2021 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.
For the sixth successive Congress, Gibson Dunn is pleased to release a table of authorities summarizing the investigative authorities of each House and Senate committee. Understanding the full extent of a committee’s investigative arsenal is crucial to successfully navigating a congressional investigation.
Congressional committees have broad investigatory powers. These authorities include the power to issue subpoenas to compel witnesses to produce documents, testify at committee hearings, and, in some cases, appear for depositions. Committees generally may adopt their own procedural rules for issuing subpoenas, taking testimony, and conducting depositions; in the House, general deposition procedures applicable to all committees are subject to regulations issued by the Chair of the Committee on Rules. In addition to the rules included in our Table of Authorities, committees also are subject to the rules of the full House or Senate.
The failure to comply with a subpoena and adhere to committee rules during an investigation may have severe legal, strategic, and reputational consequences. Indeed, if a subpoena recipient refuses to comply with a subpoena adequately, committees may resort to additional demands, initiate contempt proceedings and/or generate negative press coverage of the noncompliant recipient. Although rarely utilized, criminal contempt prosecutions can also be brought in the event of willful refusals to comply with lawful congressional subpoenas. As we have detailed in a prior client alert this year, however, defenses exist to congressional subpoenas, including challenging a committee’s jurisdiction, asserting attorney-client privilege and work product claims, and raising constitutional challenges.[1]
We have highlighted noteworthy changes in the committee rules below, which House and Senate Committees of the 117th Congress adopted earlier this year.
Some items of note:
House:
- Pursuant to the House Rules of the 117th Congress, every House committee chair of a standing committee, as well as the Chair of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, is empowered to issue deposition subpoenas unilaterally, that is, without the Ranking Member’s consent or a committee vote, after “consultation” with the Ranking Member.[2]
- In the 116th Congress, the House eliminated a prior requirement that one or more members of Congress be present during a deposition.[3] The House rules for the 117th Congress likewise do not require a member to be present for a deposition.[4] Without having to accommodate members’ schedules, these provisions make taking depositions significantly easier.
- The Rules of the 117th Congress have reauthorized two oversight select committees, the Select Committee on the Climate Crisis and the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, which will proceed with the mandates they were provided in the prior Congress.[5] The Rules also created the bipartisan Select Committee on Economic Disparity and Fairness in Growth, established by House Democrats to “investigate, study, make findings, and develop recommendations on policies, strategies, and innovations to make our economy work for everyone, empowering American economic growth while ensuring that no one is left out or behind in the 21st Century Economy.”[6] Recently, House Democrats also established the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capital, which is directed “[t]o investigate and report upon the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the January 6, 2021, domestic terrorist attack upon the United States Capitol Complex . . . and relating to the interference with the peaceful transfer of power.”[7]
- Note that while the Select Committee on Economic Disparity and Fairness in Growth lacks independent subpoena power, it may request standing committees with appropriate jurisdiction to issue them. The Select Committee on the Coronavirus Crisis and the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol have subpoena power; staff deposition authority, enforceable by subpoena; and the authority to issue interrogatories enforceable by subpoena. Hence, they have more investigative tools at their disposal than do standing House committees.
- The House Rules Committee has reissued regulations instituted in the 116th Congress governing depositions by committee counsel. Of note, these rules allow for the immediate overruling of objections raised by a witness’s counsel and immediate instructions to answer, on pain of contempt.[8] As a result, this procedure seemingly eliminates the witness’s right to appeal rulings on objections to the full committee without risking contempt (although committee members may still appeal). This procedure was intended to streamline the deposition process, as prior to the 116th Congress, the staff deposition regulations required a recess before the Chair could rule on an objection. The Rules Committee’s deposition regulations also expressly allow for depositions to continue from day-to-day[9] and permit, with notice from the Chair, questioning by members and staff of more than one committee.[10] Objections from staff counsel or members are also permitted, not just by the witness and his or her lawyer.[11]
- As the COVID pandemic continues, the House Rules Committee has adopted special regulations governing remote hearings, which were first authorized in the prior Congress.[12] The regulations address several practical considerations, including a mandate that members “must be visible on the [remote] software platform’s video function to be considered in attendance and to participate unless connectivity issues or other technical problems render the member unable to fully participate on camera” and that “[m]embers and witnesses participating remotely should appear before a nonpolitical, professionally appropriate background that is minimally distracting to other members and witnesses, to the greatest extent possible.” The rules also require committee chairs to “respect members’ disparate time zones when scheduling committee proceedings,” meaning few remote hearings will be scheduled before midday, Eastern Standard Time. The regulations also authorize remote depositions in accordance with the same rules and procedures as required for in-person depositions.[13]
Senate:
- In contrast to the House, where virtually every chair has unilateral subpoena authority, only the Chair of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (“PSI”) can issue a subpoena without the consent of the Ranking Member. With the exception of PSI, the rules of the remaining Senate Committees allow for the Ranking Member to object to a subpoena issuance within a specified timeframe of receiving notice from the Chair, requiring a majority vote to issue a subpoena. In prior Congresses, the minority at times used the majority vote requirement as a delaying tactic, but rarely ever prevented a subpoena issuance since the vote would proceed along party lines. However, the majority vote requirement assumes greater significance this Congress given the Senate’s 50-50 split and power-sharing agreement between the parties. The agreement provides that each Committee must be equally composed of Democrats and Republicans, meaning a party-line vote on a subpoena issuance would result in a deadlock. Senate procedure permits a motion to discharge a “measure or matter,” which we believe would include a subpoena, but we think this procedure would be employed only in extraordinary cases. Hence, investigations that require the issuance of subpoenas likely will need to be bipartisan.
- As in the last Congress, seven Senate committees have received express authorization to take depositions. The Judiciary Committee and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations receive the authority to do so each Congress from the Senate’s funding resolution.[14] The Aging and Indian Affairs Committees are authorized to conduct depositions by S. Res. 4 in 1977. The Ethics Committee’s deposition power is authorized by S. Res. 338 in 1964, which created the Committee and is incorporated into its rules each Congress. And the Intelligence Committee was authorized to take depositions by S. Res. 400 in 1976, which it too incorporates into its rules each Congress. Of these, staff is expressly authorized to take depositions except in the Indian Affairs and Intelligence Committees.[15] The Senate’s view appears to be that Senate Rules do not authorize staff depositions pursuant to subpoena. Hence, Senate committees cannot delegate that authority to themselves through committee rules. It is thus understood that such authority can be conferred upon a committee only through a Senate resolution.[16]
- The Committees on Agriculture, Commerce, and Foreign Relations authorize depositions in their rules. However such deposition authority has not been expressly authorized by the Senate and, hence, it is not clear whether appearance at a deposition can be compelled.
- The Judiciary Committee remains the only committee to expressly require a member to be present for a deposition. This requirement may be waived by agreement of the Chair and Ranking Member. In addition, the Rules of the Select Committee on Intelligence require a quorum of one member for purposes of taking sworn testimony, but it is not specified whether this would include depositions.
Our table of authorities provides an overview of how individual committees can compel a witness to cooperate with their investigations. But each committee conducts congressional investigations in its own particular way, and investigations vary materially even within a particular committee. While our table of authorities provides a general overview of what rules apply in given circumstances, it is essential to look carefully at a committee’s rules and be familiar with its practices to understand specifically how its authorities apply in a particular context.
Gibson Dunn lawyers have extensive experience defending targets of and witnesses in congressional investigations. They know how investigative committees operate and can anticipate strategies and moves in particular circumstances because they also ran or advised on congressional investigations when they worked on the Hill. If you have any questions about how a committee’s rules apply in a given circumstance or the ways in which a particular committee tends to exercise its authorities, please feel free to contact us for assistance. We are available to assist should a congressional committee seek testimony, information or documents from you.
Table of Authorities of House and Senate Committees:
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[1] See Congressional Investigations in the 117th Congress: Choppy Waters Ahead for the Private Sector?, https://www.gibsondunn.com/congressional-investigations-in-the-117th-congress-choppy-waters-ahead-for-the-private-sector/.
[2] See H.R. Res. 8, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (2021).
[3] See H.R. Res. 6, 116th Cong. § 103(a)(1) (2019).
[4] See H.R. Res. 8, 117th Cong. § 3(b) (2021).
[5] Id. §§ 4(d), (f).
[6] Id. § 4(d)(g).
[7] See H. R. Res. 503, § 3(1), 117th Cong. (2021).
[8] See 167 Cong. Rec. H41 (Jan. 4, 2021) (117th Congress Regulations for Use of Deposition Authority).
[9] Id. The regulations provide that deposition questions “shall be propounded in rounds” and that the length of each round “shall not exceed 60 minutes per side” with equal time to the majority and minority. The regulations, however, do not expressly limit the number of rounds of questioning. In this manner, they differ from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which expressly limit the length of depositions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1) (“Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a deposition is limited to 1 day of 7 hours.”).
[10] See 167 Cong. Rec. H41.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] See S. Res. 70, § 13(e) (2019) (Judiciary); id. § 12(e)(3)(E) (Homeland Security).
[15] However, Rule 8.3 of the Rules of the Senate Intelligence Committee allows staff to question witnesses if authorized by the Chair, Vice Chair, or Presiding Member, though depositions are not specified.
[16] See Jay R. Shampansky, Cong. Research Serv., 95-949 A, Staff Depositions in Congressional Investigations 8 & n.24 (1999); 6 Op. O.L.C. 503, 506 n.3 (1982). The OLC memo relies heavily on the argument that the Senate Rules never mentioned depositions at that time and those rules still do not mention depositions today.
The following Gibson Dunn attorneys assisted in preparing this client update: Michael D. Bopp, Thomas G. Hungar, Roscoe Jones, Jr., Tommy McCormac, and Amanda LeSavage.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these issues. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work or the following lawyers in the firm’s Congressional Investigations group in Washington, D.C.:
Michael D. Bopp – Chair, Congressional Investigations Group (+1 202-955-8256, [email protected])
Thomas G. Hungar (+1 202-887-3784, [email protected])
Roscoe Jones, Jr. (+1 202-887-3530, [email protected])
© 2021 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.
Since the collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul more than three weeks ago, tens of thousands of Afghans, along with U.S. citizens and U.S. permanent residents, have desperately tried to flee the country and the Taliban’s oppressive rule. This humanitarian crisis continued to worsen as the emergency evacuation operation ran up against the deadline of U.S. withdrawal on August 31, 2021. Some of the most vulnerable Afghans at risk of imminent harm from the Taliban include those who previously supported the U.S. military or government, promoted democracy in Afghanistan, or worked on behalf of women’s rights, as well as members of ethnic and religious minorities. As of today, thousands of Afghans continue to search for safe pathways out of the country.
Over the past few weeks, Gibson Dunn sprang into action to help individuals at heightened risk of Taliban reprisals evacuate to safety. Section I of this report briefly summarizes some of the events on the ground in Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the humanitarian crisis that has resulted from recent developments. Section II highlights the Firm’s efforts, which are still ongoing and evolving to meet the rapidly changing situation in Afghanistan and across the globe. Understanding that many families are in urgent need of short-term evacuation from Afghanistan as well as long-term immigration relief, our teams are taking a holistic approach that focuses both on helping at-risk individuals pursue pathways to enter the United States as expeditiously as possible and on identifying ways they can obtain lawful immigration status in the United States on a permanent basis. Additional information detailing several avenues of legal relief—humanitarian parole, Special Immigrant Visas (“SIVs”), refugee resettlement, and asylum—can be found in Section III of this report. If you are interested in learning more about these efforts or how to get involved, please reach out to Katie Marquart, Partner & Pro Bono Chair.
I. Overview of the Current Situation in Afghanistan
The United States completed its military withdrawal ahead of its August 31 deadline, which had been set pursuant to an agreement with the Taliban signed in February 2020. Since the evacuation operation began on August 14, more than 123,000 people, most of them Afghans, have been evacuated, according to the U.S. government. But thousands more have been left behind, including Afghan interpreters and others who worked directly alongside U.S. military and government officials. In acknowledging that it did not get everyone out of the country that it wanted to, the United States has promised to find other ways for individuals to leave Afghanistan that do not require a U.S. military presence.
Even before the withdrawal of troops, the Taliban made it more difficult for civilians to flee the country and find safe harbor by erecting checkpoints and controlling access to Hamid Karzai International Airport and Afghanistan’s land borders. Those who were able to reach the airport faced additional dangers of being crushed by crowds, abused by the Taliban, and targeted by terrorist attacks like the August 26 ISIS-K suicide attack that killed nearly 200 people.
With U.S. and allied forces now gone, the road to safety has gotten even more challenging. Despite this, thousands of people are continuing to search for pathways to safety. Gibson Dunn will not stop working on behalf of these families. Rather, we will pursue all legal avenues to ensure that Afghans eligible to travel to another country will be not be turned away.
II. Gibson Dunn’s Efforts on Behalf of Affected Families
More than 100 Gibson Dunn attorneys and staff are working on the cases of dozens of families—well over 200 people—seeking refuge in the United States to escape the Taliban regime. These families, like many others, face a heightened risk of persecution, physical violence, and even death because of their collaboration with the U.S. military or government, their work to promote the Afghan government and civil society, or their public support for causes seen as antithetical to the Taliban’s rule.
These families’ stories are incredibly compelling. Several were interpreters for the U.S. military, including for Gibson Dunn associates who previously served in the U.S. military, while others were members of the Afghan military and Afghan National Police working alongside U.S. forces in hostile regions. Others are women and children whose husbands and fathers already immigrated to the United States on SIVs to begin building a home for their families. Some are pregnant or have infants and small children. Some are being targeted because they were journalists, open critics of the Taliban, or female professionals. Many of our clients already have faced threats and physical abuse at the hands of the Taliban, while others are being actively hunted by the Taliban. Although many of these families initially wished to remain in Afghanistan to help rebuild their home country, recent developments made them face the difficult reality that they had to leave.
The danger these families face cannot be overstated. A handful of families were able to safely escape before the American withdrawal, but many remain in hiding. Some families have abandoned their houses and are now homeless with limited, dwindling resources—and no way of supporting themselves given their need to stay hidden and evade the Taliban’s attention. Many are afraid the internet will be cut at any time, leaving them without any lifeline outside the country. Most can only communicate at certain times of the day, when there is less risk the Taliban will find them and search their phones for U.S. phone numbers or English messages. All are afraid the Taliban will find them and their families before they can escape.
In light of the severe risks and the urgency of these families’ need to travel to the United States, we have advocated for our clients using every avenue at our disposal. We have called on members of Congress, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security, as well as former government officials, to seek their help and insight. We gathered intelligence from teams on the ground to notify our clients of critical information in real time. While the United States remained in Afghanistan, we were also able to connect our clients inside the airport with U.S.-sponsored non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) coordinating flights to ensure they were placed on manifests when possible.
Although the current situation is dire, we continue to fight for those who remain in Afghanistan until they can find their way to safety. This includes helping our corporate clients whose employees and representatives in Afghanistan similarly have found themselves in need of immediate assistance to escape persecution and leave the country. We have provided round-the-clock assistance to help our corporate clients navigate legal challenges in carrying out emergency on-the-ground actions related to their evacuation efforts and measures to ensure employee safety.
Our pro bono efforts thus far have largely focused on filing humanitarian parole applications to help families at risk of Taliban reprisals enter the United States on a temporary basis. Although our current focus is on helping these families reach safety outside Afghanistan, we also hope to assist with their long-term immigration cases upon arrival in the United States. Many of these families are eligible for SIVs or other priority visas and currently are awaiting resolution of their applications. The rest intend to apply for asylum upon their arrival in the United States. In the short term, however, we believe humanitarian parole remains the best chance for many of these families to gain authorization to travel to the United States.
III. Avenues of Legal Relief in the United States for Afghans Fleeing the Taliban
As we look ahead to what is to come, Gibson Dunn is eager to help provide access to the various forms of legal relief available to help these brave families. Although many logistical and safety challenges will persist, we are committed to doing what we can to help these courageous families navigate the legal pathways to obtaining temporary or permanent safe harbor in the United States or in other countries around the world. To date, most of our efforts have focused on resettlement into the United States. For that reason, we focus here on those avenues, which include: humanitarian parole for individuals facing urgent humanitarian needs; SIVs for those who worked for U.S. forces in Afghanistan; refugee admission under the P-1, P-2, and P-3 programs for certain Afghans who remain outside the United States; and asylum for those who arrive in the United States and are unable to return to Afghanistan.
A. Humanitarian Parole
Humanitarian parole is an option for temporary resettlement in the United States based on urgent humanitarian or significant public benefit needs. Under INA § 212(d)(5), the Secretary of Homeland Security “may, in his or her discretion, parole into the United States temporarily . . . on a case by case basis, for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, any alien applying for admission to the United States.” Although it is typically an extraordinary measure, humanitarian parole may be the most direct pathway for many Afghans to enter the United States, given the current situation in Afghanistan.
Because individuals can seek humanitarian parole for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” it is available to Afghan nationals who would not otherwise qualify for entry via SIV or the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (“USRAP”), discussed below. For example, humanitarian parole is an important option for those who worked for the Afghan government, collaborated with U.S. forces without meeting the stringent SIV employment requirements, or otherwise are in danger due to their beliefs or minority status. It also might be a more expeditious option for those who may qualify for SIV or USRAP resettlement, but who face such urgent danger that they cannot wait to be processed through those more traditional pathways. To reduce the processing time, applicants can request “expedited processing” in urgent, life-threatening situations. Given the exponential increase in the number of humanitarian parole applications filed in recent weeks, however, it is difficult to predict how long it will take to adjudicate these applications.
Afghans facing persecution by the Taliban can apply for humanitarian parole for themselves, without depending on a referral or support from an employer or other entity. Alternately, individuals in the United States, including SIV holders, can submit a petition for humanitarian parole on behalf of Afghans currently outside the United States. In either case, a financial sponsor with lawful immigration status in the United States must submit an affidavit agreeing to sponsor the parolee(s) upon arrival in the United States. If approved, parolees are permitted to enter the United States for a specified period of time (typically one year). Once in the United States, parolees can apply for asylum or obtain permanent residence through other lawful means.
B. Special Immigrant Visa
Recognizing the danger our Afghan allies faced due to their work with U.S. forces, Congress created the SIV programs in 2006 and 2009 to allow certain Afghans to resettle in the United States as legal permanent residents with access to resettlement assistance and other benefits. Afghan nationals who were employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan, or those who served as interpreters or translators for U.S. military personnel or under Chief of Mission Authority at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad or Kabul, may be eligible for SIVs. However, the SIV application process often takes many years—time that many Afghan allies no longer have.
There are two SIV programs for which Afghan allies, including their spouses and children under age 21, might be eligible. First, a limited number of SIVs is available under Section 1059. To qualify, an Afghan must have worked directly with U.S. forces or the Chief of Mission authority as a translator/interpreter for at least one year and must obtain a favorable recommendation from a General or Flag Officer in their chain of command or at the embassy where they worked. Second, and more commonly, Afghans can apply for SIVs under Section 602(b) if they (1) were employed for at least one year by the U.S. government, a U.S. government contractor, or the International Security Assistance Force working with U.S. forces; (2) provided faithful and valuable service; and (3) face an ongoing serious threat because of their qualifying work.
C. The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
Afghan nationals also may enter the United States through USRAP, which provides an opportunity for permanent resettlement in the Unites States to various classes of refugees. As a general rule, individuals seeking resettlement as refugees must be outside the United States and go through processing in a third country, rather than within their country of nationality.
- P-1 Refugees: The first of three categories under USRAP, Priority 1, is for individuals who have been referred by an Embassy, a designated NGO, or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), due to the applicant’s circumstances and need for resettlement. Typically, P-1 refugees are referred to the United States by UNHCR.
- P-2 Refugees: Priority 2 designations are given to individuals the Department of State determines to be part of a group of “special concern” due to their circumstances and need for resettlement. In August 2021, the Department of State announced that certain Afghan nationals and their family members who are at risk due to their affiliation with the United States may be eligible for refugee resettlement under the P-2 program. Eligible individuals could include Afghans who (1) did not meet the minimum time-in-service for an SIV but who otherwise would be eligible for an SIV; (2) worked for a U.S. government-funded program or project supported through a U.S. government grant; or (3) were employed by U.S.-based media organizations or NGOs in Afghanistan. Spouses and children of any age, whether married or unmarried, also can resettle in the United States with someone who has been given a P-2 designation. Although many Afghans might be eligible for resettlement under the P-2 program, there are two significant challenges. First, Afghans seeking refugee resettlement under the P-2 program must be referred by their employer; they cannot apply for themselves. Second, the State Department has not yet explained how or where processing, which includes interviews and security checks, will occur.
- P-3 Refugees: The third refugee designation, Priority 3, provides an opportunity for permanent resettlement for Afghan refugees outside Afghanistan who have immediate family members (i.e., spouses, parents, and children) who already have been admitted to the United States. The family member in the United States must file within five years of the date when they were admitted as a refugee or special immigrant, or granted asylum.
D. Asylum
In addition to these more extraordinary pathways, Afghans also may pursue more traditional avenues of immigration relief in the United States, such as family-based visas and asylum. Asylum, in particular, likely will be the next step for many Afghans who enter the United States via humanitarian parole. Like other immigrants, Afghans can apply for asylum if they fear persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. They can do so upon entry in the United States or within one year of entering the country.
IV. Conclusion
We understand that there is a long road ahead, and that the process of reaching physical safety is just beginning for many individuals and families facing the threat of violence from the Taliban. We will continue to fight for short- and long-term immigration solutions on behalf of these brave individuals and families, using every avenue at our disposal. Gibson Dunn also is engaging in broader efforts to assist these individuals and families as they resettle in countries across the globe. We hope these efforts, together with the work of so many other organizations that have pulled together to help evacuate and resettle vulnerable Afghans, will remind our Afghan allies that they are not forgotten, and that they have many advocates fighting for them.
Gibson Dunn lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have about these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work or the following:
Katie Marquart – New York (+1 212-351-5261, [email protected])
Patty Herold – Denver (+1 303-298-5727, [email protected])
© 2021 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.
The torrid pace of new securities class action filings over the last several years slowed a bit in the first half of 2021, a period in which there have been many notable developments in securities law. This mid-year update briefs you on major developments in federal and state securities law through June 2021:
- In Goldman Sachs, the Supreme Court found that lower courts should hear evidence regarding the impact of alleged misstatements on the price of securities to rebut any presumption of classwide reliance at the class-certification stage, and that defendants bear the burden of persuasion on this issue.
- Just before its summer recess, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pivotal Software, teeing up a decision on whether the PSLRA’s discovery-stay provision applies to state court actions, which may impact forum selection in private securities actions.
- We explore various developments in Delaware courts, including the relative decline of appraisal litigation, and the Court of Chancery’s (1) decision to enjoin a poison pill, (2) rejection of a claim that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material adverse effect, (3) approach in a potential bellwether SPAC case, and (4) analysis of post-close employment opportunities with respect to Revlon fiduciary duties.
- We continue to survey securities-related lawsuits arising in connection with the coronavirus pandemic, including securities class actions, stockholder derivative actions, and SEC enforcement actions.
- We examine developments under Lorenzo regarding disseminator liability and under Omnicare regarding liability for opinion statements.
- Finally, we explain important developments in the federal courts, including (1) the widening circuit split regarding the jurisdictional reach of the Exchange Act based on recent decisions in the First and Second Circuits, (2) the Eighth Circuit’s holding that class action allegations, including those under Section 10(b), can be struck from pleadings, (3) Congress’s codification of the SEC’s disgorgement authority in the National Defense Authorization Act, (4) a federal district court’s holding that a forum selection clause superseded anti-waiver provisions in the Exchange Act, and (5) the Ninth Circuit’s broad interpretation of the PSLRA’s safe harbor for forward-looking statements.
I. Filing and Settlement Trends
According to Cornerstone Research, both the number of new filings and the average approved settlement amount in securities class actions decreased relative to the same period last year and historically. However, the number of approved settlements is the highest it has been since the second half of 2017, indicating that 2021 may be on track to set a record in terms of the number of approved securities class action settlements even if the total dollar amount falls short of last year.
The decline in total filings is driven by a sharp decline in new mergers and acquisitions filings, which are at the lowest level since the second half of 2014. Despite the decline in filings, 2021 has nonetheless already set a record for new SPAC-related filings by doubling both the 2020 and 2019 full-year totals in this category.
A. Filing Trends
Figure 1 below reflects filing rates for the first half of 2021 (all charts courtesy of Cornerstone Research). The first half of the year saw 112 new class action securities filings, a nearly 40% decrease from the same period last year and a 25% decrease from the second half of 2020. The decrease is largely driven by a drop in new M&A filings, from 64 and 35 in the two halves of 2020, respectively, to 12 in the first half of 2021. This represents a 66% decline in M&A filings from the second half of 2020, and 83% decline against the biannual average for M&A filings dating back through 2016.
Figure 1:
Semiannual Number of Class Action Filings (CAF Index®)
January 2012 – June 2021
B. Industry and Other Trends in Cases Filed
Keeping with recent trends, new filings against consumer non-cyclical firms continued to make up the majority of new federal, non-M&A filings in the first half of 2021, as shown in Figure 2 below. New filings against communications and technology sector firms remained fairly steady, and an increase in filings against firms in the consumer cyclical and energy sectors partially offset the decline in filings against firms in the basic materials, industrial and financial sectors.
Figure 2:
Core Federal Filings by Industry
January 1997 – June 2021
As noted at the start and illustrated in Figure 3 below, the number of SPAC-related filings in the first half of 2021 exceeds those filed in both 2019 and 2020 combined. The increase is driven by filings in the consumer cyclical industry, and specifically, firms in the Auto manufacturers and Auto Parts & Equipment industries. In addition to notable activity in the SPAC space, cybersecurity-, cryptocurrency- and cannabis-related filings are all on pace to meet or exceed the 2020 totals, and 2021’s increased activity in ransomware attacks has already resulted in an uptick in cybersecurity filings in the second half of 2021. On the other hand, the majority of the new filings related to COVID-19 occurred earlier in the year, indicating that, as mentioned below, it is still too early to tell what the full year brings in terms of filings related to COVID-19.
Figure 3:
Summary of Trend Case Filings
January 2017 – June 2021
C. Settlement Trends
As shown in Figure 4, the total settlement dollars, adjusted for inflation, is down 72.7% against the same period last year despite a 35% increase in the number of settlements approved. Two settlements in the first half of 2021 exceeded $100 million, as compared to six such settlements last year and four in 2019, and the median value of approved settlements through the first half of the year is $7.9 million, reflecting an 18% decline against the same period last year. The difference between the magnitude of the decline in settlement amounts is likely driven by an outlier settlement in first half of last year.
Figure 4:
Total Settlement Dollars (in billions)
January 2016 – June 2021
II. What to Watch for in the Supreme Court
A. Supreme Court Issues Narrow Decision in Price-Impact Case
As we previewed in our 2020 Year-End Securities Litigation Update, in Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, 141 S. Ct. 1951 (2021), the Supreme Court this Term considered questions regarding price-impact analysis at the class-certification stage in securities class actions. Recall that in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014) (“Halliburton II”), the Supreme Court preserved the “fraud-on-the-market” theory that enables courts to presume classwide reliance in Rule 10b-5 cases, but also permitted defendants to rebut that presumption with evidence that the alleged misrepresentation did not affect the issuer’s stock price.
Goldman Sachs presented the Court with the opportunity to decide how courts can address cases in which plaintiffs plead fraud through the “inflation maintenance” price impact theory, which claims that misstatements caused a preexisting inflated price to be maintained instead of causing the artificial inflation in the first instance. In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court accepted two questions for review: (1) “[w]hether a defendant in a securities class action may rebut the presumption of classwide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements in showing that the statements had no impact on the price of the security, even though that evidence is also relevant to the substantive element of materiality,” and (2) “[w]hether a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption has only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Goldman Sachs, 141 S. Ct. 1951 (No. 20-222).
In its June 21, 2021 decision, the Court declined to take a position on the “validity or . . . contours” of the inflation-maintenance theory in general, which it has never directly approved. Goldman Sachs, 141 S. Ct. at 1959 n.1. On the first question, the Court unanimously agreed with the parties that lower courts should hear evidence—including expert evidence—and rely on common sense to make determinations at the class-certification stage as to whether the alleged misrepresentations were so generic that they did not distort the price of securities. Id. at 1960. This analysis is permitted at the class-certification stage even though such evidence may also be relevant to the question of materiality, which is reserved for the merits stage. Id. at 1955 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans and Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 462 (2013)). Importantly, the Court noted that in the context of an inflation-maintenance theory, the mismatch between generic misrepresentations and later, specific corrective disclosures will be a key consideration in the price-impact analysis. Goldman Sachs, 141 S. Ct. at 1961. “Under those circumstances, it is less likely that the specific disclosure actually corrected the generic misrepresentation, which means that there is less reason to infer front-end price inflation—that is, price impact—from the back-end price drop.” Id. The Court, with only Justice Sotomayor dissenting, then remanded the case for further consideration of the generic nature of the statements at issue here, explicitly directing the Second Circuit to “take into account all record evidence relevant to price impact, regardless whether that evidence overlaps with materiality or any other merits issue.” Id. (emphasis in original).
As to the second question, the Court held by a 6–3 majority that defendants at the class-certification stage bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of price impact in order to rebut the presumption of reliance—that is, to convince the court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged statements did not affect the price of securities. The Court determined that this rule had already been established by its previous decisions in Basic and Halliburton II: Basic recognized that defendants could rebut the presumption of classwide reliance by making “[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and . . . the price,” and in Halliburton II, the Court again referenced defendants’ ability to rebut the Basic presumption with a “showing.” Id. at 1962 (internal citations omitted). The majority rejected an argument by the defendants, taken up by Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justices Thomas and Alito), that these references to a “showing” by the defense imposed only a burden of production. Id. at 1962; see also id. at 1965–70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That reading would have allowed defendants to rebut the presumption of reliance “by introducing any competent evidence of a lack of price impact”—and would have imposed on plaintiffs the requirement to “directly prov[e] price impact in almost every case,” a requirement that had been rejected in Halliburton II. Id. at 1962–63 (emphasis in original). However, the Court noted that imposing the burden of persuasion on defendants would be unlikely to alter the outcome in most cases, as the “burden of persuasion will have bite only when the court finds the evidence is in equipoise—a situation that should rarely arise.” Id. at 1963.
B. Supreme Court to Decide whether the PSLRA’s Discovery Stay Applies in State Court
On July 2, 2021, just before its summer recess, the Court granted certiorari in Pivotal Software, Inc. v. Tran, No. 20-1541, which raises the question of whether the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s (“PSLRA”) discovery-stay provision applies to state court actions in which a private party raises a Securities Act claim. The PSLRA provides that the stay applies “[i]n any private action arising under” the Securities Act before a court has addressed a motion to dismiss, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1-(b)(1), but state courts are sharply divided over whether the stay applies to suits in state court, rather than only to those in federal court. In opposition, respondent plaintiffs argued that not only is the issue moot (because they have agreed to adhere to the stay provision and the state court will have issued a decision on the motion to dismiss before the Supreme Court can issue an opinion), but also that no court of appeals has ever decided the issue. Brief in Opposition at 7–16, Pivotal Software, Inc. v. Tran, No. 20-1541. Petitioners countered that the issue will only ever arise in state courts and that state trial courts are divided, with at least a dozen decisions refusing to apply the stay and seven applying it, with many more decisions unreported. Moreover, the issue evades appellate review because it is time-sensitive and unlikely to affect a final judgment, rendering any error harmless. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1–12, Pivotal Software, Inc. v. Tran, No. 20-1541.
Given the costs of discovery in securities actions, Pivotal could have a lasting impact on both the choice of forum in which securities actions are brought and on how discovery progresses in the early stages of a case.
C. The Court Addresses Constitutional Challenges to Administrative Adjudicators
Recall that in Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), the Court held that the SEC’s administrative law judges (“ALJs”) were “Officers of the United States” who must be appointed by the President, a court of law, or the SEC itself. Building on Lucia, the Supreme Court issued two decisions this Term that raised further questions on the constitutionality of administrative officers’ appointments.
Following Lucia, the petitioners in Carr v. Saul and Davis v. Saul sought judicial review of administrative decisions of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), challenging in the district courts for the first time the constitutionality of SSA ALJ appointments. Carr v. Saul, 141 S. Ct. 1352, 1356–57 (2021). The district courts split on the question of whether petitioners had been required to raise their constitutional challenges during their administrative hearings in the first instance, but both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits agreed that the challenges had been forfeited. Id. at 1357. In its April 22, 2021 decision in these consolidated cases, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the petitioners were not required to raise the appointments issue in SSA administrative proceedings, though the Justices were split in their reasoning. Id. at 1356.
The majority opinion held that the benefits claimants were not required to administratively exhaust the appointment issue, in the absence of any statutory or regulatory requirement, for three primary reasons. First, the Court had previously held that the SSA’s Appeals Council conducts proceedings that are more “inquisitorial” than “adversarial,” and that in the absence of “adversarial development of issues by the parties” before the agency tribunal, there was no basis for requiring a petitioner to raise all claims before the agency in order to preserve the issues for judicial review. Id. at 1358–59 (citing Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 112 (2000)). The Court applied the Sims rationale to SSA ALJs who, like the Appeals Council, conduct “informal, nonadversarial proceedings,” even though SSA ALJ proceedings may be considered “relatively more adversarial.” Id. at 1359–60. Second, as the Court has “often observed,” agency decision-makers “are generally ill suited to address structural constitutional challenges, which usually fall outside the adjudicators’ areas of technical expertise.” Id. at 1360. And third, the Court recognized that requiring issue exhaustion here would be futile as the agency adjudicators “are powerless to grant the relief requested.” Id. at 1361. The Court’s consolidated decision in Carr and Davis was dependent on features specific to the SSA’s review, so the question of whether issue exhaustion is required may be answered differently if it arises in future cases, either in the context of an agency with more adversarial administrative review procedures or if the constitutional challenge at issue is “[outside] the context of [the] Appointments Clause.” Id. at 1360 n.5.
In United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021), the Court took up the question of whether administrative patent judges (“APJs”) in the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) are “principal” or “inferior” officers under the Appointments Clause. (Readers should note that Gibson Dunn represented the private parties arguing alongside the government that APJs are inferior officers permissibly appointed by the Secretary of Commerce.) By a 5–4 vote, the majority held that the “unreviewable authority” of APJs to resolve inter partes review proceedings was incompatible with their appointment to an inferior office because “[o]nly an officer properly appointed to a principal office may issue a final decision binding the Executive Branch.” Id. at 1985.
In fashioning a remedy supported by seven Justices, the Court opted for a “tailored approach,” rather than striking down the entire inter partes review regime as unconstitutional. Id. at 1987. Specifically, the Court severed a provision of the statutory scheme that prevented the PTO Director from reviewing APJ decisions. Id. According to the Chief Justice, this remedy would align the Patent Trial and Appeal Board adjudication scheme with others in the Executive Branch and within the PTO itself. Id. In finding that the Constitutional violation is the restraint on the Director’s review authority rather than the APJs’ appointment by the Secretary, the Court found that the proper remedy was remand to the Director rather than to a new panel of APJs for rehearing. Id. at 1987–88.
The majority opinion drew opinions concurring and dissenting in part by Justice Gorsuch (objecting to the Court’s severability analysis) and Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, agreeing with Justice Thomas’s analysis on the merits, but supporting the Court’s remedy), as well as a full dissent by Justice Thomas, who criticized the Court’s failure to take a clear position on whether APJs are inferior officers and whether their appointment complies with the Constitution. Id. at 1988–2011. He also disagreed with the Court’s modification of the statutory scheme because, in his view, APJs “are both formally and functionally inferior to the Director and to the Secretary,” and those officers already had sufficient control over APJs. Id. at 2011 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
III. Delaware Developments
A. Court of Chancery Invalidates Poison Pill under Second Unocal Prong
In February, the Court of Chancery in Williams Companies Stockholder Litigation, 2021 WL 754593 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2021), enjoined a stockholder rights plan, also known as a “poison pill.” In March 2020, The Williams Companies, Inc. (“Williams”), a natural gas infrastructure company, adopted a stockholder rights plan after the company’s stock price declined substantially due to fallout from the COVID‑19 pandemic, which decreased demand and lowered prices in the global natural gas markets. Id. at *1. Williams adopted the plan in response to multiple perceived threats, including stockholder activism generally, concerns that activist investors may pursue disruptive, short-term agendas, and the potential for rapid and undetected accumulation of Williams stock (a “lightning strike”) by an opportunistic outside investor. Id. at *2.
The court employed the two-part Unocal standard of review to analyze whether (1) the Williams Board had a reasonable basis to implement a poison pill to respond to a legitimate threat, and (2) the reasonableness of the actual terms of the poison pill in relation to the threat posed. Id. at *22 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)). Assuming for the sake of analysis that the “lightning strike” concern constituted a legitimate corporate objective, the court held that the plan’s terms were unreasonable. Id. at *33–34. The plan included a triggering ownership threshold of just 5%, compared to a typical market range of 10% to 15%. Id. at *35–36. It also contained an expansive definition of “beneficial ownership” that covered even synthetic interests, an expansive definition of “acting in concert” that covered any parallel conduct by multiple parties, and a relatively narrow definition of the term “passive investor,” which limited the number of investors exempt from the plan’s provisions. Id. at *35. The court concluded that the combined impact of these terms went well beyond that of comparable rights plans and could impermissibly stifle legitimate stockholder activity. Id. at *35–40. Notably, the court looked beyond the stated rationales listed in board resolutions, board minutes, and company disclosures, and instead sought to determine the actual intent of the directors based on testimony and other evidence. Id. The ruling offers an important reminder that rights plans have limits and that the Court of Chancery will not hesitate to assess a board’s subjective basis for implementing a rights plan and its specific terms.
B. Court of Chancery Rejects Claim that Pandemic Constituted a Materially Adverse Effect
In April, the Court of Chancery in Snow Phipps Group, LLC v. KCake Acquisition, Inc., 2021 WL 1714202 (Del Ch. Apr. 30, 2021), rejected a claim that the COVID‑19 pandemic constituted a material adverse effect (“MAE”) under the agreement at issue. There, a private equity firm buyer signed a $550 million agreement with Snow Phillips to purchase DecoPac, a company that supplies cake decorations and equipment to grocery stores. Id. at *1, *9–10. The deal coincided with the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a significant decline in DecoPac’s sales. Id. at *1–2. The buyer subsequently attempted to terminate the agreement when it was unable to secure financing based on the target’s revised sales projections. Id. at *24–25.
In the ensuing litigation, the buyer alleged that DecoPac breached a representation that no change or development had, or “would reasonably be expected to have,” an MAE on DecoPac’s finances. Id. at *10. The court rejected this argument, observing—consistent with Delaware precedent—that the existence of an MAE must be judged in terms of DecoPac’s long-term financial prospects (measured in “years rather than months”). Id. at *30. Further, the court noted that the reduction in sales fell within a carve-out from the MAE representation, namely, effects arising from changes in laws or governmental orders. Id. at *35. The decision is notable not just for reaffirming the difficulty of invoking MAE clauses, but also for its broad discussion of how MAE clause carve-outs might negate the occurrence of an existing MAE.
C. Bellwether SPAC Litigation Remains in Initial Stages
In June, the defendants in In re MultiPlan Corp. Stockholders Litigation, Cons. C.A. No. 2021-0300-LWW, filed their motion to dismiss a closely watched consolidated class action filed by the stockholders of MultiPlan, a provider of cost management technology services to insurance agencies. MultiPlan was partially acquired in October 2020 via a reverse merger with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (“SPAC”), Churchill Capital Corp. III. Most notably, the complaint contends that SPAC structures create inherent conflicts, alleging that MultiPlan’s business prospects have weakened and its stock price has decreased approximately 30% since the acquisition, but the personal investments of individuals managing the SPAC entity have increased materially. The plaintiff stockholders accuse the SPAC, its sponsor, and other directors of issuing misleading and deficient disclosures and of grossly mispricing the transaction.
Although some commentators have characterized the case as a bellwether and the claims asserted as novel, the defendants’ motion to dismiss tracks familiar arguments for attacking complaints concerning merger transactions at the pleading stage. For example, the defendants characterize the claims as derivative and urge dismissal for failure to make a demand. The defendants alternatively assert that, if the claims are direct, they are subject to the business judgment rule and warrant dismissal. More notably, the defendants contend that claims regarding plaintiffs’ redemption rights cannot proceed as fiduciary duty claims because they arise solely from contract. A decision on the pending MultiPlan motion to dismiss may have significant implications for the very active SPAC market, as the Court of Chancery weighs in on the efficacy of these entities and any implications their structure may have for deal disclosures.
D. Court of Chancery Determines CEO Breached Fiduciary Duty and Financial Advisor Aided and Abetted That Breach in Course of Executing a Merger
In Firefighters’ Pension System of the City of Kansas City, Missouri Trust v. Presidio, Inc., 2021 WL 298141 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2021), the Court of Chancery denied motions to dismiss by Presidio’s CEO for allegedly breaching his fiduciary duty and Presidio’s financial advisor for allegedly aiding and abetting that breach, but dismissed claims against the controlling stockholder and other board members. The class action suit challenged a merger of Presidio, a controlled company, with an unaffiliated third party. The court held that a number of actions the CEO allegedly took, if credited, would yield an unreasonable sales process under Revlon. Id. at 267–68. For example, the court credited allegations that the CEO inappropriately steered the bidding process in favor of a private equity buyer that was more eager to retain existing management and simultaneously downplayed to the board of directors the interests of a strategic bidder. Although the strategic bidder allegedly had the capability to pay a higher price as a result of the synergies, it was more likely to replace the CEO. Id. at 267. The court also credited allegations that Presidio’s financial advisor had tipped the potential private equity buyer to confidential information that enabled it to structure its proposed terms into the ultimately bid-winning offer. Id. Presidio has the potential to serve as informative precedent for transactions entailing potential post-close employment opportunities for executives who guide the company’s sale process.
E. Appraisal Litigation Continues Its Steady Decline
The frequency of appraisal litigation continues to decline, with just four appraisal actions filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery in the first half of 2021, compared to the 13 actions filed in the first half of 2020. Going forward, we expect to see appraisal actions concentrated to a subset of deals involving alleged conflicts, process issues, or a limited market check.
Recent appraisal actions that have proceeded continue to reinforce the rulings in DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) and Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017): objective market evidence—including deal price (potentially less synergies) and unaffected market price—generally provides the best indication of a company’s fair value. In In re Appraisal of Regal Entertainment Group, 2021 WL 1916364 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2021), for example, the Court of Chancery awarded a relatively modest 2.6% increase over the original merger price. The court held that the best evidence of the target’s fair value was the deal price, adjusted for post-signing value increases. Id. at *58. The court rejected arguments that Regal’s stock price was the best indicator of fair value, finding that “the sale process that led to the Merger Agreement was sufficiently reliable to make it probable that the deal price establishes a ceiling for the determination of fair value.” Id. at *34.
In the absence of reliable market-based indicators, the Court of Chancery has demonstrated a willingness to fall back on potentially more subjective valuation techniques, including discounted cash flow and comparable company analyses. In January 2021, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a Court of Chancery decision awarding a 12% premium on the merger price based solely on a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) valuation. SourceHOV Holdings, Inc. v. Manichaean Capital, LLC, 246 A.3d 139 (Del. 2021). The Court of Chancery’s exclusive use of the petitioner’s DCF valuation was premised on the Respondent’s failure to prove a fair value for the transaction, with the court noting it was “struck by the fact that [Respondent] disagreed with its own valuation expert, relied on witnesses whose credibility was impeached and employed a novel approach to calculate SourceHOV’s equity beta that is not supported by the record evidence. In a word, Respondent’s proffer of fair value is incredible.” Manichaean Capital, LLC v. SourceHOV Holdings, Inc., 2020 WL 496606, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2020).
IV. Further Development of Disseminator Liability Theory Upheld in Lorenzo
As we initially discussed in our 2019 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update, in March 2019, the Supreme Court held in Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019), that those who disseminate false or misleading information to the investing public with the intent to defraud can be liable under Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act and Exchange Act, Rules 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c), even if the disseminator did not “make” the statement within the meaning of Rule 10b-5(b). In practice, Lorenzo creates the possibility that secondary actors—such as financial advisors and lawyers—could face liability under Rules 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c) (known as the “scheme liability provisions”) simply for disseminating the alleged misstatement of another, if a plaintiff can show that the secondary actor knew the alleged misstatement contained false or misleading information.
In 2021, courts have continued to grapple with Lorenzo’s application, particularly “whether Lorenzo’s language can be read to stretch scheme liability to cases in which plaintiffs are specifically alleging that the defendant did ‘make’ misleading statements (or omissions) as prohibited in Rule 10b5-(b),” or if “Lorenzo merely extends scheme liability to those who ‘disseminate false or misleading statements’ but that it does not hold that ‘misstatements [or omissions] alone are sufficient to trigger scheme liability’” absent additional conduct. Puddu v. 6D Global Techs., Inc., 2021 WL 1198566, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021) (quoting SEC v. Rio Tinto PLC, 2021 WL 818745, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2021)) (summarizing the divergent views of various district courts).
In June, the Ninth Circuit, in In re Alphabet, Inc. Securities Litigation, 1 F.4th 687 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Alphabet”), signaled its support for the view that disseminator liability does not require “conduct other than misstatements.” Alphabet involved allegations that executives at Google and its holding company, Alphabet, were aware of security vulnerabilities on the Google+ social network. Id. at 693–97. Plaintiffs brought a claim against Alphabet under Rule 10b-5(b), in addition to scheme liability claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), alleging a scheme to defraud shareholders by withholding material and damaging information about the security vulnerabilities from Alphabet’s quarterly filings. See id. at 698. The district court granted Alphabet’s motion to dismiss in full, finding that plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact and failed to adequately allege scienter for the purposes of their Rule 10b-5 claims. Id.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that that the trial court erred by dismissing the claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) because defendants had not specifically moved to dismiss those claims but instead moved to dismiss only on the basis of Rule 10b-5(b) and Rule 10b-5 generally. Id. at 709. Notably, the panel also disagreed with Alphabet’s “argument that Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) claims cannot overlap with Rule 10b-5(b) statement liability claims” because such an argument “is foreclosed by Lorenzo, which rejected the petitioner’s argument that Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) ‘concern “scheme liability claims” and are violated only when conduct other than misstatements is involved.’” Id. (quoting Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1101–02).
At the same time, district courts within the Second Circuit are considering the breadth of Lorenzo. See In re Teva Sec. Litig., 2021 WL 1197805, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2021) (summarizing the divergent views). As the Teva court explained, “[s]ome district courts in this circuit apparently agree with the” view that Lorenzo “abrogated the rule that ‘scheme liability depends on conduct that is distinct from an alleged misstatement,’” “[b]ut other district courts cabin Lorenzo and read it more restrictively” to only hold that “‘those who disseminate false or misleading statements to potential investors with the intent to defraud can be liable under [Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)], not that misstatements alone are sufficient to trigger scheme liability.’” Id. (quoting Rio Tinto PLC, 2021 WL 818745, at *2–3).
The Second Circuit itself has not yet squarely addressed the scope of Lorenzo. However, earlier this year, the district court in SEC v. Rio Tinto PLC, 2021 WL 1893165 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2021), certified an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit, following its dismissal of scheme liability claims where the SEC failed to “allege that Defendants disseminated [the] false information, only that they failed to prevent misleading statements from being disseminated by others.” At the time of this update, the Second Circuit had not ruled on whether it will hear the appeal. Gibson Dunn represents Rio Tinto in this and other litigation.
As these developments suggest, the application of the Lorenzo disseminator liability theory continues to evolve among and within the circuits. We will continue to monitor closely the changing applications of Lorenzo and provide a further update in our 2021 Year-End Securities Litigation Update.
V. Survey of Coronavirus-Related Securities Litigation
Although the stock market has largely stabilized since COVID-19 first impacted the United States in 2020, courts are still feeling the effects of the economic disruption and attendant securities litigation arising out of the pandemic. While the first series of COVID-19 securities lawsuits focused on select industries, such as travel and healthcare, plaintiffs eventually set their sights on other industries. We surveyed a select number of these cases in our 2020 Year-End Securities Litigation Update.
Since then, there have been several dismissals of COVID-19-related securities cases, including dismissals of some of the earliest cases brought in March 2020 concerning the travel industry. Nevertheless, lawsuits for misstatements regarding safety and risk disclosures are still being brought, and now that the “Delta” variant has spread throughout the United States, such lawsuits may continue for the foreseeable future.
Although it is too soon to tell whether the midpoint of COVID-19 securities litigation has passed, we will continue to monitor developments in this area. Additional resources regarding the legal impact of COVID-19 can be found in the Gibson Dunn Coronavirus (COVID-19) Resource Center.
A. Securities Class Actions
1. False Claims Concerning Commitment to Safety
Douglas v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, No. 20-cv-21107, 2021 WL 1378296 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2021): As we discussed in our 2020 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update, the COVID-19 pandemic birthed an entire category of class action lawsuits concerning service companies’ commitments to safety, including a proposed class action lawsuit against Norwegian Cruise Lines. In April 2021, Judge Robert Scola, Jr. dismissed the lawsuit, which had originally alleged that Norwegian violated securities laws by minimizing the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on its operations and failing to disclose allegedly deceptive sales practices that downplayed COVID-19. Id. at *2–3. Judge Scola, Jr. concluded that “[a]ll the challenged statements constitute corporate puffery” such that no reasonable investor would have relied on them. Id. at *4.
In re Carnival Corp. Securities Litigation, No. 20-cv-22202, 2021 WL 2583113 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2021): Similarly, in May 2021, a year after plaintiffs filed the complaint, Judge K. Michael Moore dismissed a putative class action against Carnival that alleged that Carnival misrepresented the effectiveness of its health and safety protocols during the COVID-19 outbreak. Id. at *1–3. The court held that the plaintiffs-investors had failed to show that Carnival’s “statements affirming compliance with then-existing regulatory requirements [were] materially false or misleading” because the plaintiffs’ argument relied on the inference that “passengers would ultimately fall ill aboard Carnival’s ships—just as people did in other venues across the globe.” Id. at *15. Accordingly, the court found the inference was “too tenuous to meet the heightened pleading standard applicable in the securities fraud context.” Id.
2. Failure to Disclose Specific Risks
Plymouth Cnty. Retirement Assoc. v. Array Techs., Inc., No. 21-cv-04390 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2021): Plaintiffs allege that Array, a solar panel manufacturer, along with several of its directors and underwriters, failed to disclose that “unprecedented” increases in steel and shipping costs negatively impacted the company’s quarterly results until the company’s CFO revealed the results in a conference call. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 10–42, 113–15. Upon the release of this news, Array’s stock price fell by $11.49 to close at $13.46. Id. at ¶ 118. Array had previously issued warnings on the “global shipping constraints due to COVID-19” but allegedly failed to disclose the impact of dramatically increasing supply prices and increasing freight costs. Id. at ¶¶ 103, 112. This case was later consolidated with Keippel v. Array Technologies, Inc., 21-cv-5658 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2021). Dkt. No. 61 at 1. The case remains pending.
Denny v. Canaan Inc., No. 21-cv-03299 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2021): A shareholder of Canaan, a company that manufactures and sells Bitcoin mining machines, alleged that the company misleadingly issued positive statements about strong demand for bitcoin mining machines without disclosing how “ongoing supply chain disruptions” and the introduction of its latest machines had “cannibalized sales of [its] older product offerings,” which caused sales to decline. Dkt No. 1 at ¶ 4. Purportedly, Canaan did not reveal these issues until a conference call to discuss fourth quarter earnings, after which Canaan’s American Depository Receipts, which are a type of securities, declined by nearly 30%. Id. at ¶¶ 27–28.
3. Alleged Insider Trading and “Pump and Dump” Schemes
Tang v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 20-cv-10462 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2020): In our 2020 Year-End Securities Litigation Update, we previously discussed this putative class action, in which stockholders contended Eastman Kodak violated securities law by failing to disclose that its officers were granted stock options prior to the company’s public announcement that it had received a loan to produce drugs for the treatment of COVID-19. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. On May 28, the New Jersey federal judge transferred the case to the Western District of New York, where the alleged misconduct occurred. Dkt. No. 62 at 1. In parallel, New York Attorney General Leticia James commenced an action under Section 34 of General Business Law to seek evidence of insider trading from Kodak. NYSCEF No. 451652/2021, Dkt. No. 1 at 1. On June 15, the court ordered Kodak’s executives to publicly testify. Dkt. No. 9 at 2.
B. Stockholder Derivative Actions
1. Disclosure Liability
Berndt v. Kelly, No. 21-cv-50422 (W.D. Wash. June 4, 2021): In this derivative suit, plaintiff alleges that CytoDyn Inc., which is developing a drug with potential benefits for HIV patients, misleadingly touted the drug as a potential COVID-19 treatment, resulting in a significant increase in the company’s stock price. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 2–4. “[W]hile the [c]ompany’s stock price was sufficiently inflated with the COVID-19 cure hype,” the complaint alleges, a close circle of long-term shareholders “dumped millions of shares.” Id. at ¶ 6. Following the alleged cash-out of company shares, the price of CytoDyn “dropped precipitously” after it was revealed that the COVID-19 treatment was not commercially viable. Id. at ¶ 8. The suit includes claims for breach of fiduciary duty, waste of corporate assets, unjust enrichment, and violations of the Exchange Act. Id. at ¶¶ 78–98.
Golubinski v. Douglas, No. 2021-0172 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2021): An investor of Novavax Inc. derivatively sued the company’s directors and certain officers, claiming that they granted themselves a series of lucrative equity awards in 2020 with the knowledge that Novavax’s stock was going to increase nearly 700% based on promising COVID-19 vaccine news. Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 5–13. The investor alleges that “management exploited its relationships with regulators and influential players in the vaccine community to both secure funding and position itself to receive even more funding for COVID-19 research prior to granting spring-loaded awards to [c]ompany insiders.” Id. at ¶ 15. The stock granted to executives in April and June 2020 allegedly rose in value within a few months, after the news became public that the company would be getting billions in funding through Operation Warp Speed, the U.S. government’s COVID-19 vaccine initiative. Id. at ¶¶ 9–13. The derivative suit seeks, among other things, to have the stock awards rescinded. Id. at ¶ 16.
2. Oversight Liability
Bhandari v. Carty, No. 2021-0090 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 2021): Two stockholders of YRC Worldwide, Inc. sued the company’s directors, claiming that they oversaw a fraudulent scheme to overcharge customers for freight cargo, and then sought a $700 million government bailout purportedly justified by fraudulent concerns relating to COVID-19. Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 3–15. The bailout, which plaintiffs allege “made the company one of the largest recipients of taxpayer money meant to support businesses and workers struggling amid the coronavirus,” has now “come under scrutiny from” Congress, which is investigating whether it “was really worthy of a rescue,” according to the complaint. Id. at ¶ 15. Plaintiffs allege that the board “could and should have quickly and responsibly taken action to correct management’s wrongdoing,” but failed to do so. Id. at ¶ 5.
3. Insider Trading
Lincolnshire Police Pension Fund v. Kramer, No. 21-cv-01595 (D. Md. June 29, 2021): Plaintiff sued directors of Emergent BioSolutions Inc. derivatively for claims that the board members allegedly sold a combined $20 million of personally held Emergent shares “on the basis of the nonpublic information about the problems at the Bayview Facility,” where the company was working on a COVID-19 vaccine for Johnson and Johnson. Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 15–26, 89, 101. The fund claims that the directors allegedly “used their knowledge of Emergent’s material, nonpublic information to sell their personal holdings while the Company’s stock was artificially inflated.” Id. at ¶ 89. Specifically, the allegations are that the directors were supposedly aware of Bayview’s history of internal control failures and inability to handle the “massive and critical work required to manufacture [the COVID-19] vaccines.” Id. at ¶ 3.
In Delaware, another Emergent stockholder brought a Section 220 action against Emergent to enforce his statutory right to inspect the company’s books and records. See Elton v. Emergent BioSolutions, Inc., No. 2021-0426 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2021). There, too, the stockholder alleged that there was a “credible basis to infer the Company’s fiduciaries sold Company stock while in possession of material, non-public information” relating to Emergent’s alleged “regulatory, compliance, and manufacturing failures.” Dkt. 1 at ¶ 3.
C. SEC Cases
SEC v. Arrayit Corp., No. 21-cv-01053 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2021): As we discussed in our 2020 Year-End Securities Litigation Update, the SEC charged Mark Schena, the President of Arrayit Corporation, a healthcare technology company, for “making false and misleading statements about the status of Arrayit’s delinquent financial reports.” SEC v. Schena, No. 20-cv-06717 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2020), Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 1. That case was stayed, pending the resolution of a criminal case against Mr. Schena. Dkt. 23. Since then, the SEC has brought a separate case against Arrayit itself, as well as Mark Schena’s wife, who served as Arrayit’s CEO, CFO, and chairman for over a decade. No. 5:21-cv-01053, Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 11. The new claims brought under Sections 10(b) and 13(a) mirror those in the prior action against Mr. Schena, namely that the defendants allegedly misrepresented the company’s capability to develop COVID-19 tests. Id. at ¶ 1. The parties settled on a neither-admit-nor-deny basis, with Ms. Schena also agreeing to a $50,000 penalty. Dkt. No. 11 at 1–3; Dkt No. 12 at 2.
SEC v. Parallax Health Sciences, Inc., No. 21-cv-05812 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2021): This enforcement action, brought under Section 17(a)(1)(3) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, resulted from a series of seven press releases issued by Parallax, a healthcare company, about its ability to capitalize on the COVID-19 pandemic. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 4. The SEC’s complaint alleges that Parallax falsely claimed that its COVID-19 screening test would be “available soon” despite the company’s insolvency and the company’s own internal projections showing that, even if it had the funds, other factors prevented the company from acquiring the needed equipment. Id. at ¶¶ 1–2. Parallax, its CEO, and CTO settled with the SEC on a neither-admit-nor-deny basis, and agreed to penalties of $100,000, $45,000, and $40,000, respectively. Dkt. No. 4 at 1, 4.
SEC v. Wellness Matrix Grp., Inc., No. 21-cv-1031 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2021): The SEC charged Wellness Matrix, a wellness company, and its controlling shareholder for allegedly misleading investors about the availability and approval status of its at-home COVID-19 testing kits and disinfectants in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 6–7, 9. The SEC alleges that the company’s claims were false and, to the contrary, defendants knew its distributor was unable to fulfill the order and the products were neither FDA- nor EPA-approved. Id. at ¶¶ 44–48. The SEC had suspended trading in Wellness Matrix’s securities approximately two months before bringing the action. Id. at ¶ 68.
VI. Falsity of Opinions – Omnicare Update
As we discussed in our prior securities litigation updates, lower courts continue to examine the standard for imposing liability based on a false opinion as set forth by the Supreme Court in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175 (2015). In Omnicare, the Supreme Court held that “a sincere statement of pure opinion is not an ‘untrue statement of material fact,’ regardless whether an investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong,” but that an opinion statement can form the basis for liability in three different situations: (1) the speaker did not actually hold the belief professed; (2) the opinion contained embedded statements of untrue facts; or (3) the speaker omitted information whose omission made the statement misleading to a reasonable investor. Id. at 184–89.
In 2021, federal courts have continued to grapple with whether Omnicare—which was decided in the context of a Section 11 claim—applies to claims brought under the Exchange Act. In April, the Ninth Circuit extended the Omnicare standard to claims brought under Exchange Act Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. Golub v. Gigamon Inc., 994 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2021). The court reasoned that such claims contain a “virtually identical limitation on liability” to claims under Section 11 and Rule 10b-5, to which the Ninth Circuit held Omnicare applies. Id.; see also City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2017).
Two additional cases addressing Omnicare’s application to the Exchange Act came down in the District of New Jersey, with one of them ultimately deciding to apply the Omnicare standard for falsity to claims brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Ortiz v. Canopy Growth Corp., No. 2:19-cv-20543, 2021 WL 1967714 (D.N.J. May 17, 2021). Recognizing the majority view outside the Third Circuit that Omnicare applies to such claims, the court in Ortiz “s[aw] no reason to apply a different rule.” Id. at *33. However, after finding that the alleged statements were actionable under Omnicare, the court still dismissed the complaint for failure to plead scienter. Id. at *44. While plaintiffs adequately pled that defendants did not believe certain statements when they were made and misleadingly omitted certain material facts, plaintiffs could not overcome the PLSRA’s high bar for scienter. Id. at *38–39. The court found that plaintiffs failed to plead facts to support a “strong inference” of scienter because, based on several factors, another more “innocent explanation” was plausible. Id. at *42–43. In another case, a District of New Jersey court found evaluation of Omnicare unnecessary for the same reason: Plaintiffs did not plead facts to “support a ‘strong inference’ of scienter.” In re Amarin Corp. PLC Sec. Litig., No. 3:19-cv-06601, 2021 WL 1171669 at *19 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2021). These cases suggest Omnicare may rarely be outcome-determinative for Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims because opinions that may be actionable under Omnicare may often lack an “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,” as required to demonstrate scienter. See Ortiz, 2021 WL 1967714, at *10.
Omnicare has remained a significant pleading barrier in the first half of 2021. In Salim v. Mobile Telesystems PJSC, No. 19-cv-1589, 2021 WL 796088 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2021), the Eastern District of New York held that a statement about potential liability resulting from investigations into alleged FCPA violations “would have necessarily been a statement of opinion until the company could give a reasonable estimate of its potential losses.” Because plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to show that defendant did not actually believe what it stated, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id. at *8–9. Similarly, in City of Miami Fire Fighters’ and Police Officers’ Retirement Trust v. CVS Health Corp., the District of Rhode Island held that reported results of goodwill assessments conducted under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles are opinion statements that must be assessed under Omnicare because “[e]stimates of goodwill depend on management’s determination of the fair value of the assets acquired and liabilities assumed, which are not matters of objective fact.” No. 19-437-MSM-PAS, 2021 WL 515121, at *9 (D.R.I. Feb. 11, 2021). In granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court found allegations “amount[ing] to a retrospective disagreement with [defendant’s] judgment” inadequate “without sufficient facts to undermine the assumptions [defendant] used when it made its goodwill assessments.” Id. at *10.
Other recent district court decisions illustrate the narrow situations in which plaintiffs have overcome Omnicare’s high bar. For instance, in Howard v. Arconic Inc., defendants argued that aluminum manufacturer Arconic’s statement that it “believes it has adopted appropriate risk management and compliance programs to address and reduce” certain risks was a non-actionable opinion under Omnicare. No. 2:17-cv-1057, 2021 WL 2561895, at *7 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 2021). The court disagreed, holding that the statement “conveyed to investors that there was a reasonable basis for [defendants’] belief about the adequacy of the compliance/risk management programs,” but facts regarding Arconic’s practice of selling hazardous products “call[ed] into question the reasonableness of that belief.” Id.
Finally, in SEC v. Bluepoint Investment Counsel, LLC, the SEC claimed that the investment-advisor defendants had defrauded investors by reporting misleading and unreasonable valuations of fund assets in order to charge excessive management and other fees. No. 19-cv-809, 2021 WL 719647, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2021). The court held that the statements were actionable, consistent with Omnicare, because “the SEC has alleged specific facts which, taken as true, involve valuations containing embedded statements of fact that were untrue.” Id. at *17. Specifically, defendants had stated that the valuations would be “based on underlying market driven events,” but the SEC alleged that the appraisal process was far less thorough. Id. This method, the court reasoned, “reflects the kind of ‘baseless, off-the-cuff judgment[]’ that an investor reasonably would not expect in the context of a third-party appraisal that is then relied upon in an investor fund’s financial statements.” Id.
As shareholder litigation arising from the economic impact of COVID-19 continues, including a handful of cases targeting vaccine development and efficacy, Omnicare will likely play a significant role. See Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Law, In re AstraZeneca PLC Sec. Litig., No. 1:21-cv-00722 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2021) (containing various allegations based on statements or omissions relating to clinical trials for the COVID-19 vaccine). Disclosures and accounting estimates impacted by the rapidly evolving circumstances presented by the pandemic, and other statements and estimates involving interpretation of complex scientific data, are at the heart of Omnicare analysis. We will continue to monitor developments in these and similar cases.
VII. Halliburton II Market Efficiency and “Price Impact” Cases
As previewed in our last two updates, and discussed above in our Supreme Court roundup, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System on June 21. 141 S. Ct. 1951 (2021) (“Goldman Sachs”). Practitioners now have confirmation from the Supreme Court that courts must consider the generic nature of allegedly fraudulent statements at the class certification stage when necessary to determine whether the statements impacted the issuer’s stock price, even though that analysis will often overlap with the merits issue of materiality. See id. at 1960–61. The Court also resolved the question of which party bears what burden when defendants offer evidence of a lack of price impact to rebut the presumption of reliance, placing the burdens of both production and persuasion on defendants. See id. at 1962–63.
Recall that in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014) (“Halliburton II”), the Supreme Court preserved the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption of class-wide reliance in Rule 10b-5 cases, but also permitted defendants to rebut this presumption at the class certification stage with evidence that the alleged misrepresentation did not impact the issuer’s stock price. Since that decision, as we have detailed in these updates, lower courts have struggled with several recurring questions, including: (1) how to reconcile Halliburton II with Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011) (“Halliburton I”) and Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013), in which the Court held that loss causation and materiality, respectively, were not class certification issues, but instead should be addressed at the merits stage; (2) who bears what burden when defendants present evidence of a lack of price impact; and (3) what evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption. The Court has now resolved the first two questions in Goldman Sachs.
In its most recent decision, the Second Circuit held that the generic nature of Goldman Sachs’s allegedly fraudulent statements was irrelevant at the class-certification stage and instead should be litigated at trial, and that defendants bore both the burden of production and persuasion in rebutting the presumption of reliance. Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 955 F.3d 254, 265–74 (2d Cir. 2020). As detailed above, the Supreme Court disagreed with the first holding but agreed with the second. Because it was unclear whether the Second Circuit properly considered Goldman Sachs’s price impact evidence, the Court remanded for further consideration. Goldman Sachs, 141 S. Ct. at 1961. The Court also confirmed that the Second Circuit allocated the parties’ burdens correctly, because the defendant “bear[s] the burden of persuasion to prove a lack of price impact by a preponderance of the evidence,” including at the class-certification stage. Id. at 1958. The Court clarified that its opinions had already placed that burden on defendants—although “the allocation of burden is unlikely to make much difference on the ground,” and will “have bite only when the court finds the evidence in equipoise.” Id. at 1963.
Most importantly, an eight-justice majority made clear that even when the question of price impact overlaps with merits questions, all relevant evidence on price impact must be considered at the class certification stage. Goldman Sachs, 141 S. Ct. at 1960–61 (citing Halliburton II, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013), and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011)). This is the case even though “materiality and price impact are overlapping concepts” and “evidence relevant to one will almost always be relevant to the other.” Id. at 1961 n.2. In other words, the Supreme Court has now confirmed that Halliburton I, Amgen, and Halliburton II are consistent because plaintiffs do not need to prove materiality and loss causation to invoke the presumption of reliance, but defendants can use price impact evidence—including evidence of immateriality or a lack of loss causation—to defeat the presumption of reliance at the class certification stage.
Despite its relevance to the case, the Court declined to offer a view on the validity of the inflation-maintenance theory, under which plaintiffs frequently argue that price movements associated with negative news can be attributed to earlier, challenged statements. See id. at 1959 n.1. However, the Court underscored that the connection between a statement and a corrective disclosure is particularly important in inflation-maintenance cases. Id. at 1961. As the Court noted, the inference that a subsequent price drop proves there was previous inflation “starts to break down when there is a mismatch between the contents of the misrepresentation and the corrective disclosure,” which can occur “when the earlier misrepresentation is generic . . . and the later corrective disclosure is specific.” Id.
The Second Circuit has now remanded to the district court to examine all relevant evidence of price impact in the first instance. Arkansas Tchr. Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 18-3667, 2021 WL 3776297, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2021). We will continue to monitor this and related cases.
VIII. Other Notable Developments
A. Morrison Domestic Transaction Test
The circuit split concerning the application of the domestic transaction test from Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), has widened in the first half of this year. In Morrison, the Supreme Court held that the Exchange Act only applied to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities.” Id. at 267. This holding was premised on “the focus of the Exchange Act,” which is “not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States.” Id. at 266. Thereafter, courts have held that a security that is not traded on a domestic exchange satisfies the second prong of Morrison, “if irrevocable liability is incurred or title passes within the United States.” Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012).
This January, in Cavello Bay Reinsurance Ltd. v. Shubin Stein, 986 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2021), the Second Circuit reaffirmed its prior holding in Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Automobile Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014), that the traditional “irrevocable liability” test is necessary, but not sufficient to bring a claim under the Exchange Act. Instead, a plaintiff must additionally show that the transaction was not “‘so predominantly foreign’ as to be impermissibly extraterritorial.” Cavello Bay, 986 F.3d at 165 (citing Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 216). The Second Circuit considered that this test “uses Morrison’s focus on the transaction rather than surrounding circumstances, and flexibly considers whether a claim—in view of the security and the transaction as structured—is still predominantly foreign.” Id. at 166–67. Under this framework, the court affirmed the dismissal of an action based on “a private offering between a Bermudan investor . . . and a Bermudan issuer” because it was predominantly foreign, even though the fact that the contract was countersigned in the United States may have been sufficient to incur irrevocable liability in the United States. Id. at 167–68.
On the other hand, in its first application of Morrison, the First Circuit, “[l]ike the Ninth Circuit . . . reject[ed] Parkcentral as inconsistent with Morrison.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Morrone, 997 F.3d 52, 60 (1st Cir. 2021). Because “Morrison says that § 10(b)’s focus is on transactions,” the court found that “[t]he existence of a domestic transaction suffices to apply the federal securities laws under Morrison” and “[n]o further inquiry is required.” Id.
B. Eighth Circuit Strikes Class Allegations under Rule 12(f)
In Donelson v. Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc., 999 F.3d 1080 (8th Cir. 2021), the Eighth Circuit struck class allegations pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a court to strike from a pleading “any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Id. at 1091 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)). The court “agree[d] with the Sixth Circuit that a district court may grant a motion to strike class-action allegations prior to the filing of a motion for class-action certification” when certification is a “clear impossibility,” noting that other federal courts have reached the conclusion that this was not permissible. Id. at 1092.
Donelson concerned an investor’s claims, including under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, against a broker and investment advisor for mishandling and making misrepresentations about his investment account. Id. at 1086. The plaintiff sought to bring claims on behalf of a class of individuals who had allegedly suffered similar harms. While the agreement governing the plaintiff’s account contained a mandatory arbitration clause, there was an exception for “putative or certified class actions.” Id. The court found that the class allegations should be stricken because they were not “cohesive” and would require “a significant number of individualized factual and legal determinations to be made,” including specifically whether the defendants made misrepresentations to each investor, whether those misrepresentations were material, whether the investor relied upon them, and whether the investor suffered economic harm. Id. at 1092–93. Furthermore, the court found that the circumstances warranted striking the class allegations because delaying the inevitable decision would “needlessly force the parties to remain in court when they previously agreed to arbitrate.” Id. at 1092.
C. Congress Codifies SEC Disgorgement Remedy
On January 1, 2021, Congress codified the SEC’s right to disgorgement remedies as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”). While the SEC has often sought—and courts have often granted—disgorgement remedies, the new law codifies this right and also adds guidance as to the parameters. Section 6501 of the NDAA amends the Exchange Act to allow any United States District Court to “require disgorgement…of any unjust enrichment by the person who received such unjust enrichment as a result of [violations under the securities laws].” Previously, disgorgement was awarded pursuant to the court’s equitable power, rather than statutorily mandated in cases of unjust enrichment.
Significantly, the amendment also provides for a 10-year statute of limitations that applies to “[any actions for disgorgement arising out] of the securities laws for which scienter must be established.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(8)(A)(ii). The law further provides for a 10-year statute of limitations for “any equitable remedy, including for an injunction or for a bar, suspension, or cease and desist order” irrespective of whether the underlying securities law violation carries a scienter requirement. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(8)(B). The law expands disgorgement to “any equitable remedy” and ensures that a court awards disgorgement in these cases. Moreover, for the purposes of calculating any limitations period under this paragraph, “any time in which the person . . . is outside of the United States shall not count towards the accrual of that period.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(8)(C).
D. Delaware Exclusive Forum Bylaws Applicable to Section 14
A recent federal decision in the Northern District of California precluded plaintiffs from bringing Section 14(a) claims in the face of an exclusive forum selection clause in a company’s bylaws. Lee v. Fisher, 2021 WL 1659842 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2021). In Lee, plaintiffs brought derivative claims on behalf of The Gap, Inc. for violation of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act as a result of allegedly misleading statements about the Gap’s commitment to diversity. Id. at *1. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims on forum non conveniens grounds based on the forum selection clause in Gap’s bylaws, which provided that any action had to be brought in Delaware Chancery Court. Id. at *2. In granting the motion and dismissing the claims, the court noted a strong policy in favor of enforcing forum selection clauses where practicable. Id. at *3. In response to the plaintiff’s objection that Section 14(a) claims must be asserted in federal court because of its exclusive jurisdiction and that the anti-waiver provisions in the Securities Act preclude waiving the jurisdictional requirement, the court noted Ninth Circuit precedent has held that the policy of enforcing forum selection clauses supersedes anti-waiver provisions like those in the Exchange Act. Id. In addition, enforcement of the exclusive forum selection clause would not leave the plaintiff without a remedy because the plaintiff could file separate state law derivative claims in Delaware, even if such action could not include a federal securities law claim. The plaintiffs have filed a notice of appeal in the Ninth Circuit.
E. Ninth Circuit Upholds Broad Protection for Forward-Looking Statements
In Wochos v. Tesla, Inc., 985 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2021), the Ninth Circuit upheld a broad interpretation of the safe harbor protections afforded by the PSLRA. The PSLRA’s safe harbor for forward-looking statements protects against liability that is premised upon statements made about a company’s plans, objectives, and projections of future performance, along with the assumptions underlying such statements. In Wochos, the Ninth Circuit held that this protection applies even when the statements touch on the current state of affairs.
The plaintiffs in Wochos alleged that statements by Tesla officers that the company was “on track” to meet certain production goals was misleading because the company was facing manufacturing problems that made these production goals difficult to attain. Id. at 1185–86. Plaintiffs claimed that the statements were not protected under the PSLRA’s safe harbor provisions because these “predictive statements contain[ed] embedded assertions concerning present facts that are actionable.” Id. at 1191 (emphasis in original). The court disagreed, finding that the definition of forward-looking statements “expressly includes ‘statement[s] of the plans and objectives of management for future operations,’” and “‘statement[s] of the assumptions underlying or relating to’ those plans and objectives.” Id. (emphases in original). Even though Tesla’s statements touched on the current state of the business, the court found that they were forward-looking because “any announced ‘objective’ for ‘future operations’ necessarily reflects an implicit assertion that the goal is achievable based on current circumstances.” Id. at 1192 (emphasis in original). The court reasoned that the safe harbor would be rendered moot if it “could be defeated simply by showing that a statement has the sort of features that are inherent in any forward-looking statement.” Id. (emphasis in original).
The following Gibson Dunn attorneys assisted in preparing this client update: Jeff Bell, Shireen Barday, Monica Loseman, Brian Lutz, Mark Perry, Avi Weitzman, Lissa Percopo, Michael Celio, Alisha Siqueira, Rachel Jackson, Andrew Bernstein, Megan Murphy, Jonathan D. Fortney, Sam Berman, Fernando Berdion-Del Valle, Andrew V. Kuntz, Colleen Devine, Aaron Chou, Luke Dougherty, Lindsey Young, Katy Baker, Jonathan Haderlein, Marc Aaron Takagaki, and Jeffrey Myers.
Gibson Dunn lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, the authors, or any of the following members of the Securities Litigation practice group:
Monica K. Loseman – Co-Chair, Denver (+1 303-298-5784, [email protected])
Brian M. Lutz – Co-Chair, San Francisco/New York (+1 415-393-8379/+1 212-351-3881, [email protected])
Craig Varnen – Co-Chair, Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7922, [email protected])
Shireen A. Barday – New York (+1 212-351-2621, [email protected])
Jefferson Bell – New York (+1 212-351-2395, [email protected])
Matthew L. Biben – New York (+1 212-351-6300, [email protected])
Michael D. Celio – Palo Alto (+1 650-849-5326, [email protected])
Paul J. Collins – Palo Alto (+1 650-849-5309, [email protected])
Jennifer L. Conn – New York (+1 212-351-4086, [email protected])
Thad A. Davis – San Francisco (+1 415-393-8251, [email protected])
Ethan Dettmer – San Francisco (+1 415-393-8292, [email protected])
Mark A. Kirsch – New York (+1 212-351-2662, [email protected])
Jason J. Mendro – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3726, [email protected])
Alex Mircheff – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7307, [email protected])
Robert F. Serio – New York (+1 212-351-3917, [email protected])
Robert C. Walters – Dallas (+1 214-698-3114, [email protected])
Avi Weitzman – New York (+1 212-351-2465, [email protected])
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On August 19, 2021, the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) proposed an amendment to Section 314.00 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual (the “NYSE Manual”), the NYSE’s related party transaction approval rule. The proposal follows the NYSE’s recent amendments to Section 314.00, approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on April 2, 2021, which had amended the rules to, among other things, require “reasonable prior review and oversight” of related party transactions and had defined related party transactions (for companies other than foreign private issuers) to be those subject to Item 404 of the SEC’s Regulation S-K, but “without applying the transaction threshold of that provision.” For foreign private issuers, the previous amendments had defined related party transactions to be those subject to disclosure under Form 20-F, but “without regard to the materiality threshold of that provision.” As a result of those amendments, NYSE-listed companies were faced with the prospect of potentially presenting immaterial transactions, or transactions in which related parties’ interests were immaterial, before their independent directors for approval.
In its latest proposal, the NYSE noted that the prior amendment had been intended to “provide greater clarity as to the types of transactions that were specifically subject to review and approval under the rule” but that “[i]n the period since the adoption of that amendment, it has become clear to the Exchange that the amended rule’s exclusion of the applicable transaction value and materiality thresholds is inconsistent with the historical practice of many listed companies, and has had unintended consequences.” As such, the NYSE’s latest amendments to Section 314.00 “provide that the review and approval requirement of that rule will be applicable only to transactions that are required to be disclosed after taking into account the transaction value and materiality thresholds set forth in Item 404 of Regulation S-K or Item 7.B of Form 20-F, respectively, as applicable.” Notably, Item 404 of Regulation S-K only requires disclosure of transactions where the amount involved is greater than $120,000 and in which the related person “had or will have a direct or indirect material interest” in the transaction. The notes to Item 404 also contain various other exclusions.
The following Gibson Dunn attorneys assisted in preparing this update: Elizabeth Ising, Ronald Mueller, Cassandra Tillinghast, and Lori Zyskowski.
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This update provides an overview of key class action developments during the second quarter of 2021. Part I covers TransUnion v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), an important decision from the Supreme Court about Article III standing and its application to damages class actions. Significantly, the Supreme Court for the first time held that all class members seeking to recover damages must have Article III standing. Part II reports on developments in a closely watched Ninth Circuit appeal that also concerns the application of Article III standing in putative class actions.
I. The Supreme Court Issues Important Ruling on the Application of Article III Standing to Damages Class Actions in TransUnion v. Ramirez
In the years since Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330 (2016), the courts of appeals have wrestled with applying Article III standing principles to putative class actions. On June 25, 2021, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of Article III standing for the first time since Spokeo. In TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), the Court reversed a judgment on the claims of more than 6,000 class members whose internal credit reports contained inaccuracies that were never published to any third parties. In so holding, the Court clarified an issue left ambiguous in Spokeo: whether the violation of a federal statute, standing alone, confers Article III standing. The Court held that it does not. If a plaintiff does not suffer a real harm and the risk of future harm never materializes, there is no concrete injury and thus no standing to assert a damages claim. And importantly, the Court held that “every class member”—not just the named plaintiff—is required to meet this standard in order to recover individual damages.
As covered in a previous update, Ramirez concerned a jury verdict awarding $60 million in damages to a class of over 8,000 consumers. The plaintiff alleged that TransUnion violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) by inaccurately labelling him and his fellow class members as potential terrorists, drug traffickers, and other threats to national security on their consumer credit reports. The Ninth Circuit noted that “each member of a class certified under Rule 23 must satisfy the bare minimum of Article III standing at the final judgment stage of a class action in order to recover monetary damages in federal court,” but it found that each of the 8,185 class members had done so. 951 F.3d 1008, 1023 (9th Cir. 2020). Even though 75% of the class never had an inaccurate credit report disseminated to any third party, the Ninth Circuit ruled that each class member had standing because they were subjected to a real risk of harm to their privacy, reputational, and informational interests protected by the FCRA. Id. at 1027.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed. The core of the Court’s ruling was premised on the straightforward Article III principle: “No concrete harm, no standing.” 141 S. Ct. at 2200. The Court explained that under Spokeo, each class member must have suffered a “concrete” harm bearing a “close relationship” to traditional harms—like physical injury, monetary injury, or intangible injuries like damage to reputation—to have standing. Id. And even though “Congress may create causes of action for plaintiffs to sue defendants who violate . . . legal prohibitions or obligations,” “an injury in law is not an injury in fact.” Id. at 2205. Thus, only those class members whose inaccurate credit reports were actually provided to third parties had Article III standing to pursue the FCRA claim. Id. at 2209–10. By contrast, the remaining 75% of class members, “whose credit reports were not provided to third-party businesses,” did not have Article III standing because the “mere existence of inaccurate information” does not constitute a “concrete injury.” Id. at 2209. The Court left it to the Ninth Circuit to “consider in the first instance whether class certification is appropriate in light of [the] conclusion about standing.” Id. at 2214.
Although the Court’s decision clarifies the Article III standard, and confirms that all class members seeking damages must satisfy it, the decision still left unresolved the question “whether every class member must demonstrate standing before a court certifies a class,” id. at 2208 n.4 (emphasis added), and whether the lead plaintiff’s claims were typical of those of the class, id. at 2216 n.1. As a practical matter, it makes little sense for either party to defer this question until after class certification, because time and resources spent litigating a faulty class action benefits no one. At minimum, the issue of how Article III standing can be proven in a class trial should be part of the Rule 23 calculus. But we expect that in the coming months, the lower courts will grapple with these important issues as they seek to apply TransUnion.
II. The Ninth Circuit Grants Rehearing En Banc in Olean v. Bumble Bee Foods
As we discussed in our First-Quarter 2021 Update, the Ninth Circuit issued an important decision in April 2021 in Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 993 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2021), concerning the standards for establishing predominance in putative class actions under Rule 23(b)(3). In a 2-1 decision, the court held that even though plaintiffs may establish predominance using statistical evidence, district courts must still scrutinize the reliability of that evidence before certifying a class. Id. at 791. Additionally, the court stated that the inclusion of uninjured individuals in a class “must be de minimis,” and suggested “that 5% to 6% constitutes the outer limits of a de minimis number.” Id. at 792-93. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s subsequent holding in TransUnion, the court also acknowledged that the presence of uninjured class members presented “serious standing implications under Article III,” but did not reach the issue because class certification failed under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 792 n.7.
On August 3, 2021, the Ninth Circuit vacated this split-panel decision and agreed to rehear the matter en banc. 5 F.4th 950 (9th Cir. 2021). Although the court’s order did not specify the issues the court will consider, it will likely provide guidance on the interplay between Article III and Rule 23 in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion, and potentially address whether Rule 23(b)(3) requires a district court to find that no more than a “de minimis” number of class members are uninjured before certifying a class.
The following Gibson Dunn lawyers contributed to this client update: Christopher Chorba, Kahn Scolnick, Bradley Hamburger, Lauren Blas, Jennafer Tryck, Wesley Sze, and Lauren Fischer.
Gibson Dunn attorneys are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work in the firm’s Class Actions or Appellate and Constitutional Law practice groups, or any of the following lawyers:
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7000, [email protected])
Christopher Chorba – Co-Chair, Class Actions Practice Group – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7396, [email protected])
Theane Evangelis – Co-Chair, Litigation Practice Group, Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7726, [email protected])
Kahn A. Scolnick – Co-Chair, Class Actions Practice Group – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7656, [email protected])
Bradley J. Hamburger – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7658, [email protected])
Lauren M. Blas – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7503, [email protected])
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Climate change matters and related calls for regulation are in headlines daily. On August 9, 2021, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published the first major international assessment of climate-change research since 2013. The IPCC report will inform negotiations at the 2021 UN Climate Change Conference, also known as COP26, beginning on October 31, 2021 in Glasgow.
Chair Gary Gensler of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has made climate change headlines of his own in recent weeks. On July 16, 2021, Chair Gensler appointed Mika Morse to the newly created role of Climate Counsel on his policy staff, further demonstrating the importance of climate policy to the SEC’s agenda. In addition, the Reg Flex Agenda includes “Climate Change Disclosure” – whether to “propose rule amendments to enhance registrant disclosures regarding issuers’ climate-related risks and opportunities.” (See our client alert on the Reg Flex Agenda here.) Chair Gensler has also been very active on Twitter. On July 28, 2021, he posted a video on his Twitter feed addressing the question: “What does the SEC have to do with climate?”
In prepared remarks at the Principles for Responsible Investment “Climate and Global Financial Markets” webinar later that same day, Chair Gensler shared that he has “asked SEC staff to develop a mandatory climate risk disclosure rule proposal for the Commission’s consideration by the end of the year,” and offered detailed insights into potential elements of that rulemaking. Chair Gensler’s remarks began, like many conversations this summer, with a reference to the Olympics. Drawing a connection between the games and public company disclosure, he contended having clear rules to judge performance is critical in both forums. Taking the analogy further, Chair Gensler observed the events competed in at the Olympics, as well as who can compete in them, have evolved substantially since the first modern games in 1896. Likewise, he suggested, the categories of information investors require to make an informed investment decision also evolve over time and that the framework for public company disclosure must take appropriate steps to modernize.
The following Gibson Dunn attorneys assisted in preparing this update: Hillary Holmes, Elizabeth Ising, Lori Zyskowski, and Patrick Cowherd.
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