Publications Archives

Six Gibson Dunn lawyers contributed to the Chambers and Partners Transfer Pricing 2024 guide. Sanford Stark, Saul Mezei, Terrell Ussing and Anne Devereaux authored the Introduction to the guide and the U.S. chapter. Sandy Bhogal and Bridget English authored the U.K. chapter. Sanford Stark also served as the guide’s Contributing Editor. The guide was published in May 2024.

Reed Brodsky, Benjamin Wagner, Mark Schonfeld, David Woodcock and Michael Nadler are the authors of “SEC Successfully Prosecutes Novel ‘Shadow Trading’ Theory at Trial” [PDF] published by Insights: The Corporate & Securities Law Advisor in its June 2024 issue.

Another Planet Ent., LLC v. Vigilant Ins. Co., No. S277893 – Decided May 23, 2024

The California Supreme Court held today that commercial property insurance policies that pay for “direct physical loss or damage to property” do not apply to losses resulting from the alleged presence of the coronavirus.

“We conclude, consistent with the vast majority of courts nationwide, that allegations of the actual or potential presence of COVID-19 on an insured’s premises do not, without more, establish direct physical loss or damage to property within the meaning of a commercial property insurance policy.”

Chief Justice Guerrero writing for the Court

Background:

Most commercial property insurance policies in California insure against the risk of “direct physical loss or damage to property.” Following the COVID-19 pandemic, many businesses sought to recover under such policies, claiming losses from the virus and resulting government closure orders. Another Planet, a concert production company with venues across Northern California, was one such business. It claimed that viruses like COVID-19 cause “direct physical damage” when they are present in properties and airspaces and can cause “direct physical loss” to property when they make spaces unfit for their intended use.

As Another Planet recognized in claiming coverage, state and federal appellate courts across the country have overwhelmingly rejected the claim that COVID-19 causes physical loss of or damage to a property. But Another Planet maintained that California insurance policies should be construed more broadly. After briefing and argument, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified the issue to the California Supreme Court for resolution. The California Supreme Court accepted certification to resolve the issue.

Certified Question:

Can the actual or potential presence of the COVID-19 virus on an insured’s premises constitute “direct physical loss or damage to property” for purposes of coverage under a commercial property insurance policy?

Court’s Holding:

No: The COVID-19 virus does not affect the physical characteristics of covered properties, and the fact that a property cannot be used as it was intended does not establish any covered loss.

What It Means:

The opinion is a significant win for insurers, which have faced a substantial number of claims since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court embraced the reasoning of most appellate decisions nationwide and resolved a split that had developed among the California Courts of Appeal on the issue.
The opinion clarifies that insurance policies covering “direct physical loss or damage to property” require that “the property itself must have been physically harmed or impaired.” COVID-19 does not satisfy that requirement because it does not produce any “distinct, demonstrable, physical change” that “result[s] in some injury to or impairment of the property as property.”
The opinion also clarifies that restrictions on the use of property—including those resulting from public health orders issued by the government—likewise do not implicate coverage because they do not constitute “direct physical loss or damage” to the property itself.
The same analysis applies to physical alterations made “to minimize virus transmission and safely operate”: those alterations are preventative and cannot supply the necessary direct physical damage or loss to property.
The Court distinguished the COVID-19 virus from other invisible or biological substances that become “so connected to the property that the property effectively becomes the source of its own loss or damage”—for instance, when a contaminant damages property and cannot “be easily cleaned or removed.”

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the California Supreme Court. Please feel free to contact the following practice group leaders:

Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice

Thomas H. Dupree Jr. +1 202.955.8547 [email protected]	Allyson N. Ho +1 214.698.3233 [email protected]	Julian W. Poon +1 213.229.7758 [email protected]
Lucas C. Townsend +1 202.887.3731 [email protected]	Bradley J. Hamburger +1 213.229.7658 [email protected]	Michael J. Holecek +1 213.229.7018 [email protected]

Insurance and Reinsurance

Geoffrey M. Sigler
+1 202.887.3752
[email protected]

Deborah L. Stein
+1 213.229.7164
[email protected]

Related Practice: Litigation

Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.
+1 213.229.7804
[email protected]

Theane Evangelis
+1 213.229.7726
[email protected]

This alert was prepared by associates Daniel R. Adler, Ryan Azad, and Matt Aidan Getz.

Attorney Advertising: These materials were prepared for general informational purposes only based on information available at the time of publication and are not intended as, do not constitute, and should not be relied upon as, legal advice or a legal opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. Gibson Dunn (and its affiliates, attorneys, and employees) shall not have any liability in connection with any use of these materials. The sharing of these materials does not establish an attorney-client relationship with the recipient and should not be relied upon as an alternative for advice from qualified counsel. Please note that facts and circumstances may vary, and prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

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Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski et al., No. 23-3 – Decided May 23, 2024

Today, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a court, not an arbitrator, should decide if an arbitration agreement containing a delegation clause was narrowed by a later contract providing for disputes to be decided in court.

“[W]here, as here, parties have agreed to two contracts—one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration, and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courts—a court must decide which contract governs.”

Justice Jackson, writing for the Court

Background:

Arbitration agreements often include a delegation clause providing that an arbitrator, not a court, should decide threshold questions about the agreement’s scope, applicability, and validity. David Suski entered a user agreement with Coinbase, a cryptocurrency exchange platform, that included an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause. Later, Suski participated in a Coinbase-sponsored sweepstakes, the rules of which included a forum selection clause that directed sweepstakes-related disputes to California state and federal courts.

Suski filed a putative class action against Coinbase alleging that its promotion of the sweepstakes violated California law. Coinbase moved to compel arbitration under the user agreement and argued that any dispute about arbitrability was for the arbitrator, not the court. Suski argued that the sweepstakes rules’ forum selection clause superseded the arbitration agreement. The district court agreed and denied arbitration. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the interaction between the user agreement and the sweepstakes rules was an issue that could not be delegated to an arbitrator. The court went on to hold that Suski’s claims were not arbitrable because the sweepstakes rules’ forum selection clause superseded the arbitration agreement in these circumstances.

Issue:

Where parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, should an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?

Court’s Holding:

A court should decide the conflict between the agreements under the particular circumstances of this case.

What It Means:

Today’s decision is narrow and may have limited effect beyond the factual circumstances presented in the case, which involved a second-in-time contract that was arguably in conflict with first-in-time contract’s arbitration and delegation clauses. The Court reaffirmed the general rule that “where parties have agreed to only one contract, and that contract contains an arbitration clause with a delegation provision, then, absent a successful challenge to the delegation provision, courts must send all arbitrability disputes to arbitration.” Op. 8. It also emphasized that it “would not be deciding this case” if the parties had made only their first agreement, which “quite clearly” delegated arbitrability issues to an arbitrator. Op. 2.
The Court’s ruling highlights the benefits of including consistent dispute-resolution provisions across multiple agreements between the same parties.
Justice Gorsuch concurred to emphasize that parties retain the freedom to agree to broad delegation clauses that apply across multiple contracts. He also expressed skepticism of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning below, further underscoring the limited nature of today’s decision.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the U.S. Supreme Court. Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders:

Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice

Thomas H. Dupree Jr. +1 202.955.8547 [email protected]	Allyson N. Ho +1 214.698.3233 [email protected]	Julian W. Poon +1 213.229.7758 [email protected]
Lucas C. Townsend +1 202.887.3731 [email protected]	Bradley J. Hamburger +1 213.229.7658 [email protected]	Brad G. Hubbard +1 214.698.3326 [email protected]

Related Practice: Class Actions

Christopher Chorba
+1 213.229.7396
[email protected]

Kahn A. Scolnick
+1 213.229.7656
[email protected]

This alert was prepared by associates Max E. Schulman and Jason Muehlhoff.

Michael Diamant, George Hazel and Kristen Limarzi are the authors of “How to Avoid and Resolve Pitfalls During a Monitorship’s Life Cycle” [PDF] published by the Global Investigations Review on May 9, 2023.

Gibson Dunn’s Workplace DEI Task Force aims to help our clients develop creative, practical, and lawful approaches to accomplish their DEI objectives following the Supreme Court’s decision in SFFA v. Harvard. Prior issues of our DEI Task Force Update can be found in our DEI Resource Center. Should you have questions about developments in this space or about your own DEI programs, please do not hesitate to reach out to any member of our DEI Task Force or the authors of this Update (listed below).

Key Developments:

American Alliance for Equal Rights (AAER) filed a complaint against Southwest Airlines on May 20, 2024 asserting claims under Title VI and Section 1981. See AAER v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. 3:24-cv-01209-D (N.D. Tex. 2024). Specifically, AAER alleges that Southwest’s ¡Latanzé! Travel Award Program, which awards free flights to students who “identify direct or parental ties to a specific country” of Hispanic origin, improperly discriminates based on race. AAER claims that two potential participants, anonymized as Members A and B, tried to apply to the most recent round of the program, including writing the required essays and meeting all other program criteria, but did not submit their applications once they realized they would need to “agree” to the program rules requiring all applicants to be “verifiably Hispanic.” AAER seeks a declaratory judgment that the program violates Section 1981 and Title VI, a temporary restraining order barring Southwest from closing the next application period, and a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the program’s ethnic eligibility criteria. The docket does not reflect that Southwest Airlines has been served. And potentially forecasting litigation against other airlines, America First Legal (AFL) posted to X (formerly Twitter) on May 10, 2024, soliciting “current and future pilots” and asking “Are you a white man who was denied acceptance into American Airlines’ Cadet Academy? We want to hear from you!”

On May 17, 2024, Plaintiffs Werner Jack Becker and Dana Guida filed a putative class action against Citigroup, alleging that Citigroup has “an express policy of charging customers different ATM fees based on race” in violation of Section 1981 and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. See Becker v. Citigroup, 0:24-cv-60834-AHS (S.D. Fla. 2024). The plaintiffs allege that, under its ATM Community Network program, Citigroup waives out-of-network fees for people who bank at institutions that are “minority owned.” The named plaintiffs do not bank with Citigroup but allege that they paid out-of-network fees at Citigroup ATMs because they were not clients of a minority-owned bank. The complaint alleges that the bank adopted the policy for financial reasons, in order to attract customers who are interested in supporting DEI programs. They seek to represent a nationwide class of “[a]ll persons in the United States who paid ATM fees at a Citi branch location in the last four years,” and a California class of “[a]ll persons in California who paid ATM fees at a Citi branch location in the last three years.” The complaint alleges that “the Classes [consist] of at least thousands of customers that Citibank charged ATM fees under its racially discriminatory [p]rogram.” The docket does not reflect that Citigroup has been served.

On May 15, 2024, AAER filed a complaint against Minnesota Governor Tim Walz, challenging a state law that requires Governor Walz to ensure that five members of the Minnesota Board of Social Work are from a “community of color” or “an underrepresented community.” See American Alliance for Equal Rights v. Walz, 24-cv-1748-PJS-JFD (D. Minn. 2024). The fifteen-member Board, comprised of ten professionally licensed social workers and five public member positions, has three currently open seats and will have an additional six open seats in January 2025. AAER claims that two of its white female members are “qualified, ready, willing and able to be appointed to the board,” but that they will not be given equal consideration. AAER seeks a permanent injunction and a declaration that the law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The docket does not reflect that Governor Walz has been served.

On May 14, 2024, the Fifth Circuit heard oral argument en banc in Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment v. SEC, No. 21-60626 (5th Cir.), in which plaintiffs are challenging Nasdaq’s Board Diversity Rules and the SEC’s approval of those rules. Several judges questioned whether the SEC has the authority to require corporations to disclose board diversity information under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, and what information could be required to be disclosed. Judge Engelhardt pressed the SEC as to how the agency will “draw the line” on what issues are relevant for disclosure, suggesting that “if the answer is ‘investors wanted it,’ that’s not really a line at all.” Several judges posed hypotheticals probing the kinds of disclosures that might be permissible, including TikTok use or position on abortion (Judge Smith), position on the war in Gaza (Judge Duncan), and whether they liked Taylor Swift (Judge Eldrod). Appearing for Nasdaq, which intervened in the case, Gibson Dunn partner Allyson Ho, co-chair of our Appellate Practice Group, argued that the SEC had reasonably approved Nasdaq’s rule, which met a three-prong standard requiring investor demand, a link between the information disclosed and corporate performance and governance, and substantial evidentiary support in the record. She observed that studies had demonstrated the impact of diverse board membership on corporate performance, noting, “when we look at the numbers of women on corporate boards, we find improvements and differences particularly with respect to . . . investor protection issues.” After the petitioners argued that the SEC’s approval of Nasdaq’s board diversity rule constituted discriminatory state action, Ho urged the Fifth Circuit to “reject petitioner’s attempt to turn the exchange’s private action, which the Constitution protects, into government action, which the Constitution constrains.”

On May 9, 2024, King & Spalding was named in a suit alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, and sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and discrimination based on race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Spitalnick v. King & Spalding, LLP, No. 24-cv-01367-JKB (D. Md. 2024). The plaintiff alleges that when she was a first-year law student at the University of Baltimore School of Law, she came across an advertisement for King & Spalding’s Leadership Council Legal Diversity Program, a summer associate program for students who “have an ethnically or culturally diverse background” or are “member[s] of the LGBT community.” Although the plaintiff alleges that she was both interested in and academically qualified for the position, she did not apply because she believed it would have been futile. After the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, the Commission found reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff was discriminated against, and issued a right to sue. The docket does not reflect that King & Spalding has been served.

Speaking at an event held by Jackson Lewis PC on May 8, 2024, EEOC Commissioner Andrea Lucas discussed her perspective on the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis. The decision held that employees need only show “some injury” rather than “significant” harm from a job transfer to maintain a discrimination suit under Title VII. Lucas opined that, after Muldrow, social workplace groups and groups geared towards mentorship or training could be construed as “privileges” of employment. She described such groups that restrict membership based on race or sex as DEI “blind spots.” Lucas also criticized the EEOC’s new harassment guidance, which stated that Title VII could be triggered by repeatedly misgendering a coworker or by denying an employee access to a bathroom or other workplace facility that is consistent with their gender identity. Lucas disagrees that such conduct is harassment and emphasized the value of single-sex spaces.

On May 8, 2024, a white male former employee sued Red Hat, Inc., a subsidiary of IBM in Wood v. Red Hat, Inc., No. 24-cv-237-REP (D. Idaho 2024). In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that his role was terminated “as a direct result of Red Hat’s DEI policies and efforts to diversify the workforce” and claims that, of the group of employees who were terminated at the same time, “21 of the total 22 individuals were white, and 21 were male.” The plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against for opposing his employer’s stated goals of increasing diversity, which included setting hiring quotas of 30% female employees globally and 30% employees of color in the United States by 2028. The plaintiff brought claims under Title VII, Section 1981, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Red Hat was served on May 10, 2024, and its response is due May 31, 2024.

Media Coverage and Commentary:

Below is a selection of recent media coverage and commentary on these issues:

Washington Post, “DEI is getting a new name. Can it dump the political baggage?” (May 5): The Washington Post’s Taylor Telford and Julian Mark report on how companies’ DEI tactics are evolving in response to mounting legal and political pressure. Telford and Mark highlight how, in March 2024, Starbucks secured shareholder approval to replace “representation” goals with “talent” performance for executive bonus incentives; Molson Coors replaced environmental, social and governance (ESG) goals with “People & Planet” metrics; and Eli Lilly omitted the DEI acronym from its 2024 annual shareholders letter after using it 48 times in 2023. Telford and Mark report that companies are also renaming diversity programs, overhauling internal DEI teams, and moving away from overt racial and gender considerations in hiring and promotion. Telford and Mark highlight a linguistic shift as well, with some companies now referring to DEI as “Inclusion, Equity and Diversity” (IED) or “Leadership and Inclusion” (L&I). Despite the uncertain legal landscape, many companies continue to support DEI initiatives, albeit with a keen focus on aligning their programs and communications with evolving legal standards.
Manhattan Institute, “Affirmative ‘Re-Action’: How Major American and New York Bar Associations Are Responding to Students for Fair Admissions” (May 9): Renu Mukherjee, a Paulson Policy Analyst at the Manhattan Institute, critiques post-SFFA efforts aimed at increasing racial diversity within the legal profession. Specifically, Mukherjee examines the recommendations made by the American Bar Association (ABA), New York State Bar Association (NYSBA), and New York City Bar Association (NYCBA) on how law schools, law firms, and lower courts should respond to the SFFA decision. Mukherjee notes that the NYSBA advised law schools in the state to continue considering applicants’ racial identities and experiences in the admissions process by tying those features to “a non-racial goal or value being pursued by the university.” The NYSBA also advised New York law firms to reassert their commitment to DEI principles by actively collecting, tracking, managing, and utilizing DEI-related data and consulting with outside counsel to identify potential risks and mitigation strategies. Mukherjee also discusses the collective endorsement of pipeline programs by the ABA, NYSBA, and NYCBA, which aim to facilitate the entry of underrepresented minority students into the legal profession through avenues such as free academic tutoring, standardized test prep, and career development opportunities. Mukherjee criticizes these recommendations and instead advocates for the implementation of race-neutral pipeline programs targeting students from low- and middle-income backgrounds, claiming this is a more viable approach for fostering diversity within legal institutions while ensuring SFFA-compliant concepts of fairness and equity.

Case Updates:

Below is a list of updates in new and pending cases:

1. Contracting claims under Section 1981, the U.S. Constitution, and other statutes:

Do No Harm v. Gianforte, No. 6:24-cv-00024 (D. Mont. 2024): On March 12, 2024, Do No Harm filed a complaint on behalf of a white female dermatologist in Montana, alleging that a Montana law violates the Equal Protection Clause by requiring the governor to “take positive action to attain gender balance and proportional representation of minorities resident in Montana to the greatest extent possible” when making appointments to the twelve-member Medical Board. Do No Harm further alleges that since the ten filled seats are currently held by six women and four men, Montana law requires that the remaining two seats be filled by men, which would preclude the anonymous female dermatologist identified only as “Member A” from holding the seat.
- Latest update: On May 3, 2024, Governor Gianforte moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Do No Harm lacks standing. Gianforte argues that “Member A” has not been harmed by the challenged law because she has not applied for or been denied any position.
Suhr v. Dietrich, No. 2:23-cv-01697-SCD (E.D. Wis. 2023): On December 19, 2023, a dues-paying member of the Wisconsin State Bar filed a complaint against the Bar over its “Diversity Clerkship Program,” a summer hiring program for first-year law students. The program’s application requirements had previously stated that eligibility was based on membership in a minority group. After the Supreme Court’s decision in SFFA, the eligibility requirements were changed to include students with “backgrounds that have been historically excluded from the legal field.” The plaintiff claims that the Bar’s program is unconstitutional even with the new race-neutral language, because, in practice, the selection process is still based on the applicant’s race or gender. The plaintiff also alleges that the Bar’s diversity program constitutes compelled speech and compelled association in violation of the First Amendment.
- Latest update: On April 2, the plaintiff reached a partial settlement agreement with the Bar to make the criteria for the Diversity Clerkship Program race neutral. On April 30, 2024, the plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, challenging three mentorship and leadership programs that allegedly discriminate based on race, which are funded by mandatory dues paid to the State Bar.
Beneker v. CBS Studios, No. 2:24-cv-01659 (C.D. Cal. 2024): On February 29, 2024, a straight, white, male writer sued CBS, alleging that the network’s de facto hiring policy discriminated against him on the bases of sex, race, and sexual orientation. CBS declined to hire the plaintiff as a staff writer multiple times, but did hire several black writers, female writers, and a lesbian writer. The plaintiff requested a permanent injunction against the de facto policy, a staff writer position, and damages.
- Latest update: On April 30, 2024, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed one of the CBS entities, CBS Entertainment Group, LLC, as a defendant. On May 13, 2024, he filed an amended complaint against the remaining defendants, CBS Studios, Inc. and Paramount Global, re-alleging that they discriminated against him by denying him employment based on his race, sex, and sexual orientation in favor of less qualified applicants who were members of “more preferred groups.”
Californians for Equal Rights Foundation v. City of San Diego, No. 3:24-cv-00484 (S.D. Cal. 2024): On March 12, 2024, the Californians for Equal Rights Foundation filed a complaint on behalf of members who are “ready, willing and able” to purchase a home in San Diego, but ineligible for a grant or loan under the City’s BIPOC First-Time Homebuyer Program. Plaintiffs allege that the program discriminates on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
- Latest update: On May 1, 2024, the City of San Diego, Housing Authority of San Diego, and San Diego Housing Commission answered the complaint, denying the allegations of unconstitutional race discrimination.
Khatibi v. Hawkins, No. 23-cv-06195 (C.D. Cal. 2023), on appeal No. 24-3108 (9th Cir. 2024): On August 1, 2023, doctors Azadeh Khatibi and Marilyn M. Singelton, along with Do No Harm, sued officials of the Medical Board of California, alleging that the Board was unconstitutionally compelling their speech in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs challenged a California law that, since January 1, 2022, has required all Continuing Medical Education (CME) courses to “contain curriculum that includes the understanding of implicit bias.” Khatibi and Singelton allege that, were it not for this law, they would never include implicit bias training in their medical curriculum because it is unrelated to the contents of their course. On October 10, 2023, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the CME curriculum is government speech, not private speech, and therefore the requirements do not compel any private speech in contravention of the First Amendment. And, even if the speech were not government speech, the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims would fail because the speech is not “readily associated with” them.
- Latest update: On May 2, 2024, the Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss without leave to amend, adopting their argument that teaching CME courses is government speech because it is part of a state licensing scheme, and that, much like in a state-mandated public school curriculum, the doctor-educators are not associated with the contents of their course. On May 15, 2024, the plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Their opening brief is due on June 24, 2024.

2. Employment discrimination and related claims:

Sacks v. Texas Southern University et al., No. 23-891, No. 23-1031 (U.S.): Deana Pollard Sacks, a white female law professor, brought two suits against Texas Southern University (TSU) and several employees, alleging that TSU, which is a historically Black university, had violated Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 by discriminating against her on the bases of race and sex. Sacks claimed that she was harassed, underpaid, and forced to resign after she complained that TSU had a gender pay gap. The claims in Sacks’ first suit were dismissed, except for the Equal Pay Act claim, on which she lost at trial. The second suit was dismissed for failure to state a claim. On October 3, 2023, the Fifth Circuit affirmed both motions to dismiss and the jury verdict.
- Latest update: In February and March of 2023, Sacks filed two petitions for a writ of certiorari. On May 13, 2024, the Supreme Court denied both petitions.

3. Challenges to agency rules, laws and regulatory decisions:

American Alliance for Equal Rights v. Ivey, No. 2:24-cv-00104-RAH-JTA (M.D. Ala. 2024): On February 13, 2024, AAER filed a complaint against Alabama Governor Kay Ivey, challenging a state law that requires Governor Ivey to ensure there are no fewer than two individuals “of a minority race” on the Alabama Real Estate Appraisers Board (AREAB). The AREAB has nine seats, including one for a member of the public with no real estate background (the at-large seat), which has been unfilled for years. Because there was only one minority member among the Board at the time of filing, AAER asserts that state law will require that the open seat go to a minority. AAER states that one of its members applied for this final seat, but was denied purely on the basis of race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. On March 19, 2024, the district court denied AAER’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and ordered AAER to confidentially disclose the identity of Member A, the anonymous member of AAER who asserted an injury. On March 27, AAER moved to vacate that order because it no longer sought to keep Member A’s identity confidential. On March 29, 2024, Governor Ivey answered the complaint, admitting that the AREAB quota is unconstitutional and will not be enforced.
- Latest update: On April 26, 2024, the Alabama Association of Real Estate Brokers (AAREB), a trade association and civil rights organization for Black real estate professionals, moved to intervene to “oppos[e] the parties’ position that the race-based provisions are unconstitutional.” On May 3, 2024, both AAER and Governor Ivey filed oppositions to the motion to intervene, but on May 7, 2024, the court granted AAREB’s motion. On May 14, 2024, AAREB answered the complaint, seeking a declaration that the challenged law is valid and enforceable.

DEI Legislation:

Below is a list of legislative developments relating to DEI:

On May 9, 2024, Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds signed into law SF 2435, an education funding bill with broad prohibitions on DEI in state universities. The bill forbids offices, programming, and trainings with “reference to race, color, ethnicity, gender identity, or sexual orientation,” and requires funds previously allocated for DEI initiatives to be reallocated after 2025 to the Iowa workforce grant and incentive program. Representative Adam Zabner (D-Iowa City) condemned the bill as an “embarrassment” for “woefully underfunding” education while promoting “fearmongering” about DEI. The bill will take effect July 1, 2025.
On May 14, 2024, Colorado’s Worker Freedom Act (HB 1260) was sent to Governor Jared Polis for his signature. The Act would forbid employers from disciplining employees who refuse to participate in employer meetings, while carving out DEI trainings. The bill seeks to prevent “captive audience meetings”––mandatory meetings used by employers as a tactic to interfere with union organizing. However, the bill does not protect from discipline employees who opt out of certain meetings, including state-mandated harassment training and DEI training. Governor Polis has thirty days to sign or veto the bill before it will automatically become law on June 13, 2024.

The following Gibson Dunn attorneys assisted in preparing this client update: Jason Schwartz, Mylan Denerstein, Blaine Evanson, Molly Senger, Zakiyyah Salim-Williams, Matt Gregory, Zoë Klein, Mollie Reiss, Jenna Voronov, Alana Bevan, Marquan Robertson, Janice Jiang, Elizabeth Penava, Skylar Drefcinski, Mary Lindsay Krebs, David Offit, Lauren Meyer, Kameron Mitchell, Maura Carey, and Jayee Malwankar.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of the firm’s Labor and Employment practice group, or the following practice leaders and authors:

Jason C. Schwartz – Partner & Co-Chair, Labor & Employment Group
Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8242, [email protected])

Katherine V.A. Smith – Partner & Co-Chair, Labor & Employment Group
Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7107, [email protected])

Mylan L. Denerstein – Partner & Co-Chair, Public Policy Group
New York (+1 212-351-3850, [email protected])

Zakiyyah T. Salim-Williams – Partner & Chief Diversity Officer
Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8503, [email protected])

Molly T. Senger – Partner, Labor & Employment Group
Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8571, [email protected])

Blaine H. Evanson – Partner, Appellate & Constitutional Law Group
Orange County (+1 949-451-3805, [email protected])

The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, introduced in December 2023, has significantly lowered the bar for UK authorities to bring prosecutions against international companies for economic crimes. The law also introduces a new corporate offence of ‘failing to prevent fraud’, analogous to ‘failing to prevent bribery’ under the UK Bribery Act. Together, these dynamic-shifting changes open up a real prospect of companies operating anywhere in the world being exposed to UK criminal liability if their actions impact on UK customers or counterparties.

The session compares and contrasts the UK and U.S. position on prosecuting corporates, provides insights into preparing for the broad jurisdictional reach of the new legislation and discusses the UK Serious Fraud Office’s focus on protecting UK victims. The session also considers whether and how the UK’s whistleblowing regime is catching up with that of the U.S.

PANELISTS:

Matthew Nunan is the former Head of Wholesale Enforcement at the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), and a former Case Controller at the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO). When at the FCA, Mr. Nunan oversaw investigations and regulatory actions including LIBOR- and FX-related misconduct, insider dealing, and market misconduct matters, many of which involved working extensively with non-UK regulators and prosecuting authorities. Mr. Nunan also was Head of Conduct Risk for Europe, the Middle East and Africa at a major global bank. He specializes in fraud and financial services investigations, regulation, enforcement, and white collar defense. Mr. Nunan is a partner in the London office, a member of the firm’s Dispute Resolution Group and a barrister in England and Wales.

John W.F. Chesley is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office. Mr. Chesley has been repeatedly recognized for his white collar defense work by Global Investigations Review, Law360, and the National Law Journal, among others. He represents corporations, audit committees and executives in internal investigations and before government agencies in matters involving the FCPA, procurement fraud, environmental crimes, securities violations, sanctions enforcement, antitrust violations and whistleblower claims. He also has served as the Interim Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer for a publicly traded, multi-national food company. Mr. Chesley is a member of the bars of the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia and has held a Secret security clearance.

Marija Bračković is a senior associate in Gibson Dunn’s London office and a member of the firm’s White Collar Defense and Investigations Groups. Ms. Bračković has substantial experience in both domestic and international dispute resolution, including litigation and investigations. Her practice has an emphasis on high-profile and politically sensitive matters, such as cases relating to bribery, money laundering and allegations of cross-border and international crime. Ms. Bračković has acted in matters in the UK, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Cambodia, representing diverse clients, including governments, political parties, non-governmental organizations and private individuals. She has particular experience in advising and acting for major technology companies, banks, crypto firms and financial institutions. Ms. Bračković is a barrister in England and Wales. Prior to joining the firm, she practiced at a leading set of barristers’ chambers in London and completed secondments at the Serious Fraud Office and a major retail bank.

Sarah Hafeez is an associate in Gibson Dunn’s Washington, D.C. office. She is a member of the firm’s Litigation Department and her practice focuses on white collar defense and investigations. Ms. Hafeez’s experience includes representing clients in government investigations involving the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and other regulatory and enforcement agencies, advising clients regarding the development of their compliance programs and conducting internal investigations. Ms. Hafeez is admitted to practice in the State of New York and the District of Columbia.

MCLE CREDIT INFORMATION:

This program has been approved for credit in accordance with the requirements of the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board for a maximum of 1.5 credit hours, of which 1.5 credit hours may be applied toward the areas of professional practice requirement. This course is approved for transitional/non-transitional credit.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP certifies that this activity has been approved for MCLE credit by the State Bar of California in the amount of 1.5 hours.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP is authorized by the Solicitors Regulation Authority to provide in-house CPD training. This program is approved for CPD credit in the amount of 1.5 hours. Regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (Number 324652).

Neither the Connecticut Judicial Branch nor the Commission on Minimum Continuing Legal Education approve or accredit CLE providers or activities. It is the opinion of this provider that this activity qualifies for up to 1.5 hours toward your annual CLE requirement in Connecticut, including 0 hour(s) of ethics/professionalism.

Application for approval is pending with the Colorado, Illinois, Texas, Virginia, and Washington State Bars.

Gibson Dunn and Deloitte practitioners discuss recent developments in Section 10A investigations, along with considerations for inside and outside counsel when managing these complex processes.

PANELISTS:

David Ware
Partner, Washington, D.C.
Accounting Firm Advisory and Defense

Michael Scanlon
Partner, Washington, D.C.
Accounting Firm Advisory and Defense

Darcy Harris
Partner, New York
Accounting Firm Advisory and Defense

John Treiber
Chief Risk Officer, Deloitte & Touche LLP

MCLE CREDIT INFORMATION:

This program has been approved for credit in accordance with the requirements of the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board for a maximum of 1.0 credit hour, of which 1.0 credit hour may be applied toward the areas of professional practice requirement. This course is approved for transitional/non-transitional credit.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP certifies that this activity has been approved for MCLE credit by the State Bar of California in the amount of 1.0 hour.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP is authorized by the Solicitors Regulation Authority to provide in-house CPD training. This program is approved for CPD credit in the amount of 1.0 hour. Regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (Number 324652).

Neither the Connecticut Judicial Branch nor the Commission on Minimum Continuing Legal Education approve or accredit CLE providers or activities. It is the opinion of this provider that this activity qualifies for up to 1 hour toward your annual CLE requirement in Connecticut, including 0 hour(s) of ethics/professionalism.

Application for approval is pending with the Colorado, Illinois, Texas, Virginia, and Washington State Bars.

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The Notice provides a new elective safe harbor that should reduce the practical difficulties that taxpayers face in seeking to demonstrate that their clean energy projects are eligible for the Domestic Content Bonus Credit by reducing the circumstances when taxpayers will be forced to engage in cumbersome or impractical substantiation of third-party costs.

On May 16, 2024, the IRS and Treasury issued Notice 2024-41 (the “Notice”) (here), which modifies and expands Notice 2023-38, issued last year as initial guidance for developers and investors seeking to qualify projects for the domestic content bonus credit available under sections 45, 45Y, 48, and 48E (the “Domestic Content Bonus Credit”).[1] (For a full discussion of Notice 2023-38 and the Domestic Content Bonus Credit, see our earlier client alert here.)

The Notice is a highly welcome piece of guidance. Most importantly, it provides a new elective safe harbor that should reduce the practical difficulties that taxpayers face in seeking to demonstrate that their clean energy projects are eligible for the Domestic Content Bonus Credit by reducing the circumstances when taxpayers will be forced to engage in cumbersome or impractical substantiation of third-party costs. The Notice also expands and modifies a helpful list in Notice 2023-38 categorizing components as Applicable Project Components and Manufactured Product Components for purposes of further applying the applicable requirements for the Domestic Content Bonus Credit.[2]

Background

A taxpayer is eligible to claim a Domestic Content Bonus Credit, which is an increased tax credit amount in respect of projects that meet certain requirements under sections 45 and 45Y (the “PTC”) and sections 48 and 48E (the “ITC”), if the taxpayer timely certifies to the IRS that the applicable requirements have been satisfied.[3]

The Domestic Content Bonus Credit requirements vary based on the type of Applicable Project Component. Applicable Project Components that are made primarily of steel or iron, and are structural in function, meet the Domestic Content Bonus Credit requirements if all manufacturing processes with respect to the Applicable Project Component (except metallurgical processes involving refinement of steel additives) take place in the United States (the “Steel or Iron Requirement”).[4] All other Applicable Project Components that result from a manufacturing process meet the Domestic Content Bonus Credit requirements if a certain statutory percentage (ranging from 20 percent to 55 percent) of the total of certain costs of Applicable Project Components are attributable to (i) Applicable Project Components for which all of the manufacturing processes take place in the United States and all Manufactured Product Components are of U.S. origin and (ii) “U.S. Components” (i.e., Manufactured Product Components that are mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States) of other Applicable Project Components not described in clause (i) (the “Manufactured Products Requirement”).[5]

Expansion and Modification of Existing Categorization Safe Harbor

Notice 2023-38 identified certain Applicable Project Components in utility-scale solar, wind, and energy storage projects and categorized them as subject to either the Steel or Iron Requirement or the Manufactured Products Requirement. This was a welcome development, providing highly practical guidance for taxpayers that reduced uncertainty in the threshold identification and categorization of components.

The Notice expands the guidance in Notice 2023-38 on how to identify and categorize Applicable Project Components and Manufactured Product Components of hydropower and pumped hydropower storage facilities and extends the guidance applicable to utility-scale solar to apply to ground-mount and rooftop PV systems.

The Notice also identifies additional Manufactured Product Components of inverters, solar trackers and battery containers. The Notice both states that taxpayers may treat the Applicable Project Components or Manufactured Product Components described in the Notice as having been included in the initial guidance in Notice 2023-38 and that where there are inconsistencies between the two notices regarding classifications of Applicable Project Components or Manufactured Product Components, the Notice will control.

Addition of New Elective Safe Harbor

Notice 2023-38 provided that, for purposes of satisfying the Manufactured Products Requirement, only direct material and labor costs were taken into account in the numerator and denominator when computing the applicable statutory percentage, which necessitated collecting sensitive commercial information (in documented form) from third-party suppliers or other counterparties (and then sharing that sensitive information with insurers, project buyers, lenders, tax equity investors and credit buyers). This exercise proved challenging, if not practically impossible.

The Notice eases the taxpayer’s compliance burden by providing a new safe harbor that allows taxpayers to elect to use Department of Energy-provided cost percentages (in lieu of actual costs) to determine if the Manufactured Products Requirement is met.

If a taxpayer elects to use the new safe harbor, it must apply the assigned cost percentages in the Notice to all relevant Applicable Project Components and Manufactured Product Components of the Applicable Project. If relevant Applicable Project Components and Manufactured Product Components are not enumerated in the Notice, then those components are disregarded; if the Applicable Project does not use certain Appliable Project Components and Manufactured Product Components listed in the Notice, then those components take a zero value. The safe harbor includes special provisions to facilitate its application in circumstances where a project incorporates Manufactured Products or Manufactured Product Components of the same type (e.g., a wind turbine) from both foreign and domestic sources, along with a special rule authorizing taxpayers claiming the ITC to apply the safe harbor on a project-wide basis where the project is comprised of both an energy generation and an energy storage facility.

Reliance and Certification

Taxpayers are permitted to rely on Notice 2023-38, as modified by the Notice, for purposes of claiming the Domestic Content Bonus Credit for a project on which construction begins before the date that is 90 days after publication of forthcoming proposed regulations on the domestic content requirements. Taxpayers are permitted to rely on the new safe harbor for purposes of claiming the Domestic Content Bonus Credit for a project on which construction begins before the date that is 90 days after any modification, update, or withdrawal of this new safe harbor. To rely on this new safe harbor, a taxpayer must specify on its domestic content certification statement (as described in Notice 2023-38) that the taxpayer is relying on the new safe harbor for purposes of claiming the Domestic Content Bonus Credit in respect of a project.

Observations

In our prior alert summarizing Notice 2023-38, we anticipated the commercial issues that are addressed by the Notice. We are optimistic that this Notice will allow taxpayers to take advantage of this important incentive more readily, although the all-or-nothing nature of the new safe harbor may compel some taxpayers that have good cost information with respect to some, but not all, of the Applicable Project Components to carefully weigh the pros and cons of applying the safe harbor.
Application of the new safe harbor still requires a taxpayer to identify (and document) relevant Applicable Project Components and Manufactured Product Components as having been mined, produced or manufactured in the United States, which will continue to require taxpayers to obtain information from third parties.

__________

[1] Unless indicated otherwise, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”), and all “Treas. Reg. §” references are to the Treasury Regulations promulgated under the Code.

For a discussion of the other energy community bonus credit, please see here. For our other recent updates on guidance related to energy credits, please see the following: (1) our alerts on guidance related to transferring and receiving direct payments with respect to tax credits (available here, here, and here), (2) our alert describing proposed investment tax credit regulations (available here), (3) our alert describing proposed regulations providing guidance on the prevailing wage and apprenticeship rules (available here), (4) our alert describing tax benefits for the carbon capture industry (available here).

[2] As described in our prior client alert, applicable projects are types of energy generation or storage facilities or properties, e.g., a utility-scale photovoltaic property or land-based wind facility (an “Applicable Project”). An applicable project component is the building block of an Applicable Project (an “Applicable Project Component”). For example, Applicable Project Components of for a land-based wind facility include the tower and wind turbine. Finally, a manufactured product component is an item that is directly incorporated into an Applicable Project Component that is produced as a result of the manufacturing process (a “Manufactured Product Component”).

[3] For PTC projects, if the Domestic Content Bonus Credit is available, the section 45 or 45Y credit is increased by a maximum of 10 percent, and for ITC projects, the section 48 or 48E credit percentage is increased by a maximum of 10 percentage points. In the case of projects subject to prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements (discussed in our prior alert here), failure to satisfy those requirements reduces the bonus credit amounts to 2 percent (for PTC projects) or 2 percentage points (for ITC projects).

[4] For purposes of this Notice, the United States includes the States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.

[5] The Steel or Iron Requirement applies in a manner consistent with Section 661.5(b) and (c) of title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (the “CFR”). 49 CFR §§ 661.1 through 661.21 (also known as the “Buy America” requirements). The Manufactured Products Requirement applies in a manner consistent with 49 CFR § 661.5(d).

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers prepared this update: Mike Cannon, Matt Donnelly, Josiah Bethards, and Austin Morris.

Gibson Dunn lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have about these developments. To learn more about these issues, please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of the firm’s Tax, Cleantech, or Power and Renewables practice groups, or the following authors:

Tax:
Michael Q. Cannon – Dallas (+1 214.698.3232, [email protected])
Matt Donnelly – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3567, [email protected])
Josiah Bethards – Dallas (+1 214.698.3354, [email protected])
Austin T. Morris – Dallas (+1 214.698.3483, [email protected])

Cleantech:
John T. Gaffney – New York (+1 212.351.2626, [email protected])
Daniel S. Alterbaum – New York (+1 212.351.4084, [email protected])
Adam Whitehouse – Houston (+1 346.718.6696, [email protected])

Power and Renewables:
Peter J. Hanlon – New York (+1 212.351.2425, [email protected])
Nicholas H. Politan, Jr. – New York (+1 212.351.2616, [email protected])

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From the Derivatives Practice Group: ISDA published several reports and responses this week, including a quantitative impact study on the US Basel III proposal, and a response to CPMI and IOSCO’s variation margin practices.

New Developments

CFTC Issues Proposal on Event Contracts. On May 10, the CFTC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to further specify types of event contracts that fall within the scope of Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) section 5c(c)(5)(c) and are contrary to the public interest. The proposal includes a determination that event contracts involving each of the activities enumerated in CEA section 5c(c)(5)(c) (gaming, war, terrorism, assassination, and activity that is unlawful under any Federal or State law) are, as a category, contrary to the public interest and therefore may not be listed for trading or accepted for clearing on or through a CFTC-registered entity. Further, the proposal defines “gaming” in detail, and the proposal lists illustrative examples of gaming that include staking or risking something of value on the outcome of a political contest, an awards contest, or a game in which one or more athletes compete, or an occurrence or non-occurrence in connection with such a contest or game. Thus, event contracts involving these illustrative examples of gaming could not be listed for trading or accepted for clearing under the proposal. Comments must be received on or before July 9, 2024. [NEW]
Statement of Chairman Rostin Behnam Regarding Proposed Event Contracts Rulemaking. On May 10, CFTC Chairman Rostin Behnam remarked on his support for the proposed amendments to the Commission’s rules concerning event contracts. The Chairman remarked that the Commission proposes to further specify the types of event contracts that fall within the scope of CEA section 5c(c)(5)(C) and are contrary to the public interest. He believes that the amendments will support efforts by registered entities to comply with the CEA by more clearly identifying the types of event contracts that may not be listed for trading or accepted for clearing.
CFTC Technology Advisory Committee Advances Report and Recommendations to the CFTC on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in Financial Markets. On May 2, the CFTC’s Technology Advisory Committee (TAC) released a Report on Responsible AI in Financial Markets. The CFTC stated that the TAC issued a Report that facilitates an understanding of the impact and implications of the evolution of AI on financial markets. The Committee made five recommendations to the Commission as to how the CFTC should approach this AI evolution to safeguard financial markets. The Committee urged the CFTC to leverage its role as a market regulator to support the current efforts on AI coming from the White House and Congress.]
CFTC Chairman Behnam Designates Ted Kaouk as the CFTC’s First Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer. On May 1, CFTC Chairman Rostin Behnam announced the designation of Dr. Ted Kaouk as the agency’s first Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer. Dr. Kaouk currently serves as the CFTC’s Chief Data Officer and Director of the Division of Data. The CFTC stated that in this newly expanded role as the CFTC’s Chief Data & Artificial Intelligence Officer, Dr. Kaouk will be responsible for leading the development of the CFTC’s enterprise data and artificial intelligence strategy to further integrate CFTC’s ongoing efforts to advance its data-driven capabilities.

New Developments Outside the U.S.

ESMA Publishes Data on Markets and Securities in the EEA. On May 16, ESMA published the Statistics on Securities and Markets (ESSM) Report, with the objective of increasing access to data of public interest. The report provides details about how securities markets in the European Economic Area (EEA30) were organized in 2022, including structural indicators on securities, markets, market participants and infrastructures. It covers the distribution of legal entities by member states, either based on their supervisory role or their location. It also contains information on third country entities when their activities are recognized (e.g., CCPs or benchmark administrators) or when their securities are traded in EEA30 (e.g., information on issuers and securities available for trading). [NEW]
ESMA to Host Web Event on Effective and Attractive Capital Markets. On May 22, ESMA will host an online event focused on the launch of its Position Paper on the effectiveness of capital markets in the European Union. Natasha Cazenave, ESMA Executive Director, will be moderating the event and Verena Ross, ESMA Chair, will present the paper and take questions from the audience. Registrations are now open. [NEW]
ESMA Guidelines Establish Harmonized Criteria for use of ESG and Sustainability Terms in Fund Names. On May 14, following the public statement of December 14, 2023, ESMA published the final report containing Guidelines on funds’ names using ESG or sustainability-related terms. The objective of the Guidelines is to ensure that investors are protected against unsubstantiated or exaggerated sustainability claims in fund names, and to provide asset managers with clear and measurable criteria to assess their ability to use ESG or sustainability-related terms in fund names. The Guidelines establish that to be able to use these terms, a minimum threshold of 80% of investments should be used to meet environmental, social characteristics or sustainable investment objectives. [NEW]
ESMA Asks for Input on Assets Eligible for UCITS. On May 7, ESMA published a Call for Evidence on the review of the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Eligible Assets Directive (EAD). The objective of this call is to gather information from stakeholders to assess possible risk and benefits of UCITS gaining exposure to various asset classes. Investors and consumer groups interested in retail investment products, management companies of UCITS, self-managed UCITS investment companies, depositaries of UCITS and trade associations are invited to provide their feedback on market practices and interpretation or practical application issues with respect to the eligibility criteria and other provisions set out in the UCITS EAD.

New Industry-Led Developments

US Basel III Endgame: Trading and Capital Markets Impact. On May 16, in response to the US Basel III proposal, ISDA and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) conducted a quantitative impact study (QIS) that showed that the market risk portion of the proposal, known as the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book, will result in a substantial increase in market risk capital of between 73% and 101%, depending on the extent to which banks use internal models. [NEW]
International Money Market Dates Market Practice Note. On May 15, ISDA published the International Money Market Dates Practice Note regarding setting the start date/effective date for over-the-counter interest rate derivatives traded by reference to an international money market date. [NEW]
ISDA Publishes DC Review and Launches Market Consultation. On May 13, ISDA published an independent review on the structure and governance of the Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees (DCs) and launched a market-wide consultation on its recommendations. The review covers the composition, functioning, governance, and membership of the DCs. The report makes several recommendations on possible changes that could be made to improve the structure of the DCs, which are now available on the ISDA website for public consultation. [NEW]
ISDA and FIA Response to CFTC on Swaps LTR Rules (Part 20). On May 13, ISDA and FIA responded to the CFTC’s proposed request for approval from the Office of Management and Budget to continue to collect information related to certain physical commodity swap positions in accordance with the CFTC’s swaps large trader reporting (LTR) rules. In the response, the associations request that the CFTC sunset the swaps LTR rules with §20.9 sunset provision. [NEW]
ISDA and IIF Response to CPMI-IOSCO on VM Practices. On May 10, ISDA and the Institute of International Finance (IIF) responded to a discussion paper on variation margin (VM) practices by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The associations are supportive of the effective practices on frequency, scheduling, and timing, pass through of VM, excess collateral and transparency from central counterparties (CCPs) to clearing members (CMs), which would foster market participants’ readiness for above-average VM calls. On effective practice 8 on transparency from CMs to clients on intraday VM calls, the response highlights that most CMs do not pass on intraday VM calls to their clients and this information would therefore not be relevant. [NEW]
ISDA and AFME Respond to FCA Publicizing Enforcement Consultation. On April 30, ISDA and the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) responded to a Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) proposal that would give it the ability to publicly name firms at the start of an investigation and before a decision has been reached on whether to take further action. According to ISDA, there has been a considerable reaction to the proposals across the financial services industry, and the response highlights various risks and concerns with the proposals, including the risk to the competitiveness of the UK, damage to shareholder value and reputation of the sector, and worse outcomes for consumers.
ISDA, SIFMA, and CCMA Publish T+1 Settlement Cycle Booklet. On April 30, ISDA, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and the Canadian Capital Markets Association (CCMA) published a T+1 settlement cycle booklet to address queries from market participants on the settlement cycle changes taking place in North America on May 27-28, 2024, and the possible impact to relevant securities and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions. This booklet may be updated from time to time.
ISDA Publishes Sub-Annex A Maintenance Guidelines for the 2005 ISDA Commodity Definitions. On April 30, ISDA published maintenance guidelines for Sub-Annex A of the 2005 ISDA Commodity Definitions. Sub-Annex A contains definitions for various Commodity Reference Prices.

The following Gibson Dunn attorneys assisted in preparing this update: Jeffrey Steiner, Adam Lapidus, Marc Aaron Takagaki, Hayden McGovern, and Karin Thrasher.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of the firm’s Derivatives practice group, or the following practice leaders and authors:

Jeffrey L. Steiner, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3632, [email protected])

Michael D. Bopp, Washington, D.C. (202.955.8256, [email protected])

Michelle M. Kirschner, London (+44 (0)20 7071.4212, [email protected])

Darius Mehraban, New York (212.351.2428, [email protected])

Jason J. Cabral, New York (212.351.6267, [email protected])

Adam Lapidus – New York (+1 212.351.3869, [email protected])

Stephanie L. Brooker, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3502, [email protected])

William R. Hallatt, Hong Kong (+852 2214 3836, [email protected])

David P. Burns, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3786, [email protected])

Marc Aaron Takagaki, New York (212.351.4028, [email protected])

Hayden K. McGovern, Dallas (214.698.3142, [email protected])

Karin Thrasher, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3712, [email protected])

Smith v. Spizzirri, No. 22-1218 – Decided May 16, 2024

Today, the Supreme Court held unanimously that the Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to stay, rather than dismiss, lawsuits in which all claims are subject to arbitration.

“When a federal court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration, and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, the court does not have discretion to dismiss the suit on the basis that all the claims are subject to arbitration.”

Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Court

Background:

Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that when a dispute is subject to arbitration, the court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. A circuit split developed on whether the FAA permits a court to dismiss the lawsuit instead of issuing a stay when the dispute is subject to arbitration. Most circuits held that when the claims in a lawsuit are arbitrable and a party requests a stay pending arbitration, the FAA requires the court to stay the lawsuit. A minority of circuits held that courts have discretion to dismiss lawsuits in which the claims are arbitrable.

Smith and a group of current and former on-demand delivery drivers filed claims against Intelliserve LLC, a Phoenix-based delivery service, in federal court. Intelliserve moved to compel arbitration under its arbitration agreement with the drivers and requested a stay pending arbitration. The district court granted Intelliserve’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly exercised its discretion to dismiss the lawsuit.

Issue:

Does Section 3 of the FAA require courts to stay a lawsuit pending arbitration, or do courts have discretion to dismiss lawsuits in which the claims are subject to arbitration?

Court’s Holding:

When a court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration and a party requests a stay pending arbitration, the court must stay the action and does not have discretion to dismiss the action.

What It Means:

The Court held that the plain text of Section 3 of the FAA “requires a court to stay the proceeding” and “overrides any discretion a district court might otherwise have had to dismiss a suit when the parties have agreed to arbitration.” Op. 4-5.
The Court’s decision means that parties opposing arbitration likely cannot immediately appeal orders compelling arbitration. If a court compelling arbitration were not required to issue a stay, and could instead dismiss the lawsuit, the party opposing arbitration could immediately appeal the dismissal of the lawsuit. By contrast, when a court compels arbitration and enters a stay, the party opposing arbitration ordinarily cannot appeal immediately. By requiring courts to stay lawsuits pending arbitration, the Court’s decision will likely prevent immediate appeals of orders compelling arbitration.
The Court reasoned that staying, rather than dismissing, lawsuits subject to arbitration comports with the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for courts, which include post-arbitration proceedings to confirm, vacate, or modify the arbitral award. A stay pending arbitration keeps the case on the court’s docket and allows parties to seek relief related to the arbitration without filing a new case.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the U.S. Supreme Court. Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders:

Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice

Thomas H. Dupree Jr. +1 202.955.8547 [email protected]	Allyson N. Ho +1 214.698.3233 [email protected]	Julian W. Poon +1 213.229.7758 [email protected]
Lucas C. Townsend +1 202.887.3731 [email protected]	Bradley J. Hamburger +1 213.229.7658 [email protected]	Brad G. Hubbard +1 214.698.3326 [email protected]

Related Practice: Class Actions

Christopher Chorba
+1 213.229.7396
[email protected]

Kahn A. Scolnick
+1 213.229.7656
[email protected]

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CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association of America, No. 22-448 – Decided May 16, 2024

Today, the Supreme Court held 7-2 that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s funding structure—which allows the agency to draw money from the Federal Reserve—does not violate the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause.

“Under the Appropriations Clause, an appropriation is simply a law that authorizes expenditures from a specified source of public money for designated purposes. The statute that provides the Bureau’s funding meets these requirements.”

Justice Thomas, writing for the Court

Background:

The Appropriations Clause states that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. When Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in 2010, it determined that the CFPB would not receive its funding through an annual appropriation law, as most agencies do. Instead, it directed that the CFPB would receive funding directly from the Federal Reserve each year in an amount that the CFPB Director deems “reasonably necessary”—up to an inflation-adjusted cap. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(1)–(2). The Federal Reserve, in turn, is also funded outside the ordinary appropriations process. 12 U.S.C. § 243.

Community Financial Services Association is an association of lenders that sought to set aside a CFPB regulation, arguing that it was promulgated through the CFPB’s use of funds received in violation of the Appropriations Clause. The Fifth Circuit agreed and vacated the regulation. It held that the CFPB’s funding structure violated the Appropriations Clause because the CFPB has unilateral discretion to determine its own funding level and the funds it receives are insulated from Congress’s control.

Issue:

Whether the CFPB’s funding structure violates the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause.

Court’s Holding:

The CFPB’s funding structure does not violate the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause.

What It Means:

Resolving the “narrow question” whether the CFPB’s funding mechanism complies with the Appropriations Clause, Justice Thomas, writing for a seven-Justice majority, held that the statute authorizing the CFPB’s funding qualifies as an “appropriation” because it specifies the amount (in the form of a cap), source, and purpose of the public funds. Op. 1, 15–16. The Court noted that unspecified but capped appropriations were commonplace after the founding. Op. 16. The Court held that it is not necessary that Congress regularly or directly appropriate public funds because the Constitution’s two-year limit for appropriations for the Army, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, implies authority to make standing appropriations in other contexts, as confirmed by founding-era practice. Op. 17.
The Court did not agree that upholding the CFPB’s funding structure under the Appropriations Clause would allow the Executive to operate free of any meaningful fiscal check. Op. 18–19. While leaving open the possibility that there may be structural limits on agency funding mechanisms, the Court reasoned that those limits do not find their source in the Appropriations Clause. Id.
Justice Kagan, writing for four Justices, concurred to note that the CFPB’s funding scheme is consistent not only with founding-era practices, but also with practices “at any other time in our Nation’s history” up through the present day. Op. 1. Justice Jackson concurred separately, asserting that “[w]hen the Constitution’s text does not provide a limit to a coordinate branch’s power, we should not lightly assume that Article III implicitly directs the Judiciary to find one.” Op. 1.
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented, concluding that “the CFPB’s unprecedented combination of funding features affords it the very kind of financial independence that the Appropriations Clause was designed to prevent.” Op. 23.
The decision rejects the constitutional challenge in this case and likely will allow CFPB actions stayed during the pendency of this case to resume. The Court’s “narrow” decision leaves open what constitutes “public money” or “designated purposes” for that money, questions that might be litigated in future cases involving other agencies’ funding schemes that do not depend on annual appropriations—such as the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The decision also leaves open whether other structural limits may constrain an agency’s funding structure.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the U.S. Supreme Court. Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders:

Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice

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Related Practice: Litigation

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Related Practice: Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice

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Gibson Dunn’s U.S. Supreme Court Round-Up provides summaries of cases decided during the October 2023 Term, a preview of cases set to be argued next Term, and highlights other key developments on the Court’s docket. During the October 2022 Term, the Court heard argument in 59 cases, released 58 opinions, and dismissed one case as improvidently granted. During the current Term, the Court heard 61 oral arguments and has released 20 opinions.

Spearheaded by Miguel Estrada, the U.S. Supreme Court Round-Up keeps clients apprised of the Court’s most recent actions. The Round-Up previews cases scheduled for argument, tracks the actions of the Office of the Solicitor General, and recaps recent opinions. The Round-Up provides a concise, substantive analysis of the Court’s actions. Its easy-to-use format allows the reader to identify what is on the Court’s docket at any given time, and to see what issues the Court will be taking up next. The Round-Up is the ideal resource for busy practitioners seeking an in-depth, timely, and objective report on the Court’s actions.

View the Round-Up here.

Gibson Dunn has a longstanding, high-profile presence before the Supreme Court of the United States, appearing numerous times in the past decade in a variety of cases. Fifteen current Gibson Dunn lawyers have argued before the Supreme Court, and during the Court’s eight most recent Terms, the firm has argued a total of 21 cases, including closely watched cases with far-reaching significance in the areas of intellectual property, securities, separation of powers, and federalism. Moreover, although the grant rate for petitions for certiorari is below 1%, Gibson Dunn’s petitions have captured the Court’s attention: Gibson Dunn has persuaded the Court to grant 36 petitions for certiorari since 2006.

* * * *

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the U.S. Supreme Court. Please feel free to contact the following attorneys, or any member of the Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Group.

Thomas H. Dupree Jr. (+1 202.955.8547, [email protected])
Allyson N. Ho (+1 214.698.3233, [email protected])
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This action highlights the need for investment advisers to exercise caution when contemplating any situation in which legal fees will be shared with clients.

On April 29, 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or the “Commission”) entered an administrative cease and desist order (the “Order”) against a registered investment adviser (the “Adviser”)[1] finding that the adviser had an “impermissible joint legal fee arrangement” with its client, Mutual Fund Series Trust (“Trust”), an SEC-registered open-end investment company.[2] This action highlights the need for investment advisers to exercise caution when contemplating any situation in which legal fees will be shared with clients.

Joint Legal Fee Arrangement

The Order states that the Adviser advised a series of the Trust that “experienced significant losses from its options-trading investment strategy.” Inquiries from regulators and private lawsuits soon followed, and the Adviser and the Trust retained the same counsel to represent them; neither the joint engagement letter nor the invoices explained “how legal fees and other expenses would be allocated between the Adviser and the Trust.”[3]

Because the Trust was insured for legal expenses and the Adviser was not, the Adviser “arranged to have all of the legal bills” from the joint engagement “paid by the Trust and subsequently submitted to the Trust’s insurer” to maximize insurance coverage. According to the Order, the Adviser said it intended to reimburse the Trust for any amounts not covered by insurance. Notably, the Adviser and the Trust entered this joint legal fee arrangement “without knowledge or approval of the independent trustees of the Trust’s Board of Trustees (‘Board’) and without making an application to the Commission . . . pursuant to Rule 17d-1 under the Investment Company Act.”[4]

From May 2017 to March 2020, the Trust paid nearly $2.5 million in legal fees and costs relating to the joint representation. The Adviser paid nothing during this period.[5] In April 2020, almost three full years after the Trust’s first payment, the Adviser contributed by paying $781,250 of the Trust’s share of a legal settlement in one of the private lawsuits. For the remainder of 2020 the Trust continued to pay nearly 80% of new legal fees incurred while the Adviser paid the other 20%.[6]

The SEC contacted the Adviser in early 2021 about the joint arrangement, and afterwards, the Trust, “in consultation with Counsel and independent trustees’ counsel,” allocated $1,277,388 of the legal fees to the Adviser. After accounting for the $781,250 already paid, the Adviser paid the remaining $472,403 to the Trust and, at the Board’s request, an additional $30,726 in interest.[7] The Trust’s insurer subsequently determined that it would cover “$183,757 less than the amount the Adviser and the Trust had agreed would be allocated to the Trust.” In connection with efforts to resolve the SEC’s investigation, “[the Adviser] voluntarily repaid the Trust $183,757 for those legal expenses.”[8]

Violations and Penalties

The SEC found that the Adviser’s joint legal fee arrangement violated “Section 17(d) of the Investment Company Act and Rule 17d-1 thereunder, which generally prohibit any affiliated person of a registered investment company, acting as principal, from participating in . . . any . . . joint arrangement . . . in which such registered investment company is a participant, absent an order issued by the Commission.”[9] It also found that the Adviser violated “Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act, which makes it unlawful for any investment adviser . . . to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.”[10] The adviser settled the matter without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings.

As part of its settlement, the Adviser was ordered to pay disgorgement of $280,902 (which included “time value of money benefit” and an “offset” of $183,757 based on the Adviser’s last payment to the Trust), prejudgment interest of $30,081, and a civil penalty of $200,000 to the SEC.

Analysis & Key Takeaways

Investment advisers should exercise caution before entering into joint legal fee arrangements with clients.

If considering joint representation with a client, investment advisers should ensure that legal fees and other expenses are invoiced separately from the outset of the arrangement and should ensure that the allocation of expenses is approved by any independent board or other necessary decisionmakers of the client.

Registered investment companies must seek an order from the SEC pursuant to Rule 17-d under the Investment Company Act before entering any into joint legal fee arrangements with clients.

Investment advisers should not defer any share of their legal expenses to the client. Instead, investment advisers should pay expenses as they are incurred.

Conclusion

The SEC’s settlement highlights the risks associated with joint legal fee arrangements with clients. The SEC will closely scrutinize such arrangements and, even when the investment adviser pays its full share of legal expenses, may still take enforcement action for delaying the proper allocation, approval, or payment of expenses, or for failing to seek an order from the SEC pursuant to Rule 17-d of the Investment Company Act.

__________

[1] Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Pursuant to Sections 203(e) and 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Sections 9(b) and 9(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order, Release No. 6597 (April 29, 2024).

[2] Id., Paragraph 1.

[3] Id., Paragraph 4.

[4] Id., Paragraph 5.

[5] Id., Paragraph 6.

[6] Id., Paragraph 8.

[7] Id., Paragraph 9.

[8] Id., Paragraph 10.

[9] Id., Paragraph 11.

[10] Id., Paragraph 12.

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers assisted in preparing this update: Lauren Jackson, Tina Samanta, David Woodcock, and Brian Clegg.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist with any questions you may have regarding the issues and considerations discussed above. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, the authors, or any leader or member of the firm’s Securities Enforcement or Investment Funds practice groups:

Securities Enforcement:
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Tina Samanta – New York (+1 212.351.2469, [email protected])
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Investment Funds:
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Edward D. Sopher – New York (+1 212.351.3918, [email protected])
William Thomas, Jr. – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3735, [email protected])

A recent proposed rule from the U.S. Department of the Treasury aims to enhance CFIUS’s ability to request information from parties, increase potential penalty amounts, and expedite mitigation agreement negotiations. Similarly, a new GAO study reveals CFIUS’s enforcement priorities and increasing reliance on mitigation agreements to address national security concerns.

On April 11, 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”), as Chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS” or “the Committee”) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (the “Proposed Rule”) that proposes to expand the types of information CFIUS may request in the course of non-notified reviews, add a time limit for parties to respond to mitigation agreement drafts, and raise the maximum penalty amount that Committee may impose for CFIUS violations (including violations of mitigation agreements), among other changes.

Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) publicly released a report outlining its findings concerning the Committee’s use of mitigation agreements, coordination of enforcement decisions, and staffing resources, along with recommendations for certain enhancements.

Together, the Proposed Rule and the GAO report underscore the increasing prominence of CFIUS and signal an expansion of the Committee’s monitoring and enforcement capabilities. We summarize key aspects of both below.

Proposed Rule to Expand CFIUS’s Monitoring and Enforcement Capabilities

Expanded Scope of Information Requested in Non-Notified Reviews

The Proposed Rule would expand the types of information that CFIUS can require transaction parties and other persons to submit. Current regulations permit CFIUS to request parties provide information necessary for the Committee to determine if a non-notified transaction constitutes a “covered transaction” under Part 800 or a “covered real estate transaction” under Part 802 of the CFIUS regulations. The Proposed Rule would authorize the Committee to issue requests more broadly to transaction parties and other persons for information to determine if a transaction (i) meets the criteria for a mandatory declaration and/or (ii) raises national security concerns. This expanded scope of information requests would, according to CFIUS, enhance the Committee’s ability to engage in preliminary fact-finding and further help determine whether to request transaction parties submit a declaration or notice for review.

Increased Obligations to Provide Additional Information Related to Compliance Monitoring

The Proposed Rule also expands CFIUS’s ability to require parties to provide information to the Committee in two situations post-CFIUS review:

Monitoring Compliance: Situations in which the Committee requires information to monitor compliance with or enforce the terms of a mitigation agreement, order, or condition; and
Material Misstatements or Omissions: Situations in which the Committee seeks information to ascertain whether the transaction parties have made a material misstatement or omitted crucial information during the CFIUS’s review or investigation.

While such information is already routinely requested by the Committee, the Proposed Rule formalizes the current practice and explicitly obligates parties to respond. Additionally, the Proposed Rule changes the condition for the Committee to request such information from “[i]f deemed necessary by the Committee” to “[i]f deemed appropriate by the Committee,” thereby lowering the threshold for such information requests. As with the current rule, a subpoena may be issued to non-compliant parties, but the Proposed Rule specifically assigns this power to the Staff Chairperson (as opposed to the Committee as a whole) to increase operational efficiency.

Specific Timelines for Risk Mitigation Negotiations

As discussed at greater length below, in recent years, CFIUS has increasingly imposed mitigation agreements on transaction parties in order to address alleged national security concerns. While the current regulations require parties to respond to follow-up information requests from CFIUS within three business days during the course of a transaction review, the regulations are silent on the timeframe within which parties must respond to mitigation proposals or revisions, including in the context of non-notified reviews. The Proposed Rule recognizes that in some cases, particularly in situations where transactions have already closed, parties are less motivated to respond in a timely manner without a clear obligation. Accordingly, the Proposed Rule creates a similar deadline of three business days for parties to provide substantive responses to proposed mitigation terms, though, as with responses to follow-up information requests, the CFIUS Staff Chairperson may grant reasonable extensions on a case-by-case basis. Substantive responses include acceptance of terms as proposed, counterproposals, or a detailed statement of reasons explaining why a party or parties cannot comply with the terms as proposed (which may also include a counterproposal). If parties fail to respond within the prescribed timeframe, the Committee may reject the notice or declaration.

Increased Maximum Civil Monetary Penalties

The Proposed Rule notes a significant drop in the median value of covered transactions filed with CFIUS pursuant to a joint voluntary notice following the implementation of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 and the introduction of mandatory declarations. According to the Committee, the relatively low value of many transactions undermines the current penalty framework of imposing fines of up to greater of $250,000 or the value of the transaction. For example, for certain transactions with reported low values (or even a valuation of zero dollars), the maximum penalty de facto becomes $250,000, which the Committee considers an insufficient deterrent in many instances. Consequently, the Proposed Rule would, for the first time in 15 years, increase and expand the maximum civil penalties as follows:

Material Misstatements and Omissions in Submissions. The maximum civil monetary penalty for a declaration or notice with a material misstatement or omission, or a false certification, would be increased from $250,000 to $5,000,000 per violation.
Expansion of Material Misstatements and Omissions Penalty to Information Request Responses. Currently, the above penalty only applies to material misstatements or omissions in the context of a declaration or notice filed with CFIUS, or a false certification. The Proposed Rule would expand penalty coverage to (1) requests for information related to non-notified transactions, (2) certain responses to the Committee’s requests for information related to monitoring or enforcing compliance, and (3) other responses to the Committee’s requests for information, such as for agency notices. While this expanded coverage is significant, CFIUS makes clear that the penalty provisions would not apply to the majority of communications with the Committee; rather, only with respect to responses to requests that were made in writing by the Committee, specified a time frame for response, and indicated the applicability of penalty provisions.
Failure to Submit Mandatory Declarations. The maximum civil monetary penalty for failure to submit a mandatory declaration would be increased from the greater of $250,000 or the value of the transaction to the greater of $5,000,000 or the value of the transaction.
Material Mitigation Agreement Violations. The maximum civil monetary penalty for the violation of a mitigation agreement, intentionally or through gross diligence, would be increased from the greater of $250,000 per violation or the value of the transaction to the greater of $5,000,000 per violation or the value of the transaction. Further, the transaction value would be revised to include the greater of (i) the value of the person’s interest in the U.S. business (or, as applicable, the parent of the U.S. business) at the time of the transaction; (ii) the value of the person’s interest in the U.S. business (or, as applicable, the parent of the U.S. business) at the time of the violation in question or the most proximate time to the violation for which assessing such value is practicable; or (ii) the value of the transaction filed with the Committee. This expanded approach to transaction value would allow CFIUS greater latitude in imposing penalties, though CFIUS makes clear it would only apply to mitigation agreements entered into, conditions imposed, or orders issued on or after the effective date of the final rule.
Extension of Penalty Petition Timeframe from 15 to 20 Days. Currently, parties have up to 15 business days to submit a petition to the Committee in response to a penalty notice, and the Committee similarly has 15 business days to respond. Under the Proposed Rule, both timeframes would be extended to 20 business days to account for the Committee’s routine practice of granting extensions for such petitions.

Written comments to the Proposed Rule must be received by Wednesday, May 15, 2024, by mail or submitted electronically at Regulations.gov. After such comments are received and reviewed, Treasury is expected to issue a final rule in short order.

GAO Report Provides Insight into CFIUS Mitigation Agreements and Makes Related Recommendations to Standardize Certain Processes

On April 18, 2024, GAO publicly released a report evaluating issues related to CFIUS mitigation agreements and staffing and offered targeted recommendations for improvement.

First, GAO recommended two changes related to CFIUS’s process for handling mitigation agreements:

The Secretary of the Treasury, as CFIUS’s chair, should work with member agencies to document a committee-wide process for considering and making timely decisions on enforcement actions related to mitigation agreements.
The Secretary of the Treasury, as CFIUS’s chair, should work with member agencies to document a committee-wide process for periodically assessing the relevance of mitigation agreements and amending, phasing out, or terminating them when appropriate.

Second, GAO recommends CFIUS take three actions to evaluate the level of staffing devoted to mitigation agreements:

The Secretary of the Treasury should document Treasury’s objectives for increasing its staff for monitoring and enforcing compliance with CFIUS mitigation agreements.
The Secretary of the Treasury should, once the targeted staffing increase is completed, analyze its CFIUS monitoring and enforcement staffing in accordance with federal workforce planning guidance, to determine the extent to which the targeted increase enables Treasury to achieve its documented objectives.
The Secretary of the Treasury, as CFIUS’s chair, should work with member agencies to establish a committee-wide process to regularly discuss and coordinate the staffing levels needed to address the projected increase in workload associated with monitoring and enforcing CFIUS mitigation agreements.

Apart from these recommendations, the GAO report provides key insights into CFIUS’s use of mitigation agreements and the Committee’s enforcement priorities, including the following:

Increasing Use of Mitigation Agreements and Focus on Agreement Monitoring
- From December 2000 through December 2022, the GAO reports that the cumulative total number of active mitigation agreements increased significantly, from about five to almost 230, with the number almost quadrupling from December 2012 to December 2022.
- The U.S. Department of Defense (“DOD”) has played an increasing role in supervising mitigation agreements, including an increased focus on risks related to supply assurance (which were addressed in almost half of the mitigation agreements DOD was monitoring at the end of 2022).
Increased Coordination Among CFIUS Agencies and Departments Needed, Especially with Respect to Mitigation Agreement Procedures
- The lack of clear standards to justify terminating mitigation agreements has led to long delays in the process, and GAO recommends CFIUS implement clearer responsibilities and written guidance for termination decisions.
- Treasury is working with other CFIUS agencies and departments to harmonize monitoring compliance with mitigation agreements, standardize tracking and reporting violations, and bolster enforcement resources.
Focus Is on Enforcement and Imposing Penalties When Determined Necessary
- As of October 2023, CFIUS had publicly reported only two penalties, though additional non-public penalties were imposed in 2023 and others were not yet finalized at the time the GAO report was published. The two public penalties were as follows:
  - In 2018, CFIUS imposed a $1 million penalty for repeated breaches of a 2016 mitigation agreement, including failure to establish required security policies and failure to provide adequate reports to the committee.
  - In 2019, CFIUS imposed a $750,000 penalty for violations of a 2018 interim order, including failure to restrict and adequately monitor access to protected data.
- The majority of violations identified by CFIUS have been minor or technical in nature, though CFIUS intends to increase its focus on enforcement in the coming months.
- Treasury intends to roughly double the number of Treasury staff dedicated to CFIUS monitoring and enforcement by the end of fiscal year 2024.
Site Visits to Monitor Mitigation Efforts May Become More Common
- While site visits currently occur about once every 3 years for many mitigation agreements—due primarily to the lack of resources and large number of active mitigation agreements—several CFIUS officials recognized such site visits as a critical tool for monitoring compliance, signaling their frequency may increase in the near future.

Both the Proposed Rule and the findings in the GAO report exemplify the increasingly robust role CFIUS plays in aggressively monitoring and shaping foreign direct investment in the United States. In light of these efforts and the increasing costs of non-compliance, transaction parties should carefully evaluate transactions involving foreign person investors, directly or indirectly, for CFIUS risks even in the early stages of deal discussions. CFIUS’s role and impact are poised only to increase as Treasury finalizes the Proposed Rule and the Committee ramps up its enforcement efforts.

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers prepared this update: Stephenie Gosnell Handler, Mason Gauch, and Chris Mullen.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these issues. For additional information about how we may assist you, please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, the authors, or the following leaders and members of the firm’s International Trade practice group:

United States:
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Adam M. Smith – Co-Chair, Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3547, [email protected])
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Europe:
Attila Borsos – Brussels (+32 2 554 72 10, [email protected])
Susy Bullock – London (+44 20 7071 4283, [email protected])
Patrick Doris – London (+44 207 071 4276, [email protected])
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Michelle M. Kirschner – London (+44 20 7071 4212, [email protected])
Penny Madden KC – London (+44 20 7071 4226, [email protected])
Irene Polieri – London (+44 20 7071 4199, [email protected])
Benno Schwarz – Munich (+49 89 189 33 110, [email protected])
Nikita Malevanny – Munich (+49 89 189 33 160, [email protected])

From the Derivatives Practice Group: This week, ESMA has issued a Call for Evidence to gather information from stakeholders to assess the risks and benefits of the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities gaining exposure to various asset classes.

New Developments

Statement of Chairman Rostin Behnam Regarding Proposed Event Contracts Rulemaking. On May 10, CFTC Chairman Rostin Behnam remarked on his support for the proposed amendments to the Commission’s rules concerning event contracts. The Chairman remarked that the Commission proposes to further specify the types of event contracts that fall within the scope of CEA section 5c(c)(5)(C) and are contrary to the public interest. He believes that the amendments will support efforts by registered entities to comply with the CEA by more clearly identifying the types of event contracts that may not be listed for trading or accepted for clearing. [NEW]
CFTC Technology Advisory Committee Advances Report and Recommendations to the CFTC on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in Financial Markets. On May 2, the CFTC’s Technology Advisory Committee (TAC) released a Report on Responsible AI in Financial Markets. The CFTC stated that the TAC issued a Report that facilitates an understanding of the impact and implications of the evolution of AI on financial markets. The Committee made five recommendations to the Commission as to how the CFTC should approach this AI evolution to safeguard financial markets. The Committee urged the CFTC to leverage its role as a market regulator to support the current efforts on AI coming from the White House and Congress. [NEW]
CFTC Chairman Behnam Designates Ted Kaouk as the CFTC’s First Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer. On May 1, CFTC Chairman Rostin Behnam announced the designation of Dr. Ted Kaouk as the agency’s first Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer. Dr. Kaouk currently serves as the CFTC’s Chief Data Officer and Director of the Division of Data. The CFTC stated that in this newly expanded role as the CFTC’s Chief Data & Artificial Intelligence Officer, Dr. Kaouk will be responsible for leading the development of the CFTC’s enterprise data and artificial intelligence strategy to further integrate CFTC’s ongoing efforts to advance its data-driven capabilities.
CFTC Approves Final Rule Amending the Capital and Financial Reporting Requirements of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants. On April 30, the CFTC announced it has approved a final rule that amends the capital and financial reporting requirements of Swap Dealers (SDs) and Major Swap Participants (MSPs). According to the CFTC, the amendments make changes consistent with CFTC Staff Letter No. 21-15 regarding the tangible net worth capital approach for calculating capital under CFTC Regulation 23.101, as well as CFTC Staff Letter No. 21-18, as further extended by CFTC Staff Letter No. 23-11, regarding the alternate financial reporting requirements for SDs subject to the capital requirements of a prudential regulator. The amendments also revise certain Part 23 regulations regarding the financial reporting requirements of SDs, including the required timing of certain notifications, the process for approval of subordinated debt for capital, and the information requested on financial reporting forms to conform to the rules. The CFTC stated that the amendments are intended to make it easier for SDs and MSPs to comply with the CFTC’s financial reporting obligations and demonstrate compliance with minimum capital requirements. To allow for sufficient time to effectuate the reporting and notification amendments, the final rule has a compliance date of September 30, 2024, and will apply to all financial reports with an “as of” reporting date of September 30, 2024, or later.
CFTC Approves Final Rules on Large Trader Reporting for Futures and Options. On April 30, the CFTC announced approval of final rules to amend its large trading reporting regulations for futures and options. These regulations require futures commission merchants, clearing members, foreign brokers, and certain reporting markets (reporting firms) to report to the Commission position information for the largest futures and options traders. The final rules replace the data elements currently enumerated in the CFTC’s regulations with an appendix specifying applicable data elements. The final rules also provide for the publication of a separate Part 17 Guidebook specifying the form and manner for reporting. In addition, the final rules remove the outdated 80-character data submission standard in the CFTC’s regulations. According to the CFTC, that standard will be replaced by a FIXML standard, as set out in the Part 17 Guidebook.
CFTC Approves Final Rules on Swap Confirmation Requirements for SEFs. On April 23, the CFTC approved final rules to amend its swap execution facility (SEF) regulations related to uncleared swap confirmations to address issues which have been addressed in CFTC staff no-action letters, including the most recent CFTC No Action Letter No. 17-17, as well as associated conforming and technical changes. In particular, the final rules amend CFTC Regulation 37.6(b) to enable SEFs to incorporate terms of underlying, previously negotiated agreements between the counterparties by reference in an uncleared swap confirmation without being required to obtain such underlying, previously negotiated agreements. Further, the final rules amend CFTC Regulation 37.6(b) to require such confirmation to take place “as soon as technologically practicable” after the execution of the swap transaction on the SEF for both cleared and uncleared swap transactions. The final rules also amend CFTC Regulation 37.6(b) to make clear the SEF-provided confirmation under CFTC Regulation 37.6(b) shall legally supersede any conflicting terms in a previous agreement, rather than the entire agreement. The final rules make conforming amendments to CFTC Regulation 23.501(a)(4)(i) to correspond with the amendments to CFTC Regulation 37.6(b). Finally, the final rules make certain non-substantive amendments to CFTC Regulation 37.6(a)-(b) to enhance clarity.
CFTC Extends Public Comment Period for Proposed Rule for Designated Contract Markets and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding Governance and Conflicts of Interest. On April 22, the CFTC announced it is extending the deadline for public comment period on a proposed rule that makes certain modifications to rules for Swap Execution Facilities and Designated Contract Markets in Part 37 and 38 that would establish governance requirements regarding market regulation functions, as well as related conflicts of interest standards. The deadline is being extended to May 13, 2024.

New Developments Outside the U.S.

ESMA Asks for Input on Assets Eligible for UCITS. On May 7, ESMA published a Call for Evidence on the review of the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Eligible Assets Directive (EAD). The objective of this call is to gather information from stakeholders to assess possible risk and benefits of UCITS gaining exposure to various asset classes. Investors and consumer groups interested in retail investment products, management companies of UCITS, self-managed UCITS investment companies, depositaries of UCITS and trade associations are invited to provide their feedback on market practices and interpretation or practical application issues with respect to the eligibility criteria and other provisions set out in the UCITS EAD. [NEW]
ESMA Publishes the Annual Transparency Calculations for Non-Equity Instruments, Bond Liquidity Data and Quarterly SI Calculations. On April 30, ESMA published the results of the annual transparency calculations for non-equity instruments, new quarterly liquidity assessment of bonds and the quarterly systematic internaliser calculations under MiFID II and MiFIR. As indicated in ESMA’s public statement on March 27, the quarterly liquidity assessment of bonds as well as the data for the quarterly systematic internalizers will continue to be published by ESMA.
ESAs Issue Spring 2024 Joint Committee Update. On April 30, the three European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA – the ESAs) issued their Spring 2024 Joint Committee update on risks and vulnerabilities in the EU financial system. The risk update shows that risks remain elevated in a context of slowing growth, an uncertain interest rate environment and ongoing geopolitical tensions. According to the update, in recent months, financial markets have performed strongly in anticipation of potential interest rate cuts in 2024 in both the EU and the US, despite the significant uncertainty surrounding these. The ESAs stated that this strong performance entails elevated risks of market corrections linked to unexpected events.

New Industry-Led Developments

ISDA and AFME Respond to FCA Publicizing Enforcement Consultation. On April 30, ISDA and the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) responded to a Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) proposal that would give it the ability to publicly name firms at the start of an investigation and before a decision has been reached on whether to take further action. According to ISDA, there has been a considerable reaction to the proposals across the financial services industry, and the response highlights various risks and concerns with the proposals, including the risk to the competitiveness of the UK, damage to shareholder value and reputation of the sector, and worse outcomes for consumers. [NEW]
ISDA Launches Outreach Initiative on Proposed Notices Hub. On April 25, ISDA announced major industry outreach initiative to establish support among dealers and buy-side firms for a new online platform that would allow the instantaneous delivery and receipt of critical termination-related notices, reducing the risk exposure and potential losses from a delay. Under the ISDA Master Agreement, termination-related notices must be delivered by certain prescribed methods, using company address details listed in the agreement. However, delays can occur if a company has moved and the documentation hasn’t been updated with the new details or if delivery to a physical location is not possible due to geopolitical shocks. The proposed ISDA Notices Hub would act as a secure central platform for firms to deliver notices, with automatic alerts sent to the receiving entity. Multiple designated people at each firm would be able to access the hub from anywhere in the world, regardless of the situation at its physical location. The platform would also allow market participants to update their physical address details via a single entry, providing a golden source of those details.
ISDA, SIFMA, and CCMA Publish T+1 Settlement Cycle Booklet. On April 30, ISDA, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and the Canadian Capital Markets Association (CCMA) published a T+1 settlement cycle booklet to address queries from market participants on the settlement cycle changes taking place in North America on May 27-28, 2024, and the possible impact to relevant securities and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions. This booklet may be updated from time to time.
ISDA Publishes Sub-Annex A Maintenance Guidelines for the 2005 ISDA Commodity Definitions. On April 30, ISDA published maintenance guidelines for Sub-Annex A of the 2005 ISDA Commodity Definitions. Sub-Annex A contains definitions for various Commodity Reference Prices.
ISDA and SIFMA Submit Addendum to Proposed FFIEC Reporting Revisions. On April 23, ISDA and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) submitted an addendum to the joint response to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the proposed reporting revisions of the call report, FFIEC 101 and FFIEC 102, which are designed to reflect the implementation of the Basel III endgame proposal. The addendum contains additional findings in the FFIEC 102 report, including end-of-week Fundamental Review of the Trading Book standardized approach average calculations and reported market risk risk-weighted assets in sub-parts D and E.

The following Gibson Dunn attorneys assisted in preparing this update: Jeffrey Steiner, Adam Lapidus, Marc Aaron Takagaki, Hayden McGovern, and Karin Thrasher.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of the firm’s Derivatives practice group, or the following practice leaders and authors:

Jeffrey L. Steiner, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3632, [email protected])

Michael D. Bopp, Washington, D.C. (202.955.8256, [email protected])

Michelle M. Kirschner, London (+44 (0)20 7071.4212, [email protected])

Darius Mehraban, New York (212.351.2428, [email protected])

Jason J. Cabral, New York (212.351.6267, [email protected])

Adam Lapidus – New York (+1 212.351.3869, [email protected])

Stephanie L. Brooker, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3502, [email protected])

Roscoe Jones Jr., Washington, D.C. (202.887.3530, [email protected])

William R. Hallatt, Hong Kong (+852 2214 3836, [email protected])

David P. Burns, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3786, [email protected])

Marc Aaron Takagaki, New York (212.351.4028, [email protected])

Hayden K. McGovern, Dallas (214.698.3142, [email protected])

Karin Thrasher, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3712, [email protected])

This edition of Gibson Dunn’s Federal Circuit Update for April 2024 summarizes the current status of several petitions pending before the Supreme Court, and recent Federal Circuit decisions concerning patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, obviousness, and unenforceability due to inequitable conduct and unclean hands.

Federal Circuit News

Noteworthy Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari:

There were no new potentially impactful petitions filed before the Supreme Court in April 2024. We provide an update below of the petitions pending before the Supreme Court that were summarized in our March 2024 update:

The petitions in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (US No. 23-768) and Ficep Corp. v. Peddinghaus Corp. (US No. 23-796) were denied.

Upcoming Oral Argument Calendar

The list of upcoming arguments at the Federal Circuit is available on the court’s website.

Key Case Summaries (April 2024)

AI Visualize, Inc. v. Nuance Communications, Inc., No. 22-2109 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 4, 2024): AI Visualize asserted four related patents in the field of visualization of medical scans. Specifically, the patents disclose using two-dimensional MRI scans to present three-dimensional views that can lead to better diagnosis and prognosis. The district court granted a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), determining that the asserted claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The Federal Circuit (Reyna, J., joined by Moore, C.J., and Hughes, J.) affirmed, holding that the claims were direct to patent-ineligible subject matter. At step one, “the asserted claims are directed to converting data and using computers to collect, manipulate, and display the data” and “the steps of obtaining, manipulating, and displaying data, particularly when claimed at a high level of generality, are abstract concepts.” At step two, the Court agreed with the district court that “the asserted claims involved nothing more than the abstract idea itself” and conventional computer technology. AI argued that creation of virtual views significantly transforms the claims into patent-eligible subject matter; however, the Court determined that the specification conceded that this was known in the art, which AI also acknowledged at oral argument.

Salix Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. v. Norwich Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 22-2153 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2024): Norwich filed an ANDA seeking to market 550 mg tablets of a generic version of rifaximin to treat hepatic encephalopathy (“HE”) and irritable bowel syndrome with diarrhea (“IBS-D”). Salix, which sells rifaximin under the name Xifaxan® for the treatment of HE and IBS-D, sued Norwich for infringement. The district court held that (1) Norwich infringed Salix’s patents directed to the use of rifaximin for treating HE, and (2) Norwich infringed Salix’s patents directed to the use of rifaximin for treating IBS-D, but that those claims would have been obvious over certain prior art. Norwich then amended its ANDA to remove the infringing HE indication, and moved to modify the judgment under Rule 60(b) asserting that the amendment negated any possible infringement, but the district court denied this motion.

The majority (Lourie, J., joined by Chen, J.) affirmed. The majority first affirmed the district court’s holding that the asserted claims of the IBS-D patents were invalid as obvious. Salix’s patents are directed to treating IBS-D with 550 mg of rifaximin three times a day. One prior art reference had a study evaluating 550 mg doses twice a day, and a second prior art reference teaches administering 400 mg three times a day and further states that “[r]ecent data suggest that the optimal dosage of rifaximin may, in fact, be higher.” Based on the combination of these references, the majority determined that there was no clear error in the conclusion that a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in the claimed dosage. A skilled artisan would have discerned from the combination that the optimal dosage for treating patients suffering from IBS-D may be higher than 400 mg three times a day, and the next higher dosage unit from the clinical trial was 550 mg. The majority also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to modify the judgment under Rule 60(b), because considering the amended ANDA, which removed the infringing HE indication, would “essentially be a second litigation.”

Judge Cunningham dissented-in-part, writing that she would have instead vacated the district court’s conclusion that the asserted claims of the IBS-D patents are invalid as obvious. Specifically, she concluded that the prior art references’ lack of discussion of the claimed dosage would mean that a skilled artisan would not have had a reasonable expectation of success for the claimed dosage. In particular, Judge Cunningham disagreed with the majority’s reliance on the prior art reference’s statement that “[r]ecent data suggest that the optimal dosage of rifaximin may, in fact, be higher” because that statement does not discuss an actual optimal dosage and uses the word “may.”

Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Laurain, Nos. 22-1905, 22-1970 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2024): Laurain (the inventor) and Eazy-PZ (“EZPZ”) alleged that Luv n’ care, Ltd. (“LNC”) infringed EZPZ’s patent directed to toddler dining mats. LNC asserted defenses of inequitable conduct and unclean hands. The district court concluded that LNC had failed to prove that the patent was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. Although Laurain and patent prosecution counsel had made a misrepresentation to the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), the district court found the misrepresentation was not but-for material to the patentability of the asserted patent. The district court, however, concluded EZPZ’s litigation conduct did amount to unclean hands, including by failing to disclose certain patent applications during discovery and attempting repeatedly to block LNC from obtaining Laurain’s prior art searches.

The Federal Circuit (Stark, J., joined by Reyna and Hughes, JJ.) affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and remanded. The Court affirmed the ruling of unclean hands finding the district court did not clearly err in its determination that EZPZ’s litigation conduct, including its failure to disclose related patent applications amounted to unclean hands. For inequitable conduct, which requires showing the patentee (1) withheld information from the PTO, and (2) did so with specific intent to deceive the PTO, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment and found that the district court failed to make separate findings as to materiality and deceptive intent. Additionally, regarding materiality, the Court remanded for the district court to determine whether Laurain’s misrepresentation to the PTO amounted to “affirmative egregious misconduct” that would establish per se materiality. Regarding deceptive intent, the Court determined that the district court erred in considering the “individual acts of misconduct in isolation and failed to address the collective weight of the evidence regarding each person’s misconduct as a whole.” The Court remanded for the district court to reevaluate Laurain’s deceptive intent based on her misconduct in the aggregate and to do the same for prosecution counsel.

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers assisted in preparing this update: Blaine Evanson, Jaysen Chung, Audrey Yang, Al Suarez, Evan Kratzer, and Michelle Zhu.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Federal Circuit. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any leader or member of the firm’s Appellate and Constitutional Law or Intellectual Property practice groups, or the following authors:

Blaine H. Evanson – Orange County (+1 949.451.3805, [email protected])
Audrey Yang – Dallas (+1 214.698.3215, [email protected])

Appellate and Constitutional Law:
Thomas H. Dupree Jr. – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8547, [email protected])
Allyson N. Ho – Dallas (+1 214.698.3233, [email protected])
Julian W. Poon – Los Angeles (+ 213.229.7758, [email protected])

Intellectual Property:
Kate Dominguez – New York (+1 212.351.2338, [email protected])
Y. Ernest Hsin – San Francisco (+1 415.393.8224, [email protected])
Josh Krevitt – New York (+1 212.351.4000, [email protected])
Jane M. Love, Ph.D. – New York (+1 212.351.3922, [email protected])

If SB 205 is signed into law, it would go into effect on February 1, 2026, and Colorado would become the first state to enact legislation regulating the development and deployment of high-risk AI systems generally.

On May 8, 2024, Colorado’s Legislature passed SB24-205, the Colorado Artificial Intelligence Act (“SB 205”). SB 205 seeks to govern the use of high-risk AI systems in the private sector. If SB 205 is signed into law by Colorado Governor Jared Polis—which he is expected to do—it would go into effect on February 1, 2026, and Colorado would become the first state to enact legislation regulating the development and deployment of high-risk AI systems generally.

Although SB 205 would be the most comprehensive AI-specific state law, it is not the only state to move in this area in 2024. This year alone, Utah and Tennessee enacted AI legislation (tackling consumer deception by generative AI and AI deepfakes, respectively), while the California Consumer Privacy Protection Agency (“CPPA”) has been making progress with its draft regulations related to automated decision-making technology (“ADMT”).

SB 205 is effectively an anti-discrimination law that would regulate the use of high-risk AI systems by imposing a slew of requirements on developers and deployers, including notice, documentation, disclosures, and impact assessments. SB 205’s focus on high-risk AI systems is similar to the risk-based approach taken by the European Union’s AI Act. Accordingly, companies looking to design a compliance regime to respond to these developments may find opportunities for overlap in these frameworks (e.g., by leveraging ISO’s 42001).

Structurally, SB 205 would become Part 16 within Colorado’s Consumer Protection Act, which already houses the Colorado Privacy Act. SB 205 expressly states that Part 16 does not provide the basis for a private right of action and that the Attorney General has “exclusive” enforcement authority.

Below are 6 key takeaways.

6 Key Takeaways for the Private Sector

Broad Cross-Sectoral Coverage of High-Risk AI Systems: High-risk AI systems are defined as any AI system that, when deployed, makes, or is a substantial factor in making, a consequential decision. A “consequential decision” is one that has a “material legal or similarly significant effect on the provision or denial to any consumer of, or the cost or terms of” education, employment or an employment opportunity, financial/lending services, housing, insurance, healthcare, essential government services, and legal services. Meanwhile, a “substantial factor” must (1) assist in making the consequential decision; (2) be capable of altering the outcome of a consequential decision; and (3) be generated by an AI system. There is ambiguity regarding what this means in practice as it is unclear what would constitute “assisting” in the consequential decision or being “capable” of altering the outcome. This language bears some similarity to that of the CPPA’s current draft ADMT regulations, which would cover training ADMT that is merely capable of being used for a significant decision concerning a consumer.
- Further, unlike the Colorado Privacy Act, SB 205 does not provide an exemption for the employment context. Instead, a “consumer” is defined as “an individual who is a Colorado resident,” and the law specifically intends to cover consequential decisions including related to employment and employment opportunities.
- Examples of specifically excluded tools include calculators, databases, data storage, anti-virus software, networking, spreadsheets, spam-filtering, data storage, cybersecurity, and chatbots subject to an accepted use policy prohibiting the generation of discriminatory or harmful content. The latter exclusion could be fairly significant given the number of “chatbots” being deployed by companies as could the exclusion of tools for cybersecurity—which often are subject to discussion under privacy laws given their unique but sometimes significant use of information.

Exclusive Enforcement by the Attorney General: SB 205 provides that the Attorney General would have “exclusive” authority to enforce the law and promulgate rules to implement the law regarding documentation, notice, impact assessments, risk management policies and programs, rebuttable presumptions, and affirmative defenses. The text specifies that violations of SB 205 do not provide the basis for a private right of action. Notably, SB 205 provides the following two affirmative defenses if the Attorney General commences an action.
- Robust AI Governance Programs: SB 205 would provide an affirmative defense if a deployer has implemented and maintained a risk management policy or program that complies with national or international risk management frameworks such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (“NIST”) AI Risk Management Framework (“AI RMF”) or the International Organization for Standardization’s (“ISO”) 42001.
- Cured Violations: SB 205 would also provide an affirmative defense for a developer or deployer that discovers and cures the violation due to (a) feedback, (b) adversarial testing or red teaming (under NIST’s definition), or (c) an internal review process and is otherwise in compliance with NIST’s AI RMF or ISO’s 42001.

Developers and Deployers Are Subject to an Anti-Algorithmic Discrimination Duty: SB 205 expressly covers both developers and deployers of high-risk AI systems and would require both to use reasonable care to protect consumers from any known or reasonably foreseeable algorithmic discrimination.
- Algorithmic discrimination is defined as any condition in which the use of an AI system results in unlawful differential treatment or impact based on an array of protected classes under Colorado and federal law, including race, disability, age, gender, religion, veteran status, and genetic information. Using an AI system to expand an applicant pool to increase diversity or remedy historical discrimination would not constitute algorithmic discrimination under SB 205. The law provides a narrow exemption for certain deployers with fewer than 50 employees that do not use their own data to train or further improve the AI system.
- A rebuttable presumption is available in the event of an enforcement action. The law would establish a rebuttable presumption that reasonable care was used to avoid algorithmic discrimination if certain compliance indicators (which differ between developers and deployers) are met:
  - Compliance indicators for developers include: (a) providing sufficient information and documentation to deployers such that an impact assessment can be completed; (b) disclosing to the Attorney General and deployers any known or reasonably foreseeable risk of algorithmic discrimination within 90 days of discovery; (c) publishing a publicly available statement regarding the high-risk systems developed and how any known or reasonably foreseeable risks of algorithmic discrimination are being managed; and (d) the purpose and intended benefits and uses of the AI system.
  - Meanwhile, compliance indicators for deployers include: (a) implementing a risk management policy and program; (b) completing an impact assessment; (c) providing notice to consumers; (d) disclosing to the Attorney General any algorithmic discrimination within 90 days of discovery; and (e) publishing a publicly available statement summarizing the high-risk AI system being deployed and any known or reasonably foreseeable risks of algorithmic discrimination that may arise.

Impact Assessments Required: In alignment with trends in other proposed state legislation, SB 205 would require deployers to complete an impact assessment annually, and also within 90-days of any intentional or substantial modification to the high-risk AI system. The impact assessment must include the purpose, intended use cases, benefits, known limitations, and deployment context of the high-risk AI system, any transparency measures taken, post-deployment monitoring and safeguards implemented, and the categories of data used as inputs and the outputs produced. Notably, deployers would be permitted to use a comparable impact assessment that was completed for purposes of complying with another applicable law or regulation. As noted above, completing an impact assessment is one of the indicators that would support a deployer in establishing a rebuttable presumption that reasonable care was used to avoid algorithmic discrimination.

Notice to Consumers is Key: Similar to other, more narrow AI state and local laws already in effect (g., Utah’s AI Policy Act and New York City’s Local Law 144), deployers must notify consumers of the use of a high-risk AI system, the purpose of the system, the nature of the consequential decision, a description of how the system works, and, if applicable, the consumer’s right to opt out of the processing of personal data for purposes of profiling under Section 6-1-1306 of the Colorado Privacy Act. Notably, consumers subject to an adverse consequential decision must be provided with an opportunity to appeal the decision. In alignment with the European Union’s AI Act, if it is “obvious” that a consumer is interacting with an AI system, SB 205 would not mandate such a disclosure.
A Violation is Also a “Deceptive Trade Practice” Under Colorado Law: On its final page, SB 205 provides that a violation of Part 16 would constitute a “deceptive trade practice” under Colorado Revised Statutes, Section 6-1-105, which resides in Part 1 of Colorado’s Consumer Protection Act. Note that under Part 1, consumers injured by a “deceptive trade practice” are provided with the ability to bring a civil action. At this stage, it remains unclear whether this was intended to indirectly create a private right of action under Part 1, or if the legislature inadvertently failed to make an express disclaimer (e., “Notwithstanding any provision in Part 1, Part 16 does not authorize a private right of action.”).

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers assisted in preparing this update: Vivek Mohan, Cassandra Gaedt-Sheckter, Natalie Hausknecht, Eric Vandevelde, and Emily Maxim Lamm.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these issues. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any leader or member of the firm’s Artificial Intelligence practice group, or the authors:

Cassandra L. Gaedt-Sheckter – Palo Alto (+1 650.849.5203, [email protected])
Natalie J. Hausknecht – Denver (+1 303.298.5783, [email protected])
Vivek Mohan – Palo Alto (+1 650.849.5345, [email protected])
Robert Spano – Paris/London (+33 1 56 43 14 07, [email protected])
Eric D. Vandevelde – Los Angeles (+1 213.229.7186, [email protected])
Emily Maxim Lamm – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8255, [email protected])

Observations and drafting suggestions for CRE terms in merger agreements, licenses, and royalty purchase agreements.

On April 30, 2024, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the buyer in a life sciences merger and its successor had not breached their contractual obligations under an earn-out provision to use commercially reasonable efforts (“CRE”) to achieve regulatory approvals for a pharmaceutical product. In Himawan, et al. v. Cephalon, Inc., et al., Vice Chancellor Glasscock found that the merger agreement’s definition of CRE for purposes of the earn-out provision, which referred to the efforts of a company with substantially the same resources and expertise as the buyer, required the Court to analyze whether a reasonable actor faced with the circumstances would continue to pursue the development of a drug that had failed to meet one of its co-primary endpoints in an earlier clinical trial.[1] In its reasoning, the Court relied heavily on the merger agreement’s grant to the buyer of “complete discretion with respect to all decisions” over the development activities, subject only to the more general CRE obligation. Although the impact of the decision on CRE clauses granting a buyer less discretion remains to be seen, the Court’s decision provides important guidance on the interpretation and drafting of CRE clauses generally, both in merger agreements and in other contexts, such as license agreements and revenue sharing agreements.

Background

The plaintiffs in the case were representatives of former Ception Therapeutics, Inc. (“Ception”) stockholders. Ception owned the antibody Reslizumb (“RSZ”), which was being developed for treating inflammation in the lungs (eosinophilic asthma, or “EA”) and the esophagus (eosinophilic esophagitis, or “EoE”). Cephalon Inc. (“Cephalon”) acquired Ception in April 2010 with the intent to develop and commercialize RSZ to treat EA and EoE. Two years later, in October 2012, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (“Teva”) acquired Cephalon.

Under the Merger Agreement, Ception stockholders had the right to receive two milestone payments of up to $200 million each for regulatory approval of RSZ for the treatment of EA and EoE (for a total of up to $400 million). In the context of addressing the earn-out consideration, the Merger Agreement provided that the buyer would have “complete discretion with respect to all decisions related to the business of the Surviving Corporation and its subsidiaries, including decisions relating to the research, development, … pricing and distribution of [RSZ], and shall have no obligation to conduct clinical trials related to, or otherwise pursue regulatory approvals of, any indication for [RSZ] … or otherwise take any action to protect, attain or maximize any payment to be received by” stockholders under the earn-out. Notwithstanding the flexibility afforded under this language, the buyer remained subject to an overarching obligation to use “commercially reasonable efforts” to develop and commercialize RSZ in furtherance of the development milestones. “Commercially reasonable efforts” was defined in the merger agreement as requiring “the exercise of such efforts and commitment of such resources by a company with substantially the same resources and expertise as [buyer], with due regard to the nature of efforts and cost required for the undertaking at stake.” Teva assumed this obligation when it acquired Cephalon.

The EA-related regulatory milestone events were achieved and Ception stockholders received the corresponding $200 million milestone payment. However, despite bona fide development efforts and engaging multiple times with the FDA to devise a new clinical path forward, the development of RSZ for the treatment of EoE proved unsuccessful and both Cephalon and Teva abandoned the development of RSZ for this indication. Ception stockholders then sued Cephalon and Teva for breach of the Merger Agreement based on a failure to use CRE to develop and commercialize RSZ for the treatment of EoE.

Ruling

In its ruling, the Court held that Teva and Cephalon did not breach the Merger Agreement and did not breach their obligations to use CRE to develop and commercialize RSZ for the treatment of EoE.

In measuring the efforts of Teva and Cephalon against the CRE yardstick, the Court emphasized that the Merger Agreement gave “complete discretion” to the buyer with respect to all decisions related to the business of the seller, only subject to the restriction that Teva and Cephalon could not avoid the earn-outs in a manner that was commercially unreasonable.[2]

The Court then proceeded to interpret the CRE standard to impose a requirement on the buyer as it found itself situated from an objective standard. Thus, if a reasonable actor faced with the same limitations and risks in the development of a pharmaceutical product would go forward in its own self-interest, then the buyer would be contractually obligated to do the same. Notably, the Court found unworkable the plaintiff’s preferred interpretation that the CRE clause required comparing Cephalon and Teva’s efforts with the efforts of similarly situated pharmaceutical companies and their actions in the real world developing different drugs for EoE on the basis that “no exemplar companies operate under the actual conditions” of Cephalon and Teva.[3]

Rule Application

After establishing the framework for review, the Court separately analyzed Cephalon’s efforts and Teva’s efforts, finding that the actions of both parties were commercially reasonable.

With respect to Cephalon, the Court noted that it had engaged in substantive efforts to develop RSZ for the treatment of EoE even after a failed trial, including hiring former Ception employees, holding a pre-Biologics License Application meeting with the FDA in which it “proposed to submit a pre-Biologics License Application for RSZ under an FDA program for accelerated approval of biological products” and the use of a surrogate endpoint, proposing to amend the Open-Label Study to convert it into an efficacy study, and proposing an enriched, enrollment, randomized withdrawal (“EERW”) study. However, the FDA ultimately rejected those proposals, though it provided a recommendation to gain approval through additional data and analyses. Cephalon conducted the requested analyses and ultimately concluded that it could not identify a “clinical benefit” and would discontinue development. The Court noted that similarly situated competitors also abandoned their EoE development programs after failed clinical trials and studies. While the Court took note of these actions to bolster its finding of commercial reasonableness, such comparisons were not determinative in themselves.

The Court arrived at the same conclusion regarding Teva’s development of RSZ for the treatment of EoE. When Teva acquired Cephalon, Teva did not restart the EoE program, but instead focused on EA from 2011 to 2017. The Court reasoned that Teva’s prioritization of treating EA was objectively reasonable because it was more promising clinically and commercially in comparison with treating EoE, which had already faced numerous regulatory hurdles and clinical setbacks. Teva “hired RxC, a third-party biopharma strategy consulting firm that specializes in pharmaceutical life cycle planning and new product commercialization, to conduct an opportunity assessment of RSZ for EoE.” RxC concluded that the probability of starting a successful new trial was low and that the commercial viability provided limited upside. Teva had determined that it would only be commercially reasonable to develop RSZ for the treatment of EoE if it could obtain a viable subcutaneous route of administration because RSZ was already a challenging commercial product in any indication as it required administration by infusion and the display of a black-box warning label. Teva’s clinical trials of the subcutaneous form of RSZ failed to demonstrate efficacy for the treatment of EA, and so Teva decided it would not pursue the development of RSZ for EoE. Teva had also considered the related milestone payments under the Merger Agreement in concluding that the further development of RSZ for the treatment of EoE was impractical.

Drafting Guidance

The Court’s ruling provides important guidelines for negotiating and drafting CRE definitions in the context of a variety of agreements, including merger agreements, license agreements, and synthetic royalty financing agreements. The Court focused not only on the definition of CRE, but also on surrounding language and the discretion expressly afforded the buyer with regard to the seller’s business. Sellers in future transactions might consider not including any express discretion language with respect to the buyers’ development and commercialization activities in order to bolster the objective measure of the CRE standard. Buyers, on the other hand, might consider including express discretion language in order to bolster the subjective measure of the CRE standard.

The Court’s decision suggests that CRE definitions drafted with reference to the buyer’s specific facts and circumstances will provide buyers with significantly more freedom in the interpretation of commercial reasonableness. While the Court indicated that it was utilizing an “objective” standard to measure CRE, this objectivity was not determined by looking to the efforts of similarly-situated pharmaceutical companies and their actions in the real world with respect to similar drug candidates, but rather by considering whether a reasonable person in the same situation as the buyer (i.e., considering the same opportunities and risks) would go forward in its own self-interest (sometimes referred to as a “subjective objective standard”).

The Court’s ruling notes that applying a purely objective standard is unworkable (or at least challenging to implement), as each set of circumstances around drug development is inherently unique. Simply because other companies had pursued the development of different drugs for the same indication does not provide insight into whether it would be reasonable to require similar efforts in the context of a different drug for the same disease. Rather, the Court applied an objective standard of reasonableness in the context of the buyer’s unique facts and circumstances.

Adopting that interpretative framework, parties in future transactions may consider the following options in drafting CRE terms that accomplish their desired objectives:

M&A Buyer/Licensee Side:[4] The buyer/licensee should define “Commercially Reasonable Efforts” with a subjective standard benchmarked only against itself.

“… shall use those efforts and resources that such Party would typically devote to its owned or exclusively licensed products for the same clinical indication and in the same geographic markets with a similar market potential at a similar stage in development or product life, taking into account intellectual property protection, efficacy, safety, approved labeling, the competitiveness of alternative products in such jurisdiction, pricing/reimbursement for the pharmaceutical product and the profitability of the pharmaceutical product (including with regard to the costs associated with the [earn-out payments]), all as measured by the facts and circumstances in existence at the time such efforts are due.”

M&A Seller/Licensor Side:[5] The seller/licensor should define “Commercially Reasonable Efforts” with an objective standard benchmarked against similarly situated companies as the buyer/licensee, or if possible, an objective standard with specific minimum requirements.

“… shall use those efforts and resources consistent with the usual and customary practices of a similarly situated biopharmaceutical company in the development and exploitation of a drug product owned by or licensed to it, which drug product is at a similar stage of development, is in a similar therapeutic and disease area, and is of similar market potential and without regard to the costs associated with the [earn-out payments] [(provided that, in any event, the number of full time sales representatives of the Company with respect to the Product shall not fall below [___])][6].”

__________

[1] Himawan, et al. v. Cephalon, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 2018-0075-SG (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2024).

[2] In coming to this conclusion, the Court distinguished the current context from other cases involving CRE that the plaintiffs cited. In the current context, the buyer had complete discretion over development, cabined only by CRE. On the other hand, in the other cited cases, the merger agreement required the parties to use CRE to achieve one of the milestones as a precursor to consummation of the transaction, and to use reasonable best efforts to consummate the transaction. As a result, if the milestone did not occur and could prevent the completion of the merger, the buyer was affirmatively obligated to take all reasonable steps necessary to achieve the milestone in order to complete the merger.

[3] The plaintiffs had argued that companies with similar resources and expertise (specifically, Shire, Sanofi and Regeneron, Celgene, and GlaxoSmithKline) were pursuing products for treatment of EoE and thus suggesting that Cephalon/Teva was unreasonable in not pursuing approval in the indication. The Court found this to be an apples-to-oranges comparison that was unworkable.

[4] Also aligned with the perspective of the seller of a synthetic royalty interest.

[5] Also aligned with the perspective of the buyer of a synthetic royalty interest.

[6] Where the counterparty expects the expenditure of a minimum level of resources, consider setting an explicit floor for CRE (e.g., with reference to a minimum level of expenditures or minimum number of full-time-equivalent employees working to develop or commercialize the product).

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers prepared this update: Ryan A. Murr, Karen A. Spindler, Todd J. Trattner, Marina Szteinbok, and Artin Au-Yeung.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding the issues discussed in this update. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, the authors, or any leader or member of the firm’s Mergers & Acquisitions or Life Sciences practice groups:

Life Sciences:
Jane M. Love, Ph.D. – New York (+1 212.351.3922, [email protected])
Ryan Murr – San Francisco (+1 415.393.837, [email protected])
Karen Spindler – San Francisco (+1 415.393.8298, [email protected])
Todd Trattner – San Francisco (+1 415.393.8206, [email protected])

Mergers and Acquisitions:
Robert B. Little – Dallas (+1 214.698.3260, [email protected])
Saee Muzumdar – New York (+1 212.351.3966, [email protected])
Marina Szteinbok – New York (+1 212.351.4075, [email protected])

Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy, No. 22-1078 – Decided May 9, 2024

Today, the Supreme Court held 6-3 that a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for any timely claim of infringement, even if the infringement occurred more than three years before the suit’s filing.

“The Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to recover damages for any timely claim.”

Justice Kagan, writing for the Court

Background:

The Copyright Act requires that claims for copyright infringement be brought “within three years after the claim accrued.” 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). In 2018, independent record-label owner Sherman Nealy sued Warner Chappell Music, Inc. for alleged copyright infringement roughly a decade after the alleged infringement began, and almost three years after he allegedly discovered the infringement. Warner Chappell accepted that the claim accrued when the alleged infringement was discovered but argued that Nealy could only recover damages or profits for infringement occurring in the last three years, citing Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 572 U.S. 663, 672 (2014). The district court agreed with Warner Chappell but certified the question to the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed. The Eleventh Circuit assumed that the discovery rule governed the timeliness of the claim and held that the Copyright Act does not limit the time for collecting damages.

Issue:

Whether, under the discovery accrual rule applied by the circuit courts and the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit.

Court’s Holding:

Yes. Assuming (without deciding) that a copyright infringement claim is timely if brought within three years after the plaintiff discovered the alleged infringement, the plaintiff may recover damages for any infringement, even if it occurred more than three years before a lawsuit’s filing.

What It Means:

Justice Kagan, writing for a six-Justice majority, based the Court’s holding on the plain text of the Copyright Act. The Court noted that the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations specifies a three-year time limit for filing an infringement claim “after the claim accrued.” 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). By contrast, the Copyright Act’s remedial provisions do not specify any time limit for recovering damages and lost profits. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)-(c). Therefore, the Court concluded, “a copyright owner possessing a timely claim for infringement is entitled to damages, no matter when the infringement occurred.” Op. 5.
The Court acknowledged that some language in the Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 572 U.S. 663 (2014), could be read out of context to suggest a limit on the time a copyright plaintiff can recover retrospective relief. However, the Court explained that in the context of that case, the plaintiff had sued “only for infringements that occurred in the three years before her suit.” Op. 7.
Importantly, the Court expressly assumed (without deciding) that Nealy’s infringement claims were timely under the discovery rule of accrual. But the Court noted that the Court has “never decided whether that assumption is valid—i.e., whether a copyright claim accrues when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered an infringement, rather than when the infringement happened.” Op. 4.
Three Justices, in an opinion written by Justice Gorsuch and joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissented and would have dismissed the case as improvidently granted. The dissenters disagreed with the assumption that Nealy’s claims were valid under the discovery accrual rule because, in their view, the Copyright Act “almost certainly does not tolerate a discovery rule.” Dissenting Op. 1.
Today’s decision, along with the dissent, likely means that the Court will soon be asked to decide whether claims for copyright infringement are timely under the discovery accrual rule. If they are not—that is, if claims for infringement must be brought within three years of the infringement itself rather than its discovery—then the import of today’s decision may be limited.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the U.S. Supreme Court. Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders:

Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice

Thomas H. Dupree Jr. +1 202.955.8547 [email protected]	Allyson N. Ho +1 214.698.3233 [email protected]	Julian W. Poon +1 213.229.7758 [email protected]
Lucas C. Townsend +1 202.887.3731 [email protected]	Bradley J. Hamburger +1 213.229.7658 [email protected]	Brad G. Hubbard +1 214.698.3326 [email protected]

Related Practice: Media, Entertainment and Technology

Scott A. Edelman +1 310.557.8061 [email protected]	Kevin Masuda +1 213.229.7872 [email protected]	Benyamin S. Ross +1 213.229.7048 [email protected]
Jillian N. London +1 213.229.7671 [email protected]	Ilissa Samplin +1 213.229.7354 [email protected]	Brian C. Ascher +1 212.351.3989 [email protected]

Related Practice: Intellectual Property

Kate Dominguez +1 212.351.2338 [email protected]	Y. Ernest Hsin +1 415.393.8224 [email protected]	Josh Krevitt +1 212.351.4000 [email protected]
Jane M. Love, Ph.D. +1 212.351.3922 [email protected]	Howard S. Hogan +1 202.887.3640 [email protected]

This alert was prepared by partner Jillian London and associate Branton Nestor.