Dueling Court Rulings Offer Insight into ERISA Lawsuits Targeting Pension Risk Transfers
Client Alert | April 18, 2025
This update provides a brief overview of ERISA pension risk transfer litigation, a summary of the recent Camire and Konya decisions, and an update on what may be next for ERISA plan sponsors and fiduciaries in light of these court orders.
On March 28, 2025, two federal district courts issued divergent decisions on whether plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring class action lawsuits challenging pension risk transfer transactions under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The cases—Camire v. Alcoa USA Corp. and Konya v. Lockheed Martin Corp.—are two of ten class action lawsuits filed over the past 12 months targeting employers with substantial pension plans that have executed pension risk transactions with Athene Annuity & Life Assurance Company.[1] Plaintiffs rely for standing not on any reduction in their current benefits, but on allegations of an increased risk that, if Athene fails, they will not receive the benefits their pension plans guarantee them. These two decisions provide the earliest indications of how courts might rule on plaintiffs’ standing to bring this new wave of ERISA litigation. The court in Camire granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because they had received all benefits owed to them and were not at substantial risk of failing to receive future benefits. In contrast, the Konya court denied a similar motion to dismiss, finding that it was a “close call” but plaintiffs had stated sufficient facts to nudge that case into discovery.
Background on Pension Risk Transfers
Pension risk transfers, also known as de-risking transactions, are a mechanism used by employers to help reduce pension liabilities.[2] In a pension risk transfer, an employer causes its defined benefit pension plan to transfer some or all of its pension benefit obligations to an insurance company that in turn assumes responsibility for making payments to impacted pensioners.[3] The transfer reduces the plan’s liabilities to the pensioners (and thus the employer’s future funding risks), and the pensioners continue to receive benefits pursuant to the terms of their benefit plans (albeit from a different source).[4] These transfer transactions can be very large, extending into the hundreds of millions—or even billions—of dollars.[5]
Recent Litigation
Beginning in March 2024, pension recipients have brought a series of class action lawsuits against employers that engaged in pension risk transfers.[6] Many of the cases involve a private equity-backed insurance provider (Athene), which is not named as a defendant.[7] The plaintiffs in the cases argue that Athene is a particularly high risk annuity provider, and that plaintiffs’ employers, motivated by a desire for cost savings that was not in pensioners’ best interests, breached their fiduciary duties by failing to choose the safest annuity provider available.[8] The plaintiffs argue that the transfer puts their savings at risk by stripping them of federal protection available to them under ERISA and by instead placing them in the state-regulated insurance market, which, according to the plaintiffs, provides inferior protections in the case of insolvency compared to those available to them from the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.[9]
These pension risk transfer lawsuits recount the 1991 bankruptcy of California-based Executive Life Insurance Company, which resulted in financial losses to pension annuitants.[10] As a result of the incident, Congress passed the Pension Annuitants Protection Act of 1994, which created a right of action to obtain appropriate relief for ERISA violations involving the “purchase of an insurance contract or insurance annuity.”[11]
The plaintiffs also argue that the U.S. Department of Labor’s Interpretive Bulletin 95-1 requires employers to find the “safest annuity available” in the case of a de-risking transaction, unless doing otherwise would be in the interest of participants and the plan.[12] The complaints involving Athene allege that Athene’s private equity backing and structure demonstrate that the employer’s choice is out of alignment with this DOL guidance and ERISA.[13]
This new wave of lawsuits is not the first time that employers have been sued over pension de-risking. In 2012, a group of Verizon retirees sued Verizon in an attempt to prevent it from transferring $7.4 billion in pension obligations in exchange for a group annuity contract from Prudential.[14] After the pensioners lost their bid to enjoin the transfer, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately dismissed the case because the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing and the transfer did not breach Verizon’s ERISA obligations.[15]
In the present cases, the employers’ motions to dismiss argue that plaintiffs lack standing because, as in the 2012 Verizon case, plaintiffs cannot point to any concrete, imminent injury that they have suffered as a result of the pension risk transfers.[16] In other words, there is no evidence that any plaintiff is in imminent risk of not receiving a pension payment. And even if the plaintiffs did have standing, the motions argue, the decision whether to terminate an ERISA plan is a settlor function exempt from ERISA’s fiduciary obligations.[17]
The Recent Decisions
On March 28, 2025, two federal district courts ruled on employers’ motions to dismiss two of the pending pension risk transfer cases. Despite substantially similar allegations, the courts reached divergent conclusions, with one court granting a motion to dismiss on standing grounds and the other denying it (including a standing argument).
Camire v. Alcoa USA Corp.
On March 28, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted Alcoa’s motion to dismiss on standing grounds.[18] The court held that the plaintiffs had not established Article III standing because they had suffered neither actual harm nor was there a risk of future harm.[19] The plaintiffs had not suffered actual harm from the pension risk transfer to Athene because they continued to receive their benefit payments.[20] And the plaintiffs had not established future harm because they had not shown a sufficiently substantial risk of Athene being unable to fulfill its obligations under the annuity contract; instead, they merely alleged that Athene was “at a greater risk of failure than its competitors.”[21] The court relied heavily on the constitutional requirement that an injury be “imminent” for standing to exist.[22] A risk is not sufficiently “imminent” unless there is a “substantial probability of harm” to the plaintiff.[23] Because the court dismissed the lawsuit on standing grounds, it did not reach Alcoa’s arguments that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim.[24]
Konya v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
Conversely, on March 28, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied Lockheed Martin Corp.’s motion to dismiss.[25] The court held that the plaintiffs had standing and had stated a plausible claim that Lockheed Martin had violated ERISA by selecting Athene as its annuity provider.[26] The court explained that the plaintiffs had established Article III standing (albeit “barely”) because they “provided plausible allegations that the transfer to Athene put their pensions at serious risk” and that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation would not “provide a requisite backstop to protect their retirement,” thus potentially causing the plaintiffs harm.[27] The court added that the plaintiffs’ requested remedy, the posting of security and disgorgement, “would serve to protect their ability to receive their vested retirement benefits.”[28] The court went on to reject Lockheed Martin’s argument that the plaintiffs’ claims were unripe, explaining that, because the pension risk transfers had already occurred, the evidence needed to adjudicate the decision already existed and was not contingent on future events.[29] The court also explained that the plaintiffs had statutory standing because, although they were no longer participants in the plans at the time of the lawsuit (by virtue of being part of the pension risk transfer to Athene), they were participants at the time of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty.[30]
Because the court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of standing, it proceeded to address the merits of the ERISA claim. The court rejected Lockheed Martin’s arguments that the plaintiffs had failed to state an ERISA claim. With regard to the plaintiffs’ claims for breach of fiduciary duties and failure to monitor fiduciaries (which are not identified in the Complaint), the court held that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that Lockheed Martin was acting as a fiduciary and had “breached its fiduciary duty when it transacted with Athene to increase its own profits,” explaining that the plaintiffs need not show harm to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.[31] The court also declined to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim that Lockheed Martin had engaged in a prohibited transaction with Athene because “it is plausible enough that Lockheed acted for its own benefit in selecting Athene if, in fact, it proves true that the decision to choose Athene placed Lockheed’s interests, even if only in the short run, over those of participants in the Plans.”[32]
What’s Next for Plan Sponsors and Fiduciaries
It remains to be seen whether other courts will follow the lead of the courts in Camire or Konya or will forge a new path. The plaintiffs’ mixed record in these early cases may well be enough to suggest that plan sponsors and fiduciaries can expect to see more suits alleging claims related to pension risk transfers. Over the next year, the prognosis for these cases will no doubt become clearer as motions to dismiss that are currently pending in the remaining cases are decided. Additionally, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overruled Chevron deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of statutes, may impact whether and how much courts weigh the Department of Labor’s Interpretive Bulletin 95-1 when evaluating the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.[33] But for now, and absent further guidance from the courts or the Department of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin 95-1 remains in place and provides guidance to plan sponsors and fiduciaries when selecting an annuity provider as part of a de-risking transaction for an ERISA-governed pension plan.[34] Plan sponsors and fiduciaries evaluating de-risking transactions should review this guidance in connection with implementing any pension de-risking transaction.
[1] See Camire v. Alcoa USA Corp., No. 1:24-cv-01062, 2025 WL 947526 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2025); Konya v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 8:24-cv-00750, 2025 WL 962066 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2025).
[2] See Dept. of Labor Rpt. to Congress on Employee Benefits Security Administration’s Interpretive Bulletin 95-1 2–3, 5 (June 2024), available at https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/laws/secure-2.0/report-to-congress-on-interpretive-bulletin-95-1.pdf (last accessed Apr. 11, 2025).
[3] See id. at 3.
[4] See id.
[5] See id. at 5.
[6] See, e.g., Konya, No. 8:24-cv-00750 (D. Md. 2024); Camire, No. 1:24-cv-01062 (D.D.C. 2024); Doherty v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 1:24-cv-06628 (S.D.N.Y. 2024).
[7] See, e.g., Complaint, Konya, No. 8:24-cv-00750, at ¶ 3 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2024), ECF 1; Amended Complaint, Camire, No. 1:24-cv-01062, at ¶ 3 (D.D.C. July 2, 2024), ECF 28; Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Doherty, No. 1:24-cv-06628, at ¶ 3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2024), ECF 45.
[8] See Complaint, Konya, No. 8:24-cv-00750, at ¶¶ 3–4; Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Doherty, No. 1:24-cv-06628, at ¶¶ 29–30.
[9] See Complaint, Konya, No. 8:24-cv-00750, at ¶¶ 30–32; Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Doherty, No. 1:24-cv-06628, at ¶¶ 68–69.
[10] See Complaint, Konya, No. 8:24-cv-00750, at ¶ 33; Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Doherty, No. 1:24-cv-06628, at ¶¶ 75–76.
[11] See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(9); see also Complaint, Konya, No. 8:24-cv-00750, at ¶ 39; Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Doherty, No. 1:24-cv-06628, at ¶¶ 80–82.
[12] See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1(d); see also Complaint, Konya, No. 8:24-cv-00750, at ¶ 21; Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Doherty, No. 1:24-cv-06628, at ¶ 86.
[13] See Complaint, Konya, No. 8:24-cv-00750, at ¶ 60; Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Doherty, No. 1:24-cv-06628, at ¶ 149.
[14] See Lee v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 837 F.3d 523, 532 (5th Cir. 2016).
[15] Id. at 529–31.
[16] See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Konya, No. 8:24-cv-00750, at 2 (D. Md. May 3, 2024), ECF 26-1; Memorandum of Law in Support of the Bristol-Myers Squibb Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Complaint, Doherty, No. 1:24-cv-06628, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2025), ECF 51.
[17] See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Konya, No. 8:24-cv-00750, at 2; Memorandum of Law in Support of the Bristol-Myers Squibb Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Complaint, Doherty, No. 1:24-cv-06628, at 2.
[18] See Camire v. Alcoa USA Corp., No. 1:24-cv-01062, 2025 WL 947526 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2025).
[19] Id. at *4, *7.
[20] Id. at *4.
[21] Id. at *7.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] See id. at *8.
[25] See Konya v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 8:24-cv-00750, 2025 WL 962066 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2025).
[26] Id. at *13, *17–18.
[27] Id. at *10.
[28] Id. at *9.
[29] Id. at *15.
[30] Id. at *14.
[31] Id. at *16–17.
[32] Id. at *18.
[33] See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).
[34] Dept. of Labor, News Release, UPDATED: US Department of Labor issues report to Congress on considerations for defined benefit pension plan fiduciaries choosing an annuity provider, available at https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20240624 (last accessed Apr. 11, 2025); see also Dept. of Labor Rpt. to Congress on Employee Benefits Security Administration’s Interpretive Bulletin 95-1 (June 2024), available at https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/laws/secure-2.0/report-to-congress-on-interpretive-bulletin-95-1.pdf (last accessed Apr. 11, 2025).
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